

THE
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REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantium sive confitentum.

S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

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THE SOUL AND EVOLUTION.

Habit and Intelligence. By J. J. Murphy. Second edition. Macmillan, 1879.

Problems of Life and Mind. By G. H. Lewes. Trübner, 1880.

Life and Habit. By Samuel Butler. Bogue, 1878.

Evolution, Old and New. By Samuel Butler. Bogue, 1879.

Unconscious Memory. By Samuel Butler. Bogue, 1880.

Evolution, Expression, and Sensation. By John Cleland, M.D., F.R.S.
Glasgow: Maclehose, 1881.

Ouvres Complètes de Diderot. By J. Assézat and Maurice Tourneux.
Paris: Garnier Frères, 1875-1877.

GREAT indeed is the difference between the appreciation which philosophy receives now and the estimation in which it was held some forty years ago. In this latter part of the nineteenth century we find philosophical questions discussed on all sides with the greatest interest, and there is no, even monthly, journal of any repute which does not from time to time put forth a more or less decidedly metaphysical article. Nevertheless we sometimes meet with a restatement of the old objection (to such questions) which grounds itself on the fact, that therein our attention is again and again called to the same fundamental questions by fresh thinkers. This seems to show that no real progress can be possible in such a pursuit; for were it possible, could questions which seem for a time finally settled be thus repeatedly reopened for fresh discussion? In defence of philosophy we might call attention to the disappointment which often attends well-meant efforts in other fields of human activity, which must nevertheless continue

to be assiduously cultivated. How often do not the results of political changes disappoint the expectations of their best informed and most zealous supporters? But the reply is obvious. The conditions of human life are too complex to admit of safe predictions as to the total results of such changes; for, granted that any given political change shall produce the main result directly aimed at, how many indirect and unforeseen consequences may not also ensue with more or less disastrous effect upon the total result? Justly, then, it might be replied that the difficulties attending sagacious political foresight are no excuse for non-success in the region of pure intellect, and that the non-success of philosophy is shown by its want of progress and by the absence of such stability as is a necessary condition for all progress. The systems of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel were each greeted with a chorus of praise and happy augury. Each has indeed produced important consequences, but certainly not the consequences predicted. The same may be said of the systems of the many other gifted men who have made a name in modern philosophy,—Spinoza, Leibnitz, Mallebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Schelling, Oken, Cousin, Reid, Hamilton, and the many others whose names will readily occur to our readers. There is, then, much truth in the objection above referred to, and it must be admitted to apply to most of the philosophy with which the reading public has a general acquaintance. Nevertheless we venture to affirm that the objection does not apply to all systems. We affirm that it does not apply to one which is the main (we would say the only) truly philosophical system: The system we refer to can boast of a continued growth through many centuries. It arose when the subtle Greek intellect had begun to weary itself in fruitless attempts to explain the mystery of the universe it loved to contemplate, now by the aid of a single idea, now by some form of materialism. From the midst of that mental chaos arose and towered the gigantic mind of Aristotle, and order became established. From that day to this the peripatetic system, which his genius developed, has never lacked devoted adherents. Gathering to itself the profoundest and most acute intellects of the mediæval period, and subsequently enriched by the labors of later thinkers, that system, though for a time obscured and too generally unappreciated, has been gradually regaining favor, and now promises once more to direct the minds of men from Quebec to Buenos Ayres and from Inverness to Mindanao. Among the many claims of different Supreme Pontiffs on the veneration and gratitude of posterity, few will exceed that of Leo XIII. as the zealous restorer and promoter of the study of this philosophy. The failure of the many exemplary French controversialists in their struggles with the Materialists of the eighteenth century was largely due to the extent to which the view of such thinkers as Descartes and

Mallebranche had been allowed to replace the traditional philosophy in the education of the clergy. Far different will be the result when the impetus given by our present spiritual sovereign has had time to spread and do its work, and shall have formed a new generation and produced thinkers saturated with peripatetic doctrines, and able to freely express them in the ordinary language of the culture of their day. We deny, then, altogether that the charges of instability and want of progress apply to this philosophy. At the same time no reasonable man could expect that in such a subject as philosophy any conspicuous progress should take place such as that which we see in the physical sciences. The latter repose upon the reiterated observations of, and experiments amongst, a multitude of new and ever freshly grouped phenomena. But the main facts upon which philosophy reposes were fully as open to observation four or five thousand years ago as they are now, nor were minds wanting as able to appreciate them as are our own. It will be long before we shall be able to dispense with Greek models in art and literature, nor perhaps will the earth ever see again an intellectual society such as once was that of Athens.

If these views be correct, a wise thinker will not even desire to claim fundamental novelty for any philosophical doctrine he may promulgate, but rather seek to master any leading problem of his day by means of new applications of old principles. Such a thinker, far from following the example of so many moderns and seeking to construct his philosophic edifice from foundation stone to topmost pinnacle entirely by himself, will recognize the fact that a stable structure of the kind can only be raised by building upon the solid foundation of antecedent teachers.

Such was the course pursued by our modest predecessors of the emphatically philosophic ages in the developments they gave to the palace of science. One such philosopher has been content, as it were, to enlarge a loophole into an oriel window; another has raised some turrets to a more commanding elevation; a third has devoted himself to the improvement of internal communications; while a fourth has spent himself in the adornment of some chamber of his choice. It is in the footsteps of such workers that we would seek to follow.

The very opposite course is that which most recent speculators have pursued, and the consequence naturally is that modern philosophic progress (if "progress" it can be called) takes place emphatically by "action and reaction." An illustration of one such oscillation—one now taking place before our eyes—is afforded by the works, the titles of which head this article. In them we see more or less distinct signs of the growing revulsion against that purely mechanical explanation of nature which was the ideal of Descartes, and which, as regards living beings, has culminated in

the hypothesis of "natural selection." The fashion of late has been, and amongst the less advanced still is, to regard the idea of "*matter in motion*" as giving us a truer and deeper conception of the realities of the world than the idea of "*intelligence acting with purpose*." But by degrees the facts of nature have forced one observer after another to admit that the attempt to exclude "intelligence" and "purpose" from the activities of the living world is inadmissible. "Pitiless logic" has indeed led some materialistic¹ writers to accept the extreme consequence of their principles, and to affirm that (since they are conscious automata) their own reason can in no way be a cause of their own actions. To healthy minds, however, this consequence can be but a proof of the absurdity of the principles whence it necessarily results. It is not wonderful that persons who are convinced that their own actions neither are, nor can be, directed by their own intelligence to rational ends should fail to see "intelligence" and "purpose" in external nature. But the normally constituted mind will not contemplate the admirable organization of such an animal as the horse, the dexterous nest-building of the bird, or the provision by the mother insect for the future welfare of a progeny she is never destined to behold, without recognizing that somehow and in some sense "intelligent purpose" is therein made manifest.

The intellectual vision of mankind is, however, like its bodily vision, not free from defects inherent in the mechanism which subserves it, wonderful as are the accuracy and range of either power. Our intellect, directed by our will, may be compared to a well-appointed microscope which is able, now to show clearly the outer surface of some transparent animalcule, now to reveal the details of its structure at successive depths beneath that surface. But with our highest powers we can only explore these strata successively, and as each stratum is brought into focus, the stratum which before was clearly seen becomes in turn indistinct. Thus it is both with regard to the highest truths our minds can reach after, and with the progress made, as one school of opinion succeeds another, just, again, as it is only by combining intellectually, the views obtained as we bring the different strata of a microscopic object into focus, so it is only by carefully pondering over the teachings of the past and combining it with recent knowledge that we can obtain a complete grasp of such higher truths as our intellect has been constructed to attain to. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at if some excellent persons who have come to perceive the incompleteness of one popular and partial view of things turn at once to some other view, not less partial, without pausing to seek

¹ Not precisely "Materialists" because they profess a sort of idealism. This idealism is, however, but an affair of parade. Practically they are Materialists, and so may be well spoken of as "materialistic."

for a complete conception which may embrace and harmonize the truths exhibited by the several partial views. Truth, indeed, must be discoverable in each such apparently discordant view. It is not likely that able men should write mere nonsense; nor, on the other hand, that a variety of independent thinkers should fall into the same error, unless that error was the incomplete expression of some really important truth. What is the natural antithesis to the error which would exclude all intelligence, all purpose, and all will from the actions of the sentient animal world and from the unconscious operations of organized nature? Surely it is the attribution of intelligence, purpose, and will to the very animals and plants themselves, and even to the being and operation of mere inorganic nature. Thus the recoil from the former conception, when its unreasonableness comes to be realized, tends to overpass the golden mean and to result in an error of a directly opposite nature. The golden mean must be the recognition of the truth contained in both these opposed conceptions. Our endeavor, therefore, will be to make evident what we believe to be this conciliating truth. This truth, we think, may be expressed as follows: The organic world is, in one sense, not only unconscious but devoid of intellect, and, therefore, also devoid both of purpose and of will; yet, in another sense, it is, as it were, a very incarnation of intelligence, replete with purpose and palpitating with volition.

That the revulsion from one of the above described views to the other is now actually taking place, is a fact clearly recognized by others besides ourselves, the following words¹ will show: "We are growing conscious that our earnest and most determined efforts to make motion produce sensation and volition have proved a failure. And now we want to rest a little in the opposite, much less laborious conjecture, and allow any kind of motion to start into existence, or at least to receive its pacific direction from psychical sources: Sensation and volition being for the purpose quietly insinuated into the constitution of the ultimately moving particles."

These mental attributes are, however, far from being only quietly insinuated into the material constituents of bodies. Their presence there is openly and unequivocally affirmed, as we shall presently see. The central point of the whole controversy is the question: *What is instinct?* In what sense may the intellectual conceptions and the purposive volitions, thereby manifested, be said to be those of the animals performing instinctive actions; and in what sense are such actions divorced from consciousness? If intellect and will are absolutely therein present, it seems to follow that they

¹ The Unity of the Organic Individual, by Edward Montgomery. Mind, October, 1880, p. 477. Quoted by Mr. Butler in Unconscious Memory, p. 274.

may be attributed to inorganic nature also. If they are only therein present in an analogical sense, but are absolutely those of another being, then, *a fortiori*, must all such "intellect," "purpose," and "volition," as the lower orders of creation display, be also the "intellect," "purpose," and "volition" of that other being. As Schelling has said: "Thoughtful minds will hold the phenomena manifested in animal instinct to belong to the most important of all phenomena, and to be the true touchstone of a durable philosophy."

But in order to see more clearly what we are about, let us consider certain actions, which all persons will agree to call "instinctive." Let us, for example, consider those of the carpenter bee. In order to protect her eggs, she will excavate in wood a series of chambers, one above another, separated by partitions; the lowest chamber communicating with the exterior. She lays an egg in each chamber, beginning with the lowest. From that lowest the offspring escapes by the passage left for it. The inhabitant of the chamber next above gnaws through the floor of its dwelling, and makes its way out by the same path as did its predecessor. The inhabitants of the superior chambers then act similarly in succession. Evidently this complex nest has been constructed with a view to the future actions of the progeny; but as evidently the young mother could have no conscious knowledge of the series of actions which were to ensue when she made it. Again, the wasp *sphex* will hunt about till she finds some thriving caterpillar or corpulent spider, which she pounces on and stings in a certain spot, so as entirely to paralyze it, yet without killing it. This done, she stows away the helpless victim along with her eggs. Why is this? Because the shapeless grub destined to emerge from her eggs will need for its nourishment living insect food—food which, unless thus paralyzed, it would be quite helpless either to pursue or grapple with. One species of wasp thus preys on a large kind of grasshopper, which she stings and then throws on its back, bending back its head, so as to get at the delicate membrane between the joints of its armor. This is then bitten through, and a special nervous ganglion (there concealed) is reached and mutilated, and so the wasp's purpose is effected. Another kind covers the cell in which her progeny is concealed so carefully with sand that human eyes cannot distinguish its place. Yet she knows it, and comes from time to time to give fresh food to her young. While it remains thus hidden, she is always able to find her carefully concealed treasure; but if the surface of the earth be removed, and the passage to the cell be left open, then, instead of her finding her way more easily, she becomes quite at a loss, and does not even seem to recognize her offspring. Here we have a case of

purely instinctive activity. As to the *sphex* above noticed, can it be said that the parent insect had any conscious knowledge of the purpose of its actions? Evidently this is impossible; but no less impossible is it not to see intelligent purpose and foreknowledge in her every action. How constantly do moths and butterflies lay their eggs on plants which will be useful to their young, but which are useless to the parents themselves. It may even be that the parents do not feed at all, and it would be a strong thing to say that they recollect what they did before they entered on the chrysalis condition, and that they consciously foresee that their eggs will give birth to creatures such as they themselves once were. Still more incredible is it, however, that a grub should foresee the shape of that body into which it is destined to be transformed, especially when this is widely different in the two sexes. Yet the grub of the female stag-beetle, when she digs the hole wherein she will undergo her metamorphosis, digs it no bigger than her own body; whereas, the grub of the male stag-beetle makes a hole twice as big as its own body, in order to leave room for the enormous jaws (its so-called "horns") which it will have to grow.

Again, let us consider the actions of the caterpillar of the Emperor moth. "It eats the leaves of the bush upon which it is born; at the utmost has just enough sense to get on to the lower sides of the leaves if its begins to rain, and from time to time changes its skin. This is its whole existence, which certainly does not lead us to expect a display of any, even the most limited, intellectual power. When, however, the time comes for the larva of this moth to become a chrysalis, it spins for itself a double cocoon, fortified with bristles that point outwards, so that it can be opened easily from within, though it is sufficiently impenetrable from without. If this contrivance were the result of conscious reflection, we should have to suppose some such reasoning process as the following to take place in the mind of the caterpillar: 'I am about to become a chrysalis, and, motionless as I must be, shall be exposed to many different kinds of attack. I must therefore weave myself a web. But when I am a moth I shall not be able, as some moths are, to find my way out of it by chemical or mechanical means; therefore I must leave a way open for myself. In order, however, that my enemies may not take advantage of this, I will close it with elastic bristles, which I can easily push asunder from within, but which, upon the principle of the arch, will resist all pressure from without.' Surely this is asking rather too much from a poor caterpillar; yet the whole of the foregoing must be thought out if a correct result is to be arrived at."¹

¹ From Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* as translated in Mr. Butler's *Unconscious Memory*, p. 165. Therein also the example of the Stag-beetle's grub is cited.

It is in the class of insects that we find "instinct" most strikingly exemplified. But it is clearly present both in the highest animals, and in creatures so lowly that it is a question whether they really merit to be called animals. The Rhizopods are creatures many of which are but minute and irregularly shaped specks of living jelly, without structure and without organs, save that they from time to time protrude portions of their substance (to serve as arms or fingers) which portion they can again withdraw within their shapeless bodies. As Dr. Carpenter says,¹ "We can scarcely conceive that a creature of such simplicity should possess any distinct consciousness of its needs, or that it should be directed by any intention of its own; and yet results of the most singular elaborateness have been found to be wrought out by these minute 'jelly-specks,' which build up 'tests' or casings of the most regular geometrical symmetry of form, and of the most artificial construction. Suppose a human mason to be put down by the side of a pile of stones of various shapes and sizes, and to be told to build up a dome of these, smooth on both surfaces, without using more than the least possible quantity of a very tenacious but very costly element in holding the stones together. If he accomplished this well, he would receive credit for great intelligence and skill. Yet this is exactly what these jelly-specks do on a most minute scale; the tests they construct when highly magnified, bearing comparison with the most skilful masonry of man. From the same sandy bottom one series picks up the coarser quartz grains, cements them together with phosphate of iron secreted from its own substance, and thus constructs a flask-shaped test having a short neck and a single large orifice. Another picks up the finest grains and puts them together with the same cement into perfectly spherical tests of the most extraordinary finish, perforated with numerous small pores at regular intervals. Another selects the minutest sand-grains and the terminal portions of sponge-spicules, and works these up together,—apparently with no cement at all, by the mere laying of the spicules,—into perfect white spheres, like homœopathic globules, each having a single fissured orifice. And another, which makes a straight many-chambered test, that resembles in form the many-chambered shell of an Orthoceratite, the conical mouth of each chamber projecting into the cavity of the next,—while forming the walls of its chambers of ordinary sand-grains rather loosely held together, shapes the conical mouths of the successive chambers by firmly cementing together grains of ferruginous quartz, which it must have picked out from the general mass."

¹ Dr. Carpenter's Mental Physiology, p. 41, quoted by Mr. Murphy in *Habit and Intelligence*, p. 409.

Mr. Murphy remarks¹ as to these phenomena: "It would be difficult to imagine any clearer proof of unconscious intelligence than these, especially the last; and they appear inexplicable as results of either self-adaptation or natural selection. They would be so even if this architectural power were possessed by only one species; but the difficulty of so explaining them, is greatly, perhaps we may say indefinitely, increased by the variety of the structures." Reserving our objections to the expression "unconscious intelligence" as here used, these remarks are perfectly just and reasonable.

Turning now from creatures so greatly inferior to insects to other creatures which are much higher than insects,—namely, birds,—we find that Mr. Spalding has experimentally shown that chickens, two minutes after they have left the egg, can follow with their eyes the movements of crawling insects and peck at them, judging distance and direction with almost infallible accuracy. He has also proved that they can instinctively judge of the direction of sounds, and will readily run towards a hen hidden away in a box, apprehending her position by the sound of her "call" alone. He has besides ascertained that some young birds have an innate, instinctive horror of the sight of a hawk and of the sound of its voice. A young turkey which he had taken under his care when it was still chirping within its uncracked egg-shell, was, on the tenth morning of its hatched life, eating its breakfast from his hand, when a young hawk in an adjacent cupboard gave a shrill chip, chip, chip. "Like an arrow the poor turkey shot to the other side of the room, and stood there motionless and dumb with fear, until the hawk gave a second cry, when it darted out at the open door, right to the extreme end of the passage, and there, silent and crouched in a corner, remained for ten minutes." The same observer found that swallows, titmice, tomtits, and wrens, after having been confined from birth so that they could not use their wings, were capable of flying successfully at once, when liberated, on their wings, having attained the necessary growth to render flight possible.

Even in man, there are many "instinctive" actions, such as that by which the infant first sucks the nipple, and that by which it swallows the thence extracted nourishment the first time it fills its mouth therewith.

But admirable as is the precision of instinctive action, it is not absolutely invariable; and is, generally, the more capable of modification the higher is the animal possessing it. It is indeed liable to be affected by such understanding (sensuous cognition) as the

¹ Habit and Intelligence, p. 410.

higher animals can call into play. No unprejudiced observer will question that animals can acquire a serviceable knowledge of external objects and of the material relations (relative positions, etc.) of such objects, or that they can thence draw practical conclusions. Wherever such a power exists, it might be expected to modify instinctive actions, and therefore we cannot reasonably be surprised to find birds sometimes building their nests in a manner slightly different from that of their race, whether as to situation or materials. In animals then, we undeniably meet with true instinct which is occasionally modified by such cognitive power as they may have, and such "instinct" appears to be an innate power of performing intelligently purposive actions (in response to sensations and imaginations excited by sensations) for ends not consciously foreseen and intended by the animals which perform the actions.

How is this blind but admirably calculated activity explicable? Evidently there is "reason" somehow in it; in what way may its presence there be most rationally regarded?

Mr. Murphy and Mr. Butler with Professor Hering and von Hartmann, believe that this "reason" exists absolutely, though unconsciously, in the very animals themselves.

The ordinarily received belief, on the other hand, is that the "reason" manifested in instinctive actions, is the Divine reason of the Creator who has implanted such powers in his sentient creatures. But those who are so happy as to be able to accept this belief are not thereby dispensed from inquiries as to the *modes* in which that Divinely implanted power energizes, and into any secondary causes which may be therewith connected.

Let us first consider the hypothesis of innate, unconscious intelligence as the cause of instinctive actions. Now, it is plain that no intelligence could act so as to adjust "means" to "ends," except by the aid of memory. No mere instantaneously existing intelligence could carry on a series of consecutive actions for a distinct purpose. Therefore the presence of an "unconscious memory" is a necessary condition¹ of "unconscious intelligence." This has been seen and admitted by the authors whose works we are here considering, and by Professor Hering, and it will simplify our task if, before directly addressing ourselves to the problem of "instinct," we first consider "memory."

Now "memory," as an ultimate part of our intellect, is incapable of explanation. We all know that it exists; we all know that we every now and then direct our attention to try and recall something which we know we have for the moment forgotten, and

¹ Mr. Herbert Spencer declares (*Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 444) "memory" to be "a kind of incipient instinct," and "instinct" to be "a kind of organized memory." How far this is true will appear later on.

which we instantly recognize when we have recalled it. When we reflect, we also see clearly that we are the same person we were yesterday, and that we can recollect some of the events of that day. Besides this kind of voluntary memory, we are sometimes startled by the flashing forth into consciousness of something we had forgotten, and which we were so far from trying to recollect that we were thinking of something entirely different. Thus, for example, a man deeply engaged in studying metaphysics may come upon a name which recalls into vivid consciousness the recollection of an old sweetheart. Here, then, we have a second variety of memory in which the conscious intellect comes into play.

But we often perform acts such as the following: We start to go to a shop situate in a distant part of our native city. As we go along we get immersed in speculations as to the probable effects of some political event on the price of stock. All the sights and sounds about us become lost to consciousness, or only arouse it feebly and instantaneously. We are, as they say, "lost in thought." Yet we do not miss our way along the familiar road; each turning, each crossing, is accurately effected, and it may be we are only roused from our reverie by the sight of the shop we set out to reach. Again, a young lady has by much labor and persevering attention, acquired a perfect facility in playing, on the piano, Chopin's Second Nocturne. While she is playing it she talks to a gentleman who she thinks is near making her an offer. Her consciousness is absorbed in attending to his words, his tone and manner, with mental side glances at possibilities as to fortune, temper, and other matters. Yet she never falters in her playing, nor do the long-practiced delicate distinctions as to the force and prolongation of pressure with which the different keys should be struck, for a moment fail. The dreamy tenderness of the simple melody loses none of its beauty; yet her consciousness is so far from being directed to the actions of her fingers that, were she so to direct it, the probability is that her execution would be thereby impaired. Almost every one who plays the piano knows how often a melody once learned, but now in part forgotten, can be best recalled by studiously turning the mind away to something else, while an effort is made to play it automatically.

Can these effects be said to be due to memory? Most certainly they can, for ordinary speech so employs that word; and we are said to "remember perfectly" what we can automatically effect with absolute accuracy.

Let us note, however, that though these actions may be performed unconsciously, we have nevertheless the power of intellec-

tually noting them when they occur and as they occur. In the same way the reminiscences that rise unbidden into consciousness are duly noted by it when they have arisen; so that all these powers have a distinct relation, of one kind or another, to consciousness itself. The unconscious memory of the pianist (while unconscious) is called "memory," analogically, the type of "memory" being that conscious memory, the recognition of which alone enables us to affirm that such a thing as memory exists at all. We may, then, to prevent ambiguity, distinguish such "unconscious memory" as "*sensuous memory*."

But, upon the recurrence of certain sensations, our organism constantly and accurately repeats a variety of other acts, which acts never rise into consciousness at all. A man, wrecked on an island inhabited by savages, and long dwelling there, may at first have the due action of his digestive organs impeded by the unwonted food on which he may have to live. After a little, however, the evil diminishes, and in time his organism may have "learnt" how to correspond perfectly with the new conditions. Then, with each fresh meal, the alimentary canal and glands must practically "recognize" a return of the recently obtained experience, and repeat its freshly acquired power of healthy response thereto. Can "memory" be properly predicated of such actions of the alimentary glands? It can be so predicated only by a strained analogy, such as is permissible in poetry, but not in sober science. It is not "memory," because not only is it divorced from consciousness as it occurs, but (unlike the finger-action of the pianist) it cannot anyhow be made present to consciousness.

Again, a boy at school has had a kick at foot-ball which has left a deep scar on his leg. That boy, now become an old man, still bears the same scar, though all his tissues have been again and again transformed in the course of seventy years. Is the constant reproduction of this mark an act of "memory," or can it, in any reasonable sense, be said to be due to memory? Evidently, if such actions as these are to be called acts of "memory" at all, they must, if we would avoid the greatest confusion, be distinguished by some very distinct term from all those acts in which consciousness can possibly intervene.

Besides, then, such repeated human actions as can be properly said to be due to memory, there are other actions which are capable of due repetition under the stimulus of sensation or innervation, and which are more or less modifiable by circumstances, but which cannot be said to be acts of, or due to, memory in the proper sense of that word.

But there are a number of phenomena which appear to be of an intermediate character; a multitude of actions which are at first

performed as the result of study and with the undoubted aid of memory, come subsequently performed in an automatic manner. Reading and writing are excellent examples of such a transformation. We have also many instances of curious lapses and recoveries of memory. But no example can be brought forward of acquired actions coming to be performed with such absolute unconsciousness as are those unfelt responses of our visceral organs by which they continue to repeat acts the facility to perform which has been gained by physical experience.

It appears then that we may distinguish in ourselves four kinds of repeated actions:

A. Those which result from voluntary effort, and which we may distinguish as due to true volitional memory: *Recollection*.

B. Those which arise spontaneously in the intellectual memory, and which we may distinguish as due to involuntary action: *Reminiscence*.

C. Those which are carried on without consciousness, but the power to perform which was gained through conscious memory, and which can be performed consciously. Such actions, while out of consciousness, must be quite distinguished from conscious memory, as *memory improperly so called* or *sensuous memory*. Such a power in ourselves may enable us to understand the memory of irrational animals.

D. Besides the above three kinds of repeated actions, we may distinguish others which may be only very remotely, if at all, compared with memory, since they can never be brought within consciousness. Such are the actions of the alimentary canal, before referred to, or those by which a scar is perpetuated. If such actions were to be called "memory," in any sense, they would have to be distinguished as acts of "organic memory." Such mere "organic repetition" may be distinguished as acts of "*organic habit*."

Animals show plainly that they have a certain power of memory, but we have no need to attribute to any of them, even to the highest, true consciousness. That animals are "conscious" in the sense in which that term is commonly and loosely used, is of course to be admitted. They have sensations, imaginations, sensuous cognitions, and emotions, with a power of grouping these into most complex aggregations. The animal has its undoubted psychical activity, and feels itself a unity, all its varied sensations converging to a common psychical centre. As Mr. Lewes has well said,¹ "It has sentience, but not consciousness."

What then is "consciousness?" As we know it in ourselves, it is the perception of self, not as a vague feeling of unity (a mere syn-

¹ Physical Basis of Mind, p. 362.

thesis of sensations and sensuous relations), but an intellectual separation of the conscious being from all that is external to it. It is most evident when we, by a reflex act, perceive our own thought and perceive that it is ours. Every one must admit that we *have* this intellectual power; and since we have it, it is no wonder that such intellectuality flows over into (as it were) and accompanies all our higher psychical activity, direct as well as reflex. Every one must also admit that we have the power of abstraction—of knowing relations *as* relations; the past *as* past, and the future *as* future. In a word, man is a creature “looking before and after.” He is capable of knowing his successive states of feeling *as a series*, and of synthesizing perceptions, anticipations, and recollections in a single intellectual act. This is what no animal can do, and thus a deep gulf yawns between the conscious and the unconscious.

How then may we explain those seemingly contradictory experiences which show that even in us “the conscious” continually lapses into “the unconscious,” and that we may actually in ourselves detect habits and quasi-instincts in the very making—use being “second nature?”

The explanation does not seem to be far to seek. Let it be once conceded that there is in man an intellectual power or principle, different in kind from the cognitive faculties of animals, yet subserved by an organization similar to that of animals, and all difficulty disappears. Our rational energy—our active intellect—has the power of voluntarily attending to and so developing its own action, as subserved by those sensuous acts which support it and which exist (though without true intellect) in animals also. Thus by attention the intellect can by degrees knit together physical actions (such, *e. g.*, as those by which we read or write), and so voluntarily form a sort of new instinctive habit. This once sufficiently done, the higher psychical activity which temporarily accompanies such actions may be withdrawn, in order to be applied to other work—to fresh conquests, as it were, if mere animality. When thus withdrawn the organism is, in a certain sense, left free and abandoned to its mere automatic quasi-animal activity, the merely instinctive organic process (which had been developed by intellectual attention), then going on automatically and unconsciously. Were it not for this power which we have of withdrawing the exercise of our higher psychical powers from one form of activity to expend it on another, our intellectual power would be absorbed and wasted in the merest routine work, and we could either make no progress, or could only progress with extreme slowness and almost unconquerable difficulty. Hence the great advantage of the use of symbols, and hence the unconsciousness with work comes to be done, the power to perform which has

only been acquired through the intervention of laborious and reiterated acts of consciousness.

To return to the question as to the nature of instinct. We are now in a position to state accurately in what sense "memory" can or cannot be predicated of various kinds of actions.

If we once extended the signification of the word "memory" to a power of repetition altogether beyond consciousness and beyond what we have distinguished as "sensuous memory," we may be logically compelled to extend its use very widely. If we allow that the instinctive actions of animals are due to true "memory," we cannot well refuse the same appellation to the repetition of visceral, or merely organic and unfelt animal actions, and—since we may fairly say that anything must "know" what it "remembers"—we may be driven to use the term "knowledge" in a sense as vague and wide as we have already used the term "memory." To this question we will return; but in the meantime we must affirm that Mr. Butler is not only perfectly logical and consistent in the startling consequences which he deduces from such principles, but also that gratitude is due to him for the force and vigor with which he has brought those consequences forward.

Adopting the principles he has, he is quite consequent in representing as he does, that not only the actions of adult animals are full of knowledge and purpose; but that the same qualities exist in its immature and embryonic condition.

Thus he says: ¹"There is no man in the whole world who knows consciously and articulately, as much as a half-hatched hen's egg knows unconsciously." "The chicken grows a horny beak-tip, because it knows that it will want it." Again, he affirms: ²"Each step of normal development will lead the impregnate ovum up to, and remind it of its next ordinary course of action in the same way as we, when we recite a well-known passage."

But this position leads him to still stranger consequences, in which, moreover, he is supported by the authority of Professor Hering. He not only, on the one hand, attributes unconscious intelligence and purpose to the several component cells of which any organism³ may be built up, but, on the other hand, identifies as being but one single individual, the parent together with the offspring.⁴ With respect to the inheritance of parental peculiarities, Professor Hering⁵ declares it to be "as wonderful as when a gray

¹ *Life and Habit*, p. 61.

² *L. C.*, p. 207.

³ *L. C.*, Chap. VIII., "subordinate personalities."

⁴ *L. C.*, Chapters V., VI., and VIII.

⁵ In his lecture delivered at Vienna, on May 30th, 1870, and translated in *Unconscious Memory*, p. 123.

haired man remembers the events of his own childhood, but not more so; since the young organism is but a continuation of the parent organism, so that we may say the same organized substance is again reproducing its past experience."

The identity of succeeding generations is an opinion which was, however, independently arrived at by Mr. Butler; he says:¹ "A chrysalis is much one and the same person with the chrysalis of its preceding generation, as this last is one and the same person with the egg or caterpillar from which it sprung. You cannot deny personal identity between two successive generations, without sooner or later denying it during the successive stages in the single life of what we call one individual; nor can you admit much personal identity through the stages of a long and varied life (embryonic and postnatal), without admitting it to endure through an endless series of generations." If, therefore, organic life had a single origin, "all living animals and vegetables are in reality one person, and unite to form a body corporate, of whose existence, however, they are unconscious. There is an obvious analogy between this and the manner in which the component cells of our bodies unite to form one single individuality."²

Of course with this community of life and unconscious intelligence, community of unconscious memory is included, and instinct becomes inherited memory.³ Thus not only the development of the individual, but also the evolution of each new species is due to purposive but unconscious actions, due that is to the activity of the creatures themselves, who unknowingly will the requisite changes. This is also the belief of Professor Hering, who says: "An organized being stands before us as a product of the unconscious memory of organized matter. . . . Thus regarded, the developments of one of the more highly organized animals represents a continuous series of organized recollections concerning the past developments of the great chain of living forms, the last link of which stands before us in the particular animal we may be considering."

Mr. Butler says:⁴ "Can we, or can we not see signs in the structure of animals and plants, of something which carries with it the idea of contrivance so strongly, that it is impossible for us to think of the structure without at the same time thinking of contrivance, or design, in connection with it?" He strongly affirms "design," but who is the designer he presents to us? He answers:⁵ "We can and do point to a living tangible person, . . . who did of his own cunning . . . scheme out and fashion each organ of the human

¹ Unconscious Memory, p. 251.

³ Life and Habit, chap. XI.

⁵ L. C., p. 30.

² L. C., p. 80.

⁴ Evolution, Old and New, p. 1.

body. This is the person whom we claim as the designer of the this body, and he is the one of all others the best fitted for the task by his antecedents, and his practical knowledge of the requirements of the case—for he is man himself. Not man, the individual of any given generation; but man in the entirety of his existence from the dawn of life, onward to the present moment. In like manner, we say that the designer of all organisms is so incorporate with the organisms themselves—so lives, moves, and has its being in those organisms, and is so one with them—they in it, and it in them—that it is more consistent with reason and the common use of words to see the designer of each living form in the living form itself, than to look for its designer in some other place or person.”

But why stop at the limits of the organic world? If we are to see unconscious intelligence, memory, and will in every plant, and in every cell of every plant, why not also that inorganic matter by means of which the organic world lives, which enters into its substance, and so becomes living matter? This inorganic matter not only preceded the existence of living matter, but on the non-theistic hypothesis, was the originator and producer of all that living world, which is so instinct with purpose, thought, and will. Mr. Butler carries his consequences to their legitimate conclusion. He tells us that whereas he had before¹ identified “life” with “memory,” and had said that “matter which cannot remember is dead;” he now would modify the words last quoted, because they would imply that there is such a thing as matter, which cannot remember anything at all. He declares² that now he “can conceive no matter which is not able to remember a little, and which is not living in respect of what it can remember.” He “would recommend” his “reader to see every action in the universe as living and able to feel and remember, but in an humble way.” He, in fact, affirms that “there never yet was matter without mind, however low.”³

It is not improbable that some of our readers may be tempted to throw down these pages, deeming them filled with quotations of opinions which, if not put forward in joke, are too manifestly absurd to merit serious consideration. But it would be a great mistake, so to despise these opinions, and to regard these citations as useless. For just as Mr. Lewes truly says: “There are many truths which cease to be appreciated because they are never disputed,” so there are many errors⁴ which are best exposed by allowing them to run

¹ *Life and Habit*, pp. 299 and 300.

² *Unconscious Memory*, p. 272.

³ *L. C.*, p. 215. He adds: “Nor mind however high without a material body of some sort.” Mr. Butler thus seems to be approximating to Spinoza with his universe of one substance, having two attributes—one extension, the other thought.

⁴ *Problems of Life and Mind*. Problems II., III., and IV. of 3 Series, p. 85.

to a head. Moreover, it would be a proof of little knowledge, as well as of narrow sympathies, to think slightly of a man on account of the consequences which follow from his system, unless we have made sure that we are in no way entangled in the very same principles that he is, and only differ from him, in that we lack the vigor and acumen to deduce from them those logical results which seem to us so startling.

Moreover, there is much truth, and most important truth, in Mr. Butler's general contention. Far, then, from disesteeming such a writer, we should be grateful to him, however much we may, with the kindest sympathy, regret that he has not yet seen his way to adopt other principles which would lead to widely different results. But before proceeding further let us endeavor to see clearly what we mean when we say we "*know*." Mr. Butler asks:¹ "What is to know how to do a thing?" He answers: "surely to do it;" and he represents (as we have done) how, when many things have been perfectly learnt, they may be performed unconsciously. From this he infers:² "That perfect knowledge and perfect ignorance are extremes which meet and become undistinguishable; so also perfect volition and perfect absence of volition, or perfect memory and utter forgetfulness. . . . Conscious knowledge and volition are of attention; attention is of suspense; suspense is of doubt; doubt is of uncertainty; uncertainty is of ignorance; so that the mere fact of knowing or willing implies the possession of more or less novelty or doubt."

In a very amusing chapter on "conscious and unconscious knowers," he says:³ "Whenever we find people knowing that they know this or that, . . . they do not yet know it perfectly." In certain notes he adds:⁴ "We say of the chicken that it knows how to run about as soon as it is hatched, . . . but had it no knowledge before it was hatched? It grew eyes, feathers, and bones, yet we say it knew nothing about all this. . . . What then does it know? Whatever it does not know so well as to be, it appears, unconscious of knowing it. Knowledge dwells on the confines of uncertainty. When we are very certain we do not know that we know. When we will very strongly, we do not know that we will."

Now the fact is there is great ambiguity in the use of the word "*know*." Just as before with the term memory, so also here, certain distinctions must be drawn, if we would think coherently.

A. To "know," in the highest sense which we give to the word, is to be aware (by a reflex act) that we really have a certain given perception. It is a voluntary, intelligent, self-conscious act; par-

¹ Life and Habit, p. 55.

² L. C., p. 18.

³ L. C., Chap. II., p. 42.

⁴ Unconscious Memory, p. 30.

allel to that kind of memory which we before distinguished as "recollection."

B. We also say we "know," when we do not use a reflex act, but yet have a true perception—a perception accompanied by consciousness—as when we teach and in most of our ordinary intellectual acts.

C. When we so "know" a thing, that it can be done with perfect unconsciousness, we cannot be said to "know" it intellectually; although in doing that thing our nervous and motor mechanism acts (in response to sensational stimuli) as perfectly as, or more perfectly than, in our conscious activity. The "knowledge" which accompanies such "unconscious action" is improperly so called, except in so far as we may be able to direct our minds to its perception, and so render it worthy of the name—as we have seen, we may direct attention to our unconscious reminiscences, and so make them conscious ones. As then we have distinguished such acts of memory (while unconscious) as sensuous memory, so we may distinguish such acts of apprehension, while unconscious, as *sensuous cognition*. By it we can understand what may be the "knowledge" or "sensuous cognition" of mere animals.

D. Besides the above three kinds of apprehensions, we may distinguish others which can be only very remotely, if at all, compared with knowledge, since they can never, by any effort, be brought within the sphere of consciousness. Such are the actions of our organism by which it responds to impressions in an orderly and appropriate, but unfelt manner—the intimate actions of our visceral organs, which can be modified, within limits, according to the influence brought to bear on them, as we may see in the oarsman's hand, the blacksmith's arm, and the ballet-dancer's leg.

If such actions could be spoken of as in any sense apprehensive, they would have to be spoken of as "organic cognitions," but they may be best distinguished as "*organic response*" or "*organic correspondence*."

That the inorganic world, no less than the organic, is instinct with reason, and that we find in it objective conditions which correspond with our subjective conceptions, is perfectly true; but when once the profound difference between mere organic habit and intellectual memory is apprehended, there will be little difficulty in recognizing the yet greater difference between "organic correspondence" and the faithfulness of inorganic matter to the laws of its being.

That the *absence* of consciousness in actions which are perfectly performed, does not make such actions into acts of "perfect knowledge," is demonstrated by every calculating machine. No sane

person can say that such a machine "possesses" knowledge, though it is true that it "exhibits" it. Similarly there seems to be good reason for refusing to apply the terms "memory" and "intelligence" to the merely organic action of animals and plants.

But the belief that memory, intelligence, and will operate unconsciously throughout nature, has an important bearing on the question as to the mode or origin of new species of animals and plants, the advent of which from time to time—or some kind of "evolution"—geological evidence renders simply indisputable. Before proceeding further to address ourselves to the hypothesis of unconscious intelligence, it will be serviceable to glance at this question, the consideration of which will help us to justly appreciate that hypothesis.

The question we would consider is the following one: "Have new species been the product of intellect and volition,—*i. e.*, of design,—or have they solely resulted from the blind operation of physical forces?"

There are, as Mr. Butler points out,¹ three possible views as to evolution:

(1.) The view of those who uphold "Natural Selection" as the main agent in the work, and who deny the existence of design in nature.

(2.) The view that design and purpose exist in a Creator, distinct from his material creation.

(3.) The view that design and purpose are imminent in the world, but exist there unconsciously, save in man, and do not otherwise exist at all.

The question as to the value to be assigned to "Natural Selection" is indeed no trifling one. As Mr. Butler says: "The battle is one of greater importance than appears at first sight. It is a battle between teleology and non-teleology, between the purposiveness and the non-purposiveness of the organs in animals and vegetable bodies."

And now in entering upon this question, we may call the attention of all persons interested in the history of the idea of evolution to the injustice which has been done to Diderot. A claim may be indeed made for his recognition as the earliest proclaimer of views recently made popular. Mr. Butler has done his best, and has done well, to recall to recollection the too little recognized merits of Lamarck and others, but Diderot's rights, as in many respects an anticipation of later views and as a predecessor of Lamarck himself, do not seem to have fallen under his notice. Yet to us they appear to call for full, if tardy recognition. Diderot,² like his

¹ *Evolution, Old and New*, p. 31.

² *Unconscious Memory*, p. 287.

² See his *Ouvres Complètes*, vol. ix., p. 271.

modern successors, rejected final causes and fully accepted the doctrine of the unity and continuity of nature. He proclaimed the extermination of the feeble by the strong;¹ the generation of functions through organs² and the development of organs through a sense of need;³ the self-adaptation of organisms to their environment and to internal and external conditions;⁴ the action of heredity;⁵ the indefinite modifiability of organisms and the absence of any plan or purpose in evolution, which process he conceived to be due to the action of physical causes only. In a word, we find in him just that collection of misread truths and short-sighted negations, which has become popular since the publication of the "Origin of Species."

But Diderot was also a partisan of that very unity of nature—that attribution of sensibility even to inorganic matter—which Mr. Butler is now inclined to believe in. He says (L. C., pp. 267, 269, etc.): "This sensibility, if it is a quality essential and common to all matter, it follows as a consequence that the stone feels. Why not? It is hard to believe that it does. Yet for him who cuts, strikes, and dresses it, yet does not hear it cry out, I should like you to tell me what may be the difference then between a man and a statue? Little enough; one makes marble out of flesh and blood and one makes flesh and blood out of marble. But after all one is not the other. Just so, what you call *vis viva* is not potential energy. Would you then recognize two forms of sensibility parallel with active and potential energy? That is precisely it."

As to "Natural Selection" we have elsewhere⁶ expressed our conviction that it is a "puerile" hypothesis, due to a mind replete *indeed* with a knowledge of biological facts, but one as deficient in philosophical power as abounding in expertness in weaving his facts into a tangle which it needs almost as much dexterity to unravel.

This is plainly Mr. Butler's opinion. He remarks:⁷ "I assure the reader that I find the task of forming a clear, well-defined conception of Mr. Darwin's meaning, as expressed in his 'Origin of Species,' comparable only to that of one who has to act on the advice of a lawyer who has obscured the main issue as far as he can, and whose chief aim has been to make as many loop-holes as possible for himself to escape through in case of his being called to account." He notices Mr. Darwin's remark that "natural selection is the most important means of modification" as follows:⁸ "'Means' is a dangerous word; it slips too easily into 'cause' . . . the use of the word enables Mr. Darwin to speak of natural

¹ L. C., p. 428.² L. C., p. 264.³ L. C., pp. 330, 336.⁴ L. C., p. 267.⁵ L. C., p. 419.⁶ Lessons from Nature.—Murray.⁷ Evolution, Old and New, p. 358.⁸ L. C., p. 345.

selection as if it were an active cause (which he constantly does) and yet to avoid expressly maintaining that it is a cause of modification." "It is plain that natural selection cannot be considered a cause of variation; and if not of variation, which is as the rain drop, then not of specific and generic modification, which is as the river; for the variations must make their appearance before they can be selected."

In truth the real cause to be explored is the *cause of variation*. "Natural selection," which is a metaphorical expression for the destructive agencies of nature, cannot evidently be asserted to be the cause of variation, all that it can be asserted to do is to cut off variations in different directions, on a field of indefinite variability, and so, as it were, to "cut-out," species and genera. Therefore that which is the *cause* of variation, as that which supplies the material upon which alone "natural selection" can act, must be the true *origin* of species; and that it *really is such*, Mr. Darwin himself has virtually admitted in saying that "abrupt, strongly marked changes" may occur, "neither beneficial nor injurious" to the creatures exhibiting them and produced by "unknown agencies" lying deep in "*the nature of the organism*." Since these changes are neither beneficial nor injurious it is obvious that natural selections must be simply *impotent* in their regard. But what can be the real cause of these changes the existence of which is thus admitted?

It is surely wonderful (considering the keenness of his sight for all physical phenomena) how mole-eyed Mr. Darwin is as regards the manifestations of intellect in the organic world, and even as to its character in man himself. Very different are the views of Dr. Cleland¹ who tells us that, "Development both in the individual and in the totality of life, is not only a development from a simple beginning, but a development towards a completed whole. There is morphological design, and when in any line of development the design is completed, the evolution ceases, although, by the operation of the environment or external circumstances, variation may continue to occur and degenerations of diverse kinds may take place." As to the notion that a mere mechanical explanation can ever suffice, he observes:² "This notion, often put forward with much dogmatism and with unnecessary rancor, must be set aside because there are phenomena, such as morphological plan, which cannot possibly be referred at any future time to physical laws, but indicate spirit."

Mr. Murphy entirely rejects natural selection as a sufficient cause for the origin of species, and asserts the existence of an organizing

¹ Evolution, Expression, and Sensation, p. 7.

² L. C., p. 10.

though unconscious intelligence.¹ He quotes with approval² Mr. G. H. Lewes's rejection of natural selection which is as follows:³ "At each stage of differentiation there has been a selection, but we cannot by any means say that this selection was determined by the fact of its giving the organism a superiority over rivals, in as much or *during all the early stages, while the organ was still in formation, there could be no advantage accruing from it.* One animal having teeth and claws developed will have a decided superiority in the struggle over another animal that has no teeth and claws; *but so long as the teeth and claws are in an undeveloped state of mere preparation, they confer no superiority.*"

"The sudden appearance of new organs, not a trace of which is discernible in the embryo or adult form of organisms lower in the scale,—for instance, the phosphorescent (organs of such insects as the glowworm) or the electric organs (of some fishes),—is like the sudden appearance of hard instruments in the social organism, such as the printing press and the railway, *wholly inexplicable on the theory of descent, but explicable on the theory of organic affinity.*"

This "organic affinity" Mr. Murphy justly declares to be a mere synonym for "organizing power" which, as thus used, explains nothing, and suggests a misleading analogy with chemical affinity."

Mr. Alfred Wallace himself, though as firm a supporter as ever of that "Natural Selection" which he independently excogitated, has, nevertheless, remarked: "In so far as Mr. Darwin denies the necessity of any such power (as that superintending individual development), and maintains that the origin of all the divers forms and types and all the complex structures of the organic world are due to identically the same laws and processes as are adequate to produce the different species of *Rubus* or of *Canis*, from some ancestral bramble or dog respectively, his opponents here undoubtedly are well worthy of being argued out in the courts of science."

But what "Natural Selection" is absolutely impotent to explain, is the first origin of such wonderful powers as those of sight and hearing. We do not mean the *organs*, but the special *psychical modifications* or *feeling themselves*. An organ of sight might doubtless be manufactured from an organ of touch, if an innate capacity for sight already there existed in a latent condition. But it is simply impossible that natural selection should give rise to any such latent capacity. As Dr. Cleland says:⁴ "The very existence of vision and the other senses points to their being an unknowable

¹ Habit and Intelligence, p. 596.

² P. 403.

³ Physical Habits of Men, pp. 110, 117.

⁴ Evolution, Expression, and Sensation, pp. viii, 21 and 87.

territory whence, and not from the material world, they take their origin." . . . "No more than Lamarck has Darwin considered that it is not a sensitive nerve alone which is required to begin vision or any other special sense, but a capability of the consciousness to be modified in a way altogether incomparable with the equally incomprehensible affection which constitutes general sensation." . . . "To me it appears plain that the idea of vision must have previously existed before it could form part of the consciousness of any animal;¹ and in the evolutions of organs of sight I am compelled to recognize in the simple forms the early stages of a morphological design, moving forward in definite directions to accomplish a mode of contact between the external world and the consciousness of animals, the idea of which already existed."

He also points out, as was pointed out in our "Genesis of Species," that an admirable organ of sight has not only been developed on two different types of structure—that of the insects and that of the back-boned animals—but also that the very same type has been independently evolved in back-boned animals and in the cuttle-fishes. The fact that while the mode of formation of the retinae is wonderfully different in the two cases, yet the results attained are still more wonderfully alike, only makes the extraordinary teleological coincidence the more remarkable, proving as it does that the two similar optical instruments must have been independently evolved. As Dr. Cleland observes:² "It is impossible to conceive that by any process of modification in successive ages the one kind of eye could have grown out of the other."

In fact the objection made long ago by Paley, against all such views as "Natural Selection," has here been answered. He truly said:³ "No laws, no course, no power of nature which prevail at present, nor any analogous to these would give the commencement of a new sense; and it is in vain to inquire how that might proceed which would never *begin*."

Mr. Butler attempts to reply to this by imagining inhabitants of another world who contemplate a man of science using a microscope, and who dispute together as to its mode of development. But the comparison does not meet Paley's point which concerns not the *organ*, but the *sense* of vision. Mr. Butler further replies by saying that a wish can originate a power, which wish was nevertheless originated by such power: "Both coming up gradually out of something which was not recognizable as either

¹ The word "consciously" as here used loosely, merely implying that we term "convenience."

² L. C., p. 83.

³ Natural Theology, Ch. XXIII, quoted in *Evolution, Old and New*, p. 46.

⁴ *Evolution, Old and New*, p. 47.

power or wish." But most certainly such indeliberate progress does not take place with respect to any human mechanical invention, and certainly not with respect to the microscope. An intellectual preconception is invariably the starting-point in the invention of every machine made by man.

The many sudden changes which have been ascertained to occur in organisms, all tell against "natural selection" and in favor of those views of evolution which declare "design" (whether conscious or unconscious) to be manifestly therein present. Amongst such instances referred to by Mr. Murphy¹ are the following: A poppy which produced a crown of secondary capsules—a peculiarity reproduced by its seed; a *Datura tatula* which had smooth instead of spring capsules, and all the seeds of which, for six generations, reproduced the peculiarity, while hybrids between it and the spring form reverted to one or other of the two parent types; pigs with solid hoofs; moss and plain roses suddenly appearing, the one from the other; a new form of peacock (the black-shouldered) which breeds true and marked and permanent new wild varieties of deer.

The effects of changed conditions favor this mode of specific origin; thus,² "*Ficus stipulata*, grown on a wall, has small, thin leaves, and clings to the surface like a large moss or a miniature ivy. Planted out, it forms a shrub, with large, coarse, leathery leaves."

Mr. Wallace has pointed out some of the curious direct effects of external conditions on organisms. He tells us³ that in the small island of Amboina, the butterflies (twelve species, of nine different genera) are larger than those of any of the more considerable islands about it, and that this is an effect probably due to some local influence. In Celebes a whole series of butterflies are not only of a larger size, but have the same peculiar form of wing. The Duke of York's Island seems, he tells us, to have a tendency to make birds and insects white, or at least pale, and the Philipines to develop metallic colors, while the Molaccas and New Guinea seem to favor blackness and redness in parrots and pigeons. Species of butterflies which in India are provided with a tail to the wing, begin to lose that appendage in the islands, and retain no trace of it on the borders of the Pacific. The *Æneas* group of Papilios never have tails in the equatorial region of the Amazon Valley, but gradually acquire tails, in many cases, as they range towards the northern and southern tropics. Mr. Gould says that birds are more highly colored under a clear atmosphere than in

¹ Habit and Intelligence, pp. 163 and 179.

² L. C., p. 244.

³ Tropical Nature, pp. 254-259.

islands or on coasts—a condition which also seems to affect insects, while it is notorious that many shore plants have fleshy leaves. We need but refer to the English oysters mentioned by Costa, which, when transported to the Mediterranean, grew rapidly like the true Mediterranean oyster, and to the twenty different kinds of American trees, said by Mr. Meehan to differ in the *same manner* from their nearest American allies, as well as to the dogs, cats, and rabbits, which have been proved to undergo modifications directly induced by climatic change. But still more strange and striking changes have been recorded as due to external conditions. Thus it is said¹ that certain creatures of the crab and lobster class (certain crustacea) have been changed from the form characteristic of one genus (*Artemia*) into that of quite another (*Branchipus*), by means of diluting the salt water they inhabited with fresh water. The latter form is not only larger than the former, but has an additional abdominal segment and a differently formed tail. Such changes tell strongly in favor of the existence in creatures of positive, innate tendencies to change in definite directions under special conditions. “Natural selection,” however, can never serve to account for the initiation and preservation of the incipient stages of many organs which at first are and must be useless, however useful such organs may be when once developed. Neither can it account for the beginnings of such complex instincts as some of these we have described. How, again, could it account for the appearance of teeth such as those of the Cape ant-eater? But for a full statement of such difficulties as these, the reader must be referred elsewhere.² Here there is no space even for their enumeration.

From “natural selection,” then, let us turn to consider the hypothesis of the evolution of new species by “unconscious intelligence.” As to this, we cannot refuse to admit that irrational beings have, as a fact, worked towards rational ends, and have themselves, by their intimate organic processes of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, unconsciously attained results such as demand an intellectual cause. The world of life is no chaos. Stability and order reign over it as we see it now. In spite, moreover, of the remains of extinct species intermediate between different existing forms, no naturalist can doubt but that, if he could see the world as it was at different periods of its geological history, he would find there also stability and order, similar to what we see at present. Granted that they have been even gradually evolved, they none the less have a relative permanence. There are definite

¹ See the Physical Basis of Mind, p. 125 (note).

² See the Genesis of Species.

"kinds" of animals now, and our experience tells therefore in favor of there having always been such definite, though different, "kinds" of animals, whatever periods of slight change (how many soever transient forms) may have existed between the various stages of stability—the various true species.

But a process of evolution more or less closely analogous to that which geology shows us to have taken place in the past, physiology shows us to take place before our eyes to-day. It is the fact that a process of evolution is carried on in the generation of every individual animal—a process essentially similar to that marked and well-known process of transformation which we see in the frog and the butterfly. Animals mostly attain their adult condition by passing through a series of developmental stages, in which they have a generalized resemblance to creatures of various, more or less, inferior kinds.

Now, reason demands a cause not only for the occurrence of phenomena, but also for the order which it detects in their occurrence. Wherever it detects constant and regular coincidences, it spontaneously seeks for some cause adequate to produce them, and this the more imperatively, the more complex and involved the coincidences may be. But when this order and these coincidences relate to the future—when they laboriously prepare the way for existences which as yet are not but the advent of which alone explains the preceding labor, then, indeed, our intellect imperatively asks the cause of phenomena which possess such a quasi-prophetic character. Indeed, to most men, as Schopenhauer says, the "final cause" is more interesting than the "physical cause;" we care more to know *why* the blood circulates than for the details of the structure of our bloodvessels.

Concerning the phenomena of individual development, Mr. Alfred Wallace has written the following significant words:¹ "No thoughtful person can contemplate without amazement the phenomena presented by the development of animals. We see the most diverse forms—a mollusk, a frog, and a mammal—arising from apparently identical primitive cells, and progressing for a time by very similar initial changes, but thereafter each pursuing its highly complex and often circuitous course of development, with unerring certainty, by means of laws and forces of which we are totally ignorant. It is surely a not improbable supposition that the unknown power which determines and regulates this marvellous process may also determine the initiation of those more important changes of structure, and those developments of new parts and organs which characterize the successive stages of the

¹ In the Nineteenth Century, for January, 1880, p. 96.

evolution of animal forms." This is most true, and it is what we have before more than once urged.

The really important question then is, What is this "unknown power" which thus governs the evolution of each individual animal? Is it the creature itself? The better to be able to answer this, let us look carefully into the nature of an animal and see of what it really consists.

Each living creature consists of an aggregation of bodily parts and of functional activities, which are evidently knit together into a unity. Each is not only a visible unity, but is somehow the seat of some unifying power which synthesizes its various activities and is a principle of individuation.¹ Here we have an activity which has no organ, but (as Mr. Lewes has pointed out) is the activity of the body as one whole. This activity is no extra organic force, but an *intraorganic* force, so that it and the visible body of the animal possessing it are together "one thing." They are "one" as the impression in stamped wax and the wax itself are one, though we may ideally distinguish between the two. Our very common sense assures us that a living creature is not a mere piece of complex matter, played on by physical forces from without, which transform themselves in passing through it, but that its activities are the manifestations of a peculiar imminent principle. This principle, indeed, is inseparable from the material element, but, as the true *dynamical* principle, may far more truly be said to be the animal itself than the mere matter of its body can be so called. In every action, then, of every living organism, we have these two sides: the active, immaterial, imminent principle, the *ψυχή* or soul,² and the matter, the motions of which are the indication of its activity—the activity, *i. e.*, of the essentially active constituent of the bifold unity, the two aspects which can be thus ideally distinguished.

¹ Dr. Cleland remarks (L. C., p. 134): "The mere tissue-life in individual corpuscles will not account for the phenomena of development, without the addition of a larger life or a formative principle common to the whole individual. . . . No one has yet reduced, in a satisfactory way, any of the properties above mentioned as belonging to corpuscles, namely, irritability, contractility, nutrition, and reproduction, to the laws of unorganized matter; and having regard to that circumstance, and to the complicated phenomena of development of higher organisms, exhibiting series of changes unlike anything in the organic world, it is legitimate to conclude that in living beings there is a superadded element acting on the textural units individually, and that such an element controls likewise the development of the organism. The neoplasms of the pathologist afford abundant example of corpuscular life breaking loose from the central control, by means of which it is utilized in health for the construction and continuance of definite organs."

² This word must not be understood in its modern, unphilosophical signification of a substance memorically distinct from an animal's body, but in its old and proper Aristotelean meaning.

In every animal, then, we meet with a chain of physical phenomena, accompanied by a chain of immaterial energies, some parts of which are known in ourselves as "thought and feeling." The chain of physical phenomena consists of the actions of that side of the one living whole which we call its body. The chain of immaterial energies consists of the actions of that side of the one living whole which we call its principle of individuation, "psyche" or "soul."

It is plain, then, that no link of this double chain can be omitted on either side. Mr. Alexander Bain has said:¹ "It would be incompatible with everything we know of cerebral action to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance; which immaterial substance, after working alone, imparts its results to the other edge of the physical break, and determine the active response—two shores of the material, with an intervening ocean of the immaterial." This is good as far as it goes, but the converse is at the least as contrary to reason, namely, a break in the immaterial chain, bridged over by the intervention of a physical substance.

The necessary existence of this double series has been so clearly seen by some thinkers that they have been led to deny the possibility of the action of one series upon the other, and to maintain that men and animals are mere conscious automata, and that neither thought nor feeling can be real *causes* of physical actions.

But no owner of a dog, who has the least sympathy with his beast, or who has ordinary powers of observation, can doubt the truth of the adage, "the burnt dog dreads the fire," or fail to perceive that both actual pain and the reminiscences of pains formerly suffered, really govern those physical acts by which it shrinks back from a fireplace when the fall of a few hot cinders revives them in imagination.

But what does our consciousness tell us as to ourselves? We *know* that a feeling of pain may lead us to walk towards the dentist's, and that it is our knowledge² of possible consequences which

¹ See his *Mind and Body*, p. 13.

² As to the certainty that it is the *intellectual activity*, and not the material accompaniment of such activity, which is the efficient cause of such actions, Dr. Cleland well observes (L. C., p. 13): "If a servant whispers in your ear that there are robbers in the house, there will be cause of much less vibration of the drum of your ear and consequent action of the auditory nerve than by the loud ringing of a dinner bell; but there will possibly result very much greater mental disturbance. The stimuli in both cases would be applied to the same nerves; and no physical theory can represent it as possible that the channels taken in the brain by the irritation conveyed along the nerves would vary according to the meaning of the sounds. It is plain, therefore, that the physical stimulant in sensation does not lie in the same relation to the mental changes immediately following, as does the charge exploded in a gun to the flight of the bullet. . . . These are undeniable facts, though not what a confiding public has been always taught in science lectures."

makes us try to dissuade some young friend from visiting a gaming table.

Can anyone be found who, after hurrying home on being told that his house is on fire, will seriously maintain that it was not the comprehension of the information received which made him so hurry home? To say such a thing is to deny the teachings of consciousness. It is to deny what is most evident in favor of what is much less so—some speculative hypothesis. If we do not *know* such a thing as this we know nothing, and discussion is useless. As Mr. Lewes says:¹ "That we are conscious, and that our actions are determined by sensations, emotions, and ideas, are facts which may or may not be explained by the reference to material conditions, but which no material explanation can render more certain." The advocate of natural selection may be asked: How did knowledge ever come to be, if it is in no way useful to its possessor, if it is utterly without action, and is but a superfluous accompaniment of physical changes which would go on as well without it?

But, as we have already seen, very many of our bodily actions are often, and others are always, performed unconsciously. The immaterial principle of individuation (or soul) then evidently, in our own case, acts with intelligence in some actions, with sentience in many actions, but constantly also in an unperceived and unfelt manner. Yet we have seen that it undeniably intervenes in the chain of physical causation!

We may then, by this, well understand how that *immaterial reality*—the principle of individuation—may intervene (with sentience or without it) in all the actions of animals and plants. As to the difficulty with respect to the interaction of two parallel series such as those we are considering, we may compare the effects of their reciprocal influence to the alterations produced by heat in the shape of a ring, formed of two inseparable metals which contract unequally at the same temperature—alterations in either constituent affecting the compound whole, and therefore affecting the other constituent also. In the words² of Professor Hering, we may say that, in animals, the immaterial processes become functions of the material of organized substance, and inversely the material process becomes functions of the immaterial processes, "For when two variables are so dependent upon one another in the changes they undergo in accordance with fixed laws that a change in either involves simultaneous and corresponding change in the other, then the one is called a function of the other."

This principle of individuation, then, presides over the changes

¹ *Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 383.

² See *Unconscious Memory*, p. 103.

incident to the development of each individual. What is the true meaning of these changes? As there is this absolute correspondence between structure and function—as absolute as that between the convexities and concavities of the same curved line—it is manifest that the principle of individuation of each kind of creature must correspond with its bodily organization. To every kind of creature must be absolutely restricted its own kind of imminent principle. As is the body, so is the soul; a change in either one must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the other. Now the body of an animal has at first only an organization like that of some microscopic fungus. It has no trace of an organ of any kind—a *fortiori* of an organ of animal life. It can then be animated by no higher “principle of individuation” than that of some fungus; it has, in fact, but a vegetal psyche. As the process of development proceeds, a series of successive organizations are evolved in it, and with them, therefore, must be evolved a corresponding series of principles of individuation. Moreover, while each such principle in turn presides for a time over the developing embryo, such principle must be the main agent in preparing the way for the advent of its successor.

In the development of the individual, then, we see a process of singular and surprising change, during which a series of transitory forms successively appear and disappear, and so affect a true process of continued evolution—bringing about a precise, definite, and predetermined end by the operation of internal powers, which are called into exercise in accordance with their own internal laws by the stimulus and co-operation of the various physical forces.

Here is, we believe, the truth contained in the views of those who assert the existence of “unconscious intelligence” in animated nature. There is indeed an intelligently acting, immaterial principle innate in each individual living organism, and therefore, as applied to irrational organisms, there is full truth in Mr. Butler’s assertion¹ that “there was never yet either matter without [such principle], however low, nor [any such principle], however high, without a material body of some sort; there can be no change in one without a corresponding change in the other.”

This teaching accords with that of the Angelic Doctor. St. Thomas tells us that in the development of man himself, the germ is at first animated by a merely vegetal soul, afterwards by an animal soul, and only at last by that rational, immaterial principle which makes it human. Each soul, or form, according to this philosophy,

¹ Unconscious Memory, p. 216. Mr. Butler uses the word “mind” where we have put words in brackets. But we have made the change because we do not believe that he means by “mind” what we do. “Mind” properly denotes the phenomenon of human consciousness—the rational soul energizing both corporeally and consciously.

recedes and disappears simultaneously with the advent of its successor, and each comes into existence at the moment the pre-existing matter is proximately fit for its reception. After the recession of the first or vegetal soul, and before the advent of the rational power, the embryonic body is not a human body, but is that of an irrational animal, though of a kind such as nowhere else exists in *rerum natura*. Moreover, in each case the temporarily existing principle prepares the matter it informs, for the reception of the form which is to succeed it, and thus at the same time prepares the way for its own disappearance and lapse into mere potentiality—the accession of one form being simultaneously accompanied by the recession of its predecessor.

Let us now review the process of specific evolution in the light thus gained, and see its bearing on the three conflicting views as to evolution which are here discussed. And, in the first place, let us try to answer the questions: “In what sense are the different kinds of being evolved *different*?” “In what does their ‘difference’ essentially consist?”

The really more essential constituent of every living creature being its “principle of individuation,” it must be the distinctions between *these* that really constitute distinctions of kind, and the external difference between creatures which our senses can perceive are serviceable but as indices of the profounder distinctions existing between different inner principles.

But we have seen that in the evolution of the individual, successive inner principles may prepare the way (as according to St. Thomas they do in man prepare the way) one for another. Since such inner principle is the animal *par excellence*, it is *its* action which must be the main cause of such change, though its action is doubtless stimulated and aided by environing agencies.

Surely then we may conclude that in the process of *specific evolution*, it is the “inner principle,” “substantial form,” or “psyche” of any given organism which (stimulated and aided by external conditions) so modifies the intimate action of the generative system, that the matter thence produced may become apt for the reception of a new form of life—a new species. And how small a change may be needful to effect this! As Professor Hering observes:¹ “An infinitely small change of position on the part of a point, or in the relations of the parts of a sequent of a curve to one another, suffices to alter the law of its whole path, and so in like manner an infinitely small influence exercised by the parent organism ‘on the germ’ may suffice to produce a determining effect upon its whole further development.”

¹ Quoted in *Unconscious Memory*, p. 121.

According to this conception of internal force—the action of the psyche—we have the evolution of species by means of unconscious, intelligent action innate in the organism—not, however, by any means excluding, as we shall see, an external directing conscious intelligence. We have thus a process of “*specific genesis*” (or evolution by internal force) which is apt to be stimulated or modified by external conditions—including, of course, those distinctive agencies symbolized by the term “natural selection.” This process of specific genesis may be termed “the evolution of new species by PSYCHOGENESIS.”¹

This conception appears capable of harmonizing the doctrines contended for by the conflicting schools of Evolutionary Philosophy. It harmonizes them in the only mode by which conflicting theories can ever be (where they can be at all) satisfactorily harmonized—namely, by accepting the affirmation of each and eliminating their negations.

By this process, in the first place, Divine creative action in the formation of each several kind of creature, far from being obscured, is made more evident than before. The secondary or derivative creation,² “*per temporum moras*,” distinguished by the great Saint Augustine from that instantaneous primary creation which took place “*potentialiter atque cansaliter*” in the beginning. God is thus recognized as making use of his living creatures as his instruments in this secondary creation.

Thus we have really in evolution, no true *descent* of kind from kind, although evolution takes place by means of physical generations.

Thus every species is distinct in its origin, and there is no confusion of kinds; and if the transitional steps may now and again seem to us to have been small, they have not therefore been purposeless, and as it is with the individual, so it is with the species. The changes of the process of individual development, the succession of forms of subordinate rank—are in each and every case, a process carried on according to definite internal laws, to fulfil a precise and predetermined end. Similarly the successive changes in the development of species, have been directed to definite ends; as we may see by the diversified creation around us to-day. The world about us is, as before observed, no incoherent mass of unstable, indistinguishable forms. It is inhabited by a vast multitude of animals and plants of plainly distinct kinds, however difficult it may be in a few genera to define their component

¹ For further details as to this process, and for more detailed arguments on this subject, see the present author's work, “The Cat; an introduction to the study of back-boned animals.” C. Scribner's Brothers, N. Y., 1881; and John Murray, London.

² See Lessons from Nature, p. 492.

species. As we find it to be the case now, so we may reasonably suppose it to have been the case before. We do not find fossil remains, such as would be inconsistent with specific distinctness through their minute intermediateness of character. Living species, generation after generation, faithfully reproduce their kind; only occasionally exhibiting such deviations and exceptions as are sufficient to render the occasional productions of new species an imaginable process.

It is true, as we have seen, that some speculators believe in the substantial identity of all nature. Mr. Butler is one of those inclined to accept the belief, not only that intelligence and unconscious memory are actually present in every particle of even inorganic matter, but also the belief that all animals and plants are really but one individual being. Unity, however, cannot be predicated of the multitudinous objects, animate and inanimate, presented to our senses, save by neglecting to note their differences and abstracting their resemblances solely, and also by denoting these their resemblances by terms which are inadequate and misleading.

The late Mr. G. H. Lewes has forcibly pointed out the fallacy of such a process. He says: "Psychological—Metaphysical speculation, untrammelled by the distinctions of sensible experience, easily arrive at Panpsychisms. The hypothesis rests upon an arbitrary extension of terms, and upon an exclusive selection of one order of conceptions. By a sufficient elasticity of terms, we may easily reduce all diversities to identity; all things are alike if you disregard their points of unlikeness . . . stretching terms, it is easy to identify life molecular change, and then conclude all things to be living. But the biologist must protest against such manipulations of conceptions. For him life expresses a vast class of phenomena, never found except in definite groups of substances, undergoing definite kinds of molecular change. The crystal is not alive, because it does not assimilate, reproduce itself, and die. Any one choosing to stretch terms, may say that molecules live because molecules exist. But in that case we shall have to create a new term for the mode of existence, which is now called life. . . . Playing such tricks with language, we may add: Why should not a lamppost feel and think, since it is subject to molecular changes, consequent on impression? Why should not a crystal calculate? Does not oxygen *yearn* after hydrogen? Has not hydrogen the property of humidity? These questions seem absurd, yet they are only naked presentations of what some philosophers have clothed in technical terms, and their readers have accepted with confidence. . . . And why this reliance on the law of continuity? That law is simply a deduction from the conception of quantity, abstracted from

quality by mathematical artifice ; it is one abstract idea of existence, irrespective of all concrete modes of existence. It has its uses ; but note, first, that it is an ideal construction, not a real transcription ; secondly, that not only is it an ideal construction, which once framed becomes a necessity of thought, although it is detached from and contradictory of real experience. It is also in the very nature of the case only applicable to abstract existence and not to concrete modes of existence. See how these considerations nullify the application of the law to the gradations and diversities of organic phenomena. If continuity is a necessity of thought, not less imperiously is discontinuity a necessity of experience, given in every qualitative difference. The manifold of sense is not to be gainsaid by a speculative resolution of all diversities into gradations. Experience shows us sharply-defined differences, which make gaps between things. Speculation may imagine these gaps filled, some unbroken continuity of existence linking all things. It *must* imagine this, because it cannot imagine the non-existence coming between discrete existence. . . . Turning from the metaphysical to the biological consideration, it is plain that the characteristic phenomena observed in organisms are not observed in anorganisms ; and even in cases where a superficial appearance seems to imply an identity. An investigation of the conditions shows this not to be so. The actions of a machine often resemble certain actions of an organism. But when we come to understand how both are produced, we understand also how the products are really very different. We deny that a crystal has sensibility ; we deny it on the ground that crystals exhibit no more signs of sensibility than plants exhibit signs of civilization ; and we deny it on the ground that among the conditions of sensibility there are some positively known by us, and these are demonstrably absent from the crystal. It is in vain to say sensibility depends on molecular change, therefore all molecular change must in some degree be sentient change ; we have full evidence that it is only special kinds of molecular change that exhibit the special signs called sentient ; we have as good evidence that only special aggregations of molecules are vital, and that sensibility never appears except in living organism, disappearing with the vital activities, as we have that banks and trades' unions are specifically human institutions. On the first head, that of evidence, we must therefore pronounce against the hypothesis of pansychism."

"How about its philosophic advantages ? To some minds eager for unity, and above all charmed by certain poetic vistas of a cosmos no longer alienated from men, the hypothesis has attractions. But while its acceptance would introduce great confusion into our conceptions, and necessitate a completely new nomencla-

ture to correspond with the established conceptions, it would lead either to a vague mysticism enveloping all things in formless haze, or to a change of terms with no alteration in the conceptions. By speaking of the souls of the molecules, we may come to talk of the molecule as men 'writ small;' we may assign our controversial passions to the torrent, and our dogmatic serenities to the summer sky; we shall see volition in the magnet, and contemplative effort in morphological changes. If we escape this, and regard the life and sentience of inorganic bodies as only the lowest and simplest state of consciousness, undistinguishable from what we now call motion, except that it has an infinitesimal quantity of consciousness; and if from inorganic bodies, we pass to simple organisms, from these to organisms more and more complex, the soul enlarging with each stage of evolution; well, then we have returned once more to the old point of view; the broad lines of demarcation, which our classifications fix, remain undisturbed, and all modes of existence known to science are recognized as such. Into this scientific system, the metaphysical conception of uniform existence has obtruded itself and borrowed scientific terms; but the obtrusion is a comparison, not an illumination."

But even he who asserts that all animals and plants are really but one individual, must admit that all are not equally individual; must admit that his own son (if he has one) is not part of himself in the same degree, in the same sense, as his own arm is part of himself. Thus the differences we all recognize remain, and the only real change is the introduction of a different terminology, and one calculated to mislead by inducing us to take no note of, or to disregard, real differences.

Therefore not only are different kinds of creatures really distinct, but the individual distinctness of offspring from parents must be maintained. What results from this as regards "memory" and "intelligence"? The distinction between "memory" and "organic habit" has been pointed out, and the necessary dependence of "intelligence" on "memory" is evident and indisputable. Offspring do indeed reproduce the characters of the parents from whence they sprang, and this repetition may be spoken of as a form of "organic habit," but it can never be fitly called "memory." If then "memory" is not thus innate in the organisms themselves, neither can intelligence be therein innate. Where then shall we look for that self-conscious intelligence which manifests itself in the implanted "organic habits" and "instincts" of living organisms? It must be external to such organisms, and it must therefore be in God; and thus we come to the third of the three alternatives enumerated by Mr. Butler,—an alternative re-

jected by him. What objections are then to be urged against this third alternative?

In the first place we may remark, with Mr. Sully,¹ "Surely the fact that the motive principle of existence moves in a mysterious way outside our consciousness, no way requires that the All-One Being should be himself unconscious."

Mr. Butler's objections to the Theistic conception of nature are expressed as follows:² "We turn then on Paley, and say to him: 'We have admitted your design and your designer. Where is he? Show him to us. If you cannot show him to us as flesh and blood, show him as flesh and sap; show him as a living cell . . . it is not in the bond or *nexus* of our ideas that something utterly *inanimate*³ and inorganic should scheme, design, contrive, and elaborate structures which can make mistakes Nevertheless, we will commit such abuse with our understanding as to waive this point, and we will ask you to show him to us as air, which, if it cannot be seen, yet can be felt, weighed give us half a grain of hydrogen or if you cannot do this, give us an imponderable, like electricity, or even the higher mathematics; but give us something, or throw off the mask and tell us fairly out that it is your paid profession to hoodwink us in this matter if you can, and that you are but doing your best to earn an honest living.'" Again he says:⁴ "I have a strong feeling as though the material universe is always and everywhere sustained and directed by an infinite cause, for which to us the word 'mind' is the least inadequate and misleading symbol.⁵ But I feel that any attempt to deal with such a question is going far beyond the sphere on which man's powers may be at present employed with advantage. I trust, therefore, that I may never try to verify it, and am indifferent whether it is correct or not." "I could neither conceive of such a mind influencing and directing the universe from a point as it were outside the universe itself, nor yet of a universe in any present or past stage as existing without there being present—or having been present—in its every particle something for which mind should be the least inadequate and misleading symbol."

Mr. Murphy expresses himself as follows:⁶ "For the reasons here stated, we conclude that vital intelligence is the same throughout; in other words, that the unconscious intelligence which

¹ Westminster Review, new series, vol. xlix., p. 151, cited in "Unconscious Memory," p. 139.

² "Evolution, Old and New," page 29.

³ The italics are ours.

⁴ L. C., p. 371.

⁵ Quoted by Mr. Butler from "Lessons from Nature," p. 300.

⁶ Habit and Intelligence, pp. 411-414.

directs the formation of the organic structures is the same which becomes conscious in mental actions. The two are generally believed to be distinct; conscious mental intelligence is believed to be human, and formative intelligence to be divine. This view leaves us room for the intermediate region of instinct; and hence the marvellous character with which instinct is generally invested. But if we admit that all the intelligence manifested in the organic creation is fundamentally the same, we shall reasonably expect to find such a gradation as we actually witness, from perfectly unconscious to perfectly conscious intelligence; the intermediate region being occupied by intelligent but unconscious motor action; in a word, by Instinct.

"If it is true, as here maintained, that the intelligence which adapts organic structures to their functions is fundamentally identical with that which becomes conscious in the mind, it follows from the mere statement, that the intelligence which forms the lenses of the eye is the same which, in the mind of man, has discovered the theory of the lens; the intelligence that hollows out the bones and the wing feathers of the bird in order to combine lightness with strength, and places the feathery fringes where they are needed for the purpose of flight, is the same which, in the mind of the engineer, has devised the construction of iron pillars hollowed out like those bones and feathers; and the Intelligence that guides the bee in its unconscious shaping of its hexagonal cells, is the same which, in our minds, understands the properties of hexagons.

"This view is well known among the Germans, and is beginning to be known among us; but most English-speaking people have been accustomed to refer all organic adaptations to Creative Wisdom directly. This was almost inevitable for believers in a Divine Creator, so long as the world and all that it contains was supposed to have been created in a few days. But now that the doctrine of Evolution has been sufficiently established, it appears more reasonable to believe that organic progress has been effected, not by a fresh exertion of Creative Power at every one of its innumerable stages, but by a principle of intelligence which guides all organic formations and all motor instincts, and finally attains to consciousness in the brains of the higher animals, and to self-consciousness in the brain of man.

"When rightly considered, the view of direct creation will appear untenable. It cannot be reconciled with the imperfections of the organic world, and the slow and interrupted progress towards relative perfection. And absolute perfection is not always attained, even in nature's highest work. The human eye, even when healthy and normal, is asserted by Helmholtz to be very

imperfect in comparison with the best optical instruments that human skill can produce.

"But these are the smallest of the difficulties of the old view. I refer especially to the existence of such organisms as parasitic worms, which are well adapted for their mode of life, but have probably no sensation and certainly no consciousness, yet inflict pain, disease, and death on sentient and conscious animals. On the theory of the independent creation of every separate species, these can only be regarded as instruments of torture devised by Creative Wisdom. But if we believe that they are descended from species which were not parasitic, and have become self-adapted to new habitats, their existence is only a particular case of the question why pain and disease are permitted at all.

"The same is true of what have been called 'unnatural,' and may almost be called 'immoral instincts;' such as the working bees slaughtering the drones after the queen has been fertilized; the habit of some species of carrying off ants of other species while in the pupa state, and making slaves of them; the cuckoo's habit of laying its eggs in the nests of other birds, and the young cuckoo throwing the original tenants out of the nest to perish. It is easier to believe these instincts to be peculiar and abnormal results of vital intelligence, than to believe each of them to be a special providential endowment.

"Matter has been endowed with gravitative and chemical forces which are capable of producing motion. When a mass moves, as in the fall of a stone, or when a fire burns and produces heat, which is atomic motion, the energy of the motion is neither brought from without nor created at the moment,—it only becomes actual or active from being potential or latent. There is not a fresh exertion of Divine Power whenever a stone falls or a fire burns. So with intelligence. All intelligence is a result of Divine Wisdom; but there is not a fresh determination of Divine Thought needed for every new adaptation in organic structure, or for every original thought in the mind of man. Every one will admit that there is not a fresh act of creation when a new individual is born;—I say the same of the origin of species and of classes."

Before considering these objections seriatim, let us for a moment assume (for argument's sake) that they cannot be answered, and let us consider the other horn of the dilemma, namely, "the belief in an innate, intelligent, unconscious activity in organisms themselves, unaccompanied by any conscious activity external to such organisms." We believe that such a conception contains an inherent contradiction, and is therefore fundamentally irrational. In the first place, what do we mean by "intelligence" *par excellence*?

What is our intellectual type? Surely it is our own psychical activity at its best. We exercise it when we perceive actual or ideal existences, together with their relations one to another, and judge as to their reality and truth. It is called into play in the pursuit of the physical and abstract sciences, and also in the deliberate government of our own lives. If any person should choose to say that blind actions (in which no end is perceived or intended, and wherein no notice is taken of the truth of ideas and the consequences of acts) are the most truly intellectual, the wisest actions, then such a person abuses language. The meaning of words is due to convention, and any one applying to such blind actions the terms "most intelligent" and "most wise," thereby divides himself from the rest of mankind by refusing to speak their language.

Intelligent conduct is understood by all men to mean "a wise adaptation of means to ends,"—a deliberate adaptation, and not one due to accident merely. No one would call an act done "blindly" a "wise action," whatever might be its result. The act of idly remaining in bed one morning till too late to start by a vessel which afterwards sank at sea, may serve as an example of an action fortunate in its results, but which no reasonable person would, on that account, call a "wise" act. No amount of "blindness" can make "sight," and no actions can at the same time be "intelligent" and "blind." But it is impossible for us to perceive external objects and their relations to us (relations necessarily perceived in "wise" conduct) without the perception of ourselves,—without our being directly aware of our own being (our activity), although we need not reflexly advert to it. We cannot *expressly* recognize things as external to ourselves without expressly recognizing our own existence, and we cannot *implicitly* recognize things as external to ourselves without *implicitly recognizing our own being*. The recognition of "self," either explicit or implicit, accompanies all our intellectual activity.

What experience then have we which can justify such a conception as that of "unconscious intelligence?" We are indeed aware of a multitude of actions which are evidently the outcome of intelligence, but which (like the analogous actions of a calculating machine) are performed by unconscious creatures. Such are the instinctive actions both of irrational animals and of ourselves. They are actions more or less modifiable by reflex, unintelligent responses to environing agencies. We know that our conscious intelligence can elicit from animals trained by us a multitude of seemingly rational actions which in them are perfectly irrational, as we can make machines manifest an intelligence and foresight

which is "in them" in so far as it is they which manifest it, but which for all that is not truly "in them."

Our experience then utterly contradicts the hypothesis that there may be such a thing as really unconscious intelligence,— "unconscious" in its foundation and cause as well as in its manifestation. Such a conception is like that of a "square pentagon," or a "pitch-dark luminosity."

Nevertheless our experience is *in favor* of the existence of an intelligence which can implant in, and elicit from, unconscious bodies, activities which are intelligent in appearance and result. "Truly intelligent action" we know as being intelligent and wise in its foresight, and therefore as necessarily conscious in the innermost principle of its being and in the initiation of its activity, *i. e.*, in its real cause, man.

"Unconsciously intelligent action," improperly called "intelligent" or "wise," is that which is intelligent and wise only as to its results and not in the innermost principle of the creatures (living bodies or mere machines) which perform such action. To speak technically, we have "formal" and "material" intelligence, as we have "formal" and "material" vice and virtue, and without understanding this fundamental distinction no true solution of the problem here investigated can be arrived at. It is the failure to apprehend this distinction which is the root of a vast number of modern philosophical errors. It is the want of clearly perceiving this distinction and a consequent misleading ambiguity in the use of terms which has led to the promulgation of the theory of "unconscious intelligence" as the cause of so many phenomena we admire in the world of organic life.

The better to understand the distinction let us take an example from ethics. A man, who has married a second wife, his first wife being still alive, has committed bigamy and adultery. But although legally culpable, he may be a perfectly innocent man, for he may have married under the mistaken conviction that his first wife had been drowned at sea. If so, he is "materially" a bigamist, but not one "formally." Let him however be aware of the fact and yet continue as the husband of his second wife and he becomes "formally" guilty. Again, if a man wishing to aid another, by miscalculation causes his death, he does an action which is "materially" homicidal, though "formally" his act is a virtuous one.

Applying this distinction to the admirably directed actions which are blindly performed by living beings, we may say that "intelligence" is not *formally* in them, but exists "formally" in their ultimate cause, *i. e.*, in God. Nevertheless inasmuch as such creatures by their actions manifest that intelligence, and such

intelligence exists in them *materially*, though it is not truly and "formally" *in* them.

Let us now consider the objections, above cited, to the idea of the conscious Intelligence of God as being the formal cause of that material intelligence which we see latent in nature. Mr. Butler's difficulty seems to be mainly due to that defect which so commonly underlies the objections which are now-a-days made against religion—the defect namely of not distinguishing between "conception" and "imagination." His difficulty seems to be that he is unable to imagine a purely spiritual being—or, at least, the action of such a Being in creating and sustaining the material universe. We are quite as unable as he is to imagine anything of the kind—for no one can imagine anything which has not (at least in its elements) been perceived by one or more of his senses. But it by no means follows that what has not and cannot be perceived by the senses, cannot be conceived, understood, and believed—although it is true that every human conception needs some material accompaniment (if only a single letter) to serve as its sign and sensuous support. None of us ever saw a "cause" or felt a "non-existence," or heard a "quality," "quantity," or "relation," save as spoken sounds. Nevertheless that all these entitles can be "conceived" is plain from the fact that so much is written and spoken about them. We read with much pleasure Mr. Butler's admission¹ that he has a strong feeling in favor of the Theistic conception and with proportionate disappointment his declaration of his indifference as to its truth. We believe and strongly hope he deceives himself as to his indifference. A studious desire to avoid prejudice in investigating any problem is one thing, but "indifference" is quite another. Voluntary indifference with respect to a question which concerns the welfare of all men far more deeply than any other possible question can concern it would be an ethical fault, and therefore a violation of reason of which ethics form one department. He tells us that he can neither conceive intelligence directing the universe from "as it were outside" it, nor of a universe in every particle of which there is not present "something for which mind should be the least inadequate and misleading symbol." But Christianity which proclaims a God "in whom we live and move and have our being" will never call on Mr. Butler to do that of which he here declares himself incapable. It does not teach us that God exists "outside" that universe in the sense in which Mr. Butler uses that word, while its doctrine of the immanence of the Divine action throughout nature supplies all the truth which is continued in the misleading expression "unconscious intelligence."

¹ Evolution, Old and New, p. 371.

But Mr. Butler has much respect (and we in this go entirely with him) for the far too little appreciated Lamarck. We would then call his attention to the facts that Lamarck, at least, saw no difficulty in the theistic conception of nature, and it is very desirable that justice should now be rendered to him in this, no less than in other respects. That illustrious naturalist says:¹ "Certes the power which has made the animals has made them all that they are, and endowed them with the faculties observed in each, by giving an organization fitted to produce them. Observation authorizes us to recognize this power in *Nature*, and that she is the product of the will of the Supreme Being, who has made her what she is Strange indeed! people have confounded the watch with the watch-maker, the production itself with the producer." It would be difficult to find words more entirely repudiating the main position assumed by Mr. Butler than do those of the man whose just scientific renown he so properly seeks to vindicate.

Mr. Murphy's objections, before cited at length, may be summarized, and we believe obviated, as follows :

(1.) "Divine action (he tells us) is incompatible with such a slow and uninterrupted process towards perfection as that which we find in nature." But if this objection has any real force it applies to a quick and uninterrupted process also. If God could be blamed for not acting in a way which seems to us "quick" and "uninterrupted," he could also be blamed for any delay at all and for not having at once instantaneously created what might seem to us "the best of all possible worlds." But as we may be sure that the creation with all its apparent imperfections is (as God sees it and with His infinite purpose necessarily unfathomable by us) a creation ultimately for the best, so also we may be sure that the rate of its progress is that which is ultimately for the best. God cannot make a circular triangle or cause an event now passed never to have happened, for such things are contradictions and therefore nonentities, and can have no relation to omnipotence. But how many objective contradictions which we cannot suspect may render irrational and therefore impossible to God, actions which to us may seem calculated to open short cuts and easy roads to perfection.

(2.) "God could never have created tape-worms, because while themselves comparatively devoid of enjoyment, they inflict suffering

¹ History Natural des Animaux Seurs Vertebres, 3d edition, pp. 66 and 95, cited by Dr. Cleland in his Evolution, Expression, and Sensation, pp. 14 and 15. This latter author also calls attention (at p. 16) to the fact that the author of the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, is no less Theistic in his views and describes the evolution of organisms as taking place "under the providence of God."

on highly sentient creatures." Now it is very probably true that such organisms are the modified descendants of other organisms, which once lived a free and non-parasitic life. No Theist, however, can consent to make, as it were, an excuse for the Almighty, by saying that though he permitted what he might have disallowed, he did not directly produce it. A permission voluntarily given for a bad act is culpable as well as its actual performance. But such existences will appear to us in a very different light from that in which Mr. Murphy represents them, if we regard them as necessary parts of a vast scheme of infinite beneficence, wherein pain, disease and death have a necessary place, and wherein they have in the long run a beneficent action, so infinitely surpassing the temporary evils they inflict, that could we know all, they would merit our profoundest wonder and admiration. In such matters we are constantly the dupes of an irrational attempt to estimate the universe from a purely human point of view. I do not mean that we judge it by human reason, for we can judge it in no other way. Our reason tells us however that in such judgments we must if we would not delude ourselves, make abstraction of our *feelings*. I mean then by "an irrational attempt to estimate the universe from a purely human point of view," an attempt to estimate it without abstracting such merely subjective sentiments. Our specially human sympathies and our feelings as animals render it most difficult for us to take an unbiassed and purely rational view of such phenomena as have painful relations with our sensibilities. The misleading results of this prejudice extend very far.

(3.) "God could not have instituted immoral instincts, such as those which prompt working-bees to kill drones, certain ants to make slaves, and cuckoos to lay their eggs as they do with the correlative shocking habit of the young cuckoo when hatched."

These objections are but other instances of the misleading prejudice just referred to. Such actions in *human beings* would be reprehensible from an ethical point of view as well as disgusting, but no possible action of any irrational creature can be immoral. Nothing is really immoral which is not done against the light of reason.

We view these phenomena with prejudiced eyes because we cannot help thinking of parallel actions performed by such creatures as ourselves. But a pure spirit could gaze upon every action performed by any mere animal, with perfect complacency and satisfaction, knowing that such creature was fitly playing its appointed part in that vast structure—the whole world of nature. But man as he is can as little judge that world of nature as a minute insect perched

on a pinnacle of York Minster can perceive the relative portions and bearings of the stones of that noble pile.

(4.) "No fresh determination of Divine thought is needed for every new adaptation in organic structure, any more than when a stone falls or fire burns."

Leaving to theologians the treatment of the curious form of expression here cited, it may suffice to point out that those who, like ourselves, see divine action in every stone which falls and every fire which burns, also of course see that action in every organic evolution, and in each instinctive or habitual action of every living creature. But we rejoice here to note that Mr. Murphy expressly repudiates Partheism.¹ He is thoroughly persuaded that in spite of his own, here cited, objections, the facts of nature broadly viewed are consistent with the existence of an all-wise and all-holy Creator. We only differ from him therefore in believing that the parts of nature viewed narrowly (that is deeply and in detail) no less consistently with that existence. To this end all that is necessary is to avoid mere prejudice and to distinctly recognize the impossibility of our comprehending the whole scope and intention of God's creation.² A little reflection is alone needed, we think, to make us aware that the "improvements" which we would suggest to the author of Nature, might if we could see all, involve absolute objective contradiction, and so be impossibilities even to omnipotence.

There are not a few persons who are troubled in mind by the fact that we find in nature "Rudimentary organs." Such organs are the minute wings of the Apteryx of New Zealand and the fetal teeth of Whalebone whales, which teeth are destined never to cut the gum. Organs of this kind are useless to their possessor, though they are rudimentary representatives of organs which are useful enough in other creatures. Such objections of our own day were well answered antecedently by Buffon³ when he asked: "Why is it considered so necessary that every part in an individual should be useful to the other parts and to the whole animal? Should it not be enough that they do not injure each other nor stand in the way of each other's fair development?"

If then there are no valid objections which can be raised against that (third) view of Evolution which sees the conscious intelligence of

¹ Habit and Intelligence, p. 413; the author's words are: "I am not a Protheist, on the contrary, I believe in a Divine Power and Wisdom infinitely transcending all that can be born to us in our present state of being."

² The end and object of our own being is made known to us by reason as well as by revelation, but certainly not the full meaning and purpose of the whole sidereal universe, which, after all, may itself be but a fragment of but one out of many kinds of created existences.

³ *Histoire Naturelle*, tome v., 1875, p. 104. Quoted in *Evolution, Old and New*, p. 120. The italics are ours.

the Creator manifested in the actions of his creatures—whether organic or inorganic—which are themselves devoid of conscious intelligence, how may that view be best expressed (as shown by the light of modern science) and what are those “modes of operation” (referred to in the beginning of this article) into which the Theist may reverently inquire?

Before fully stating our judgment in this matter, it may be well shortly to recapitulate the ground we have gone over that the thread of our argument may be more clearly seen.

After adverting to the revulsion which has taken place from a purely mechanical view of nature, to a conception of it as everywhere animated by “unconscious intelligence,” we have pointed out the great importance of correctly estimating those phenomena which are commonly spoken of as “Instinctive,” and have described some of those phenomena.

In commencing the consideration as to whether unconscious intelligence can be accepted as the cause of Instinct, we have begun by considering “Memory” in its various forms, and determining to what kinds of acts that term could or could not be applied. We have next examined the meaning of the term consciousness and then returned to review, in the light thus gained, the question as to “Instinct,” recognizing in so doing the ambiguity of the word “know,” and distinguishing different kinds of “cognition” parallel with the before-distinguished different kinds of “Memory.” Next, we have remarked as to the bearing of the question as to “unconscious intelligence” on that as to the process of specific evolution, and have recognized the three alternative views of evolution, (1) the Mechanical, (2) the Theistic, and (3) that favored by Mr. Butler and Mr. Murphy. After reviewing the first of these, as expressed in the theory of “Natural selection,” and rejecting it, we have proceeded to examine the third alternative—evolution by unconscious Intelligence. In order the better to be able to appreciate the bearings of the question we have reviewed the phenomena of the evolution of individual animals, calling attention to the fact that the most important constituent of each is as immaterial principle or psyche, which must be conceived as the agent presiding over each process of individual evolution. Next, turning to consider the question of specific evolution, we have pointed out how it also is similarly explicable and how such explanation harmonizes the truths maintained by thinkers of different and opposed schools. After refuting the doctrine of universal identity we have passed to the examination of the third view of evolution and Instinctive action—*i. e.*, to the view that they are the effects of Divine action—and with the objections made to it by the authors reviewed. Before considering the latter, however, we have directly attacked their position by

pointing out what seem to us to be the essential contradiction contained in the term "Unconscious Intelligence," and by distinguishing between intelligence which is actual and "formal" from that which is "material" only. Having now replied to the objections, it remains but to state distinctly what we believe to be the true view as to this question of physical philosophy. This, it seems to us, may be expressed as follows:

(1.) In the whole unconscious creation there is present, *materially*, that intelligence which exists *formally* in God. It is, however, materially present in the organic world in a different mode from that in which it is materially present in the inorganic world.

(2.) In the inorganic world each substance, utterly devoid of even quasi-sensibility, responds only physically (*i.e.*, mechanically, chemically, etc.), but according to the laws of its own being, to the actions upon it of its environment.

(3.) The vegetable world, devoid of sensibility, is endowed with a vital activity, the immaterial constituent, or psyche, of each plant unifying its operations so that it can respond vitally, as well as physically, to the actions on it of its environment. Each plant has been endowed with a certain impressionability very different in degree in different species. Each plant, that is, has a certain susceptibility to organic impressions and aptitude for more or less appropriate response, together with a tendency to the reiteration of both receptive and responsive acts. Evidently this tendency to repetition stimulates, but is not "memory," as the responsive power stimulates, but is not cognition! As these faculties have been implanted by Infinite wisdom, they are innate faculties which are in a sense "rational" and "intelligent," but they are only materially so and not formally.

(4.) Animals possess the first-described *vegetal* powers, and in addition a special *animal* activity, involving "sensuous memory" and "sensuous cognition," as well as "feeling." The sentient powers of each animal, moreover, meet and are unified in a common sentient centre, and the animal therefore has "consentience," though not "consciousness." Along with the organization of each creature there is conjoined a necessarily accompanying psychical activity, which takes the form of "instinct," and which, as animals are higher and higher in grade, is more and more modifiable by their "sensuous cognition." The "material" presence of rationality and purposiveness in the instinctive action of insects, is as manifest as is their "formal" absence. "Instinct," is "animal habit," which may be said to be "implanted," as it is the necessary psychical accompaniment of a definite material organization. The animal psyche of each individual animal is the one agent of both

its vegetal and animal activities—the one agent of both modes of operation, the felt and the unfelt.

(5.) The soul of man has powers which are rational as well as animal and vegetal, and it is the one principle of these three diverse modes of operation. In him we find “organic habit” and “organic correspondence,” as well as “animal habit” or “instinct,” together with reason, and therefore with “consciousness” in the proper sense of that word.

Not only “memory,” but also “intelligence” and “purpose,” are “formally” as well as “materially” *in* him. They are “materially” present in the unfelt, organic actions of his organism and in his purely instinctive acts. They are formally present in his conscious, intellectual operations only. Man has, however, one instinct which is indeed noble, and which distinguishes him from all inferior creatures; it is that faculty which makes us glow with admiration and pleasure at the recital of a deed of heroic virtue. It is our reason, indeed, which judges that such an act is virtuous, but it is a Divinely implanted instinct which makes our hearts respond to the clear, cold judgment of our intellect.

(6.) The process of evolution in organic nature generally, as well as that process as it takes place in the formation of the individual, is a process replete with “purpose,” “intelligence,” and “volition;” these qualities, however, exist therein but “materially,” while they “formally” exist in their First Cause. He has ordained that succession of “forms” which takes place in each individual, in each plexus of individuals as a species, and in all nature as one whole—a succession mainly brought about by the ordered activity of that “principle of individuation” which is the immaterial and sovereign constituent of each animal and plant. The evolution of new species is therefore brought about by “psychogenesis,” and therein God acts by making use of those secondary causes, which are the souls of his organic creation, acting by their implanted powers of “organic habit” and “organic correspondence,” in response to the incident forces of environing agencies.

Thus, we venture to think, may be conciliated the various truths contained in the conflicting views of modern philosophers and physiologists, as exemplified in the works herein referred to. In this way we may welcome the theory of evolution by psychogenesis, as showing us how by merely natural but yet by immaterial agencies, the Creator has brought into being the many kinds of animals and plants which now exist, and the many more which once existed, but which now exist no longer. Thus also we may see how far “unconscious intelligence” may be truly said to be present in the material world around us—holding each organism in the wonderfully purposive transformation of individual develop-

ment, and also in the now small and transient, how considerable and stable changes, which lead to the first manifestation of yet another Divine idea—a new species. At the same time we may thus also justify the declaration of common sense when it affirms that conscious intelligence, purpose, and will exist pre-eminently in God, but are not formally present in the material creation, save only in his rational creatures, who have been formed in His image and likeness. Finally, this conception also enables us to recognize that in our own conscious intelligent and deliberately willed actions, we may behold a faint and feeble image of that infinite wisdom, and that omnipotent will by which the Creator first instituted and now sustains all the powers of his irrational creatures, organic and inorganic—their mechanical, chemical, and other physical forces; their vegetal and animal vital powers, including organic habits and responses and sensuous memories and cognitions.

In concluding this article, we would point out how the present reaction against the merely mechanical conception of nature, seems to point towards a mental revolution, like that which took place so many centuries ago when the peripatetic philosophy arose against the antecedent Ionian materialism. The views here put forward are we believe in harmony with that great traditional system, which is re-establishing its claims far and wide on the attention of mankind. It is this belief which leads us to hope they may be found to be of some slight use by harmonizing the dictates of science and of common sense, and so help, in however trifling a degree, in making more widely appreciated the just claims of what we believe may be justly called the “natural philosophy.”

THE CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN WESTERN COLONIZATION—COLONIZATION IN NEBRASKA.

Nebraska: its Advantages, Resources, and Drawbacks. By Edwin A. Curley. London: Sampson, Low & Co.

The Irish Catholic Colonization Association—Colony in Greeley County, Nebraska. Published by the Association.

The Religious Mission of the Irish Race and Catholic Colonization. By Rt. Rev. J. L. Spalding, Bishop of Peoria.

Nebraska As It Is. By L. D. Burch.

THE stream of emigration to the far Western States and Territories has set in during the past year with a force and volume which may well excite astonishment. The increased activity in all departments of trade in the cities, and the great impetus given to every branch of industry in the chief manufacturing centres of late, would seem to justify the expectation that the Western movement of the urban American population would have been greatly checked, if not altogether arrested. Not so. Good wages and plenty of work have not served to efface from the recollection of the artisan class the experiences of recent periods of painful distress, and sore and harassing struggles with poverty. The yearning to "occupy and possess the land" has grown in force and breadth of late years.

It is no new experience to the hardy and restless Western pioneers to follow the course of the sun, to explore the sources of the rivers that flow to either great ocean, and to penetrate the mountain defiles in search of "fresh fields and pastures new;" but this spirit of adventure and pioneer resolution is fast losing the fields and opportunities for its display and exercise. The tide of Western emigration and the mania for mining has carried a population into the remotest parts of the country; and within a few years, immense ranges of land, hitherto literally a *terra incognita*, have been opened to settlement and civilization. The curiously misnamed "Bad Lands," on the line of the Northern Pacific Railway in Dakota, the pastures of Montana, the coal-fields of Wyoming, the valleys and table-lands of Nebraska, are now rapidly filling up with a population as various in race and characteristics as can well be imagined. The enormous emigration from abroad the present year shows its significant traces in the streaming throng of German, Scandinavian, Polish, Bohemian, and Irish immigrants, which, as to far the greater number of all these nationalities, the Irish only forming the excep-

tion, with scarcely a pause at the seaboard cities, push onward to the West. The Scandinavians going mainly to the North, to Minnesota, Wisconsin, Dakota; the Germans, to the West and South, to Kansas and Texas; Poles and Bohemians, to Western Iowa and Nebraska; the Irish, to—where? A considerable number, we are told, pass on to Minnesota and Dakota, drawn thither, doubtless, by the fame of the Catholic colonies in the former State and the cheap lands in the latter. A large body went to Nebraska and to Kansas, but far the greater number evidently accepted employment, or were content with the chance of it, in the great cities.

Now that the area of land available in the West for agricultural purposes is steadily and rapidly diminishing, it becomes important to inquire into and investigate the resources and relative advantages presented by the States and Territories which still invite immigration, and hold out more or less alluring prospects to the colonist from abroad. Special importance attaches to this inquiry at the present time, in view of the movements and efforts made to influence the Catholic—especially the Irish Catholic—population in the American cities to avail of the opportunity to “buy a farm,” before the available and desirable land shall pass beyond the possibility of control by them.

This paper does not aim to detail the history of that movement. The logic and necessity of it has been forcibly and eloquently demonstrated in the Right Rev. Bishop Spalding’s remarkable book, *The Religious Mission of the Irish Race and Catholic Colonization*. But it may be necessary to lay stress on the fact that the organization of which the Bishop is the head, and to which he has lent the force and influence of his position and energy, is not designed or intended to promote and encourage emigration from Ireland. It is to remove the Irish people, or a moiety of them, out of the cities and manufacturing centres on to the land.

The Nebraska colony, in Greeley County, is the first colony founded by the association referred to, though it acquired land, about 10,000 acres, in one of Bishop Ireland’s previously established colonies in Minnesota, which was promptly taken, and is now fully settled by a colony of Irish-American families from Boston and vicinity.

The Nebraska colony, however, is the larger and more important venture; and upon its success the association has staked a considerable part of its capital and the outcome of its enterprise.

Nebraska comprises an area of 76,000 square miles, or, 48,636,800 acres. It is between the parallels of 40° and 43° and the meridians of 95 and 104 west.

Geographically it is in the centre-line of the States of the Union, and in the pathway to the States and Territories of the Pacific

slope. Its shape is nearly that of a parallelogram. Its greatest length from east to west is 412 miles, and its greatest width from north to south 208 miles. The notes and plats in the U. S. Surveyor-General's office shows 6485 miles of rivers and streams within the limits of Nebraska. The land lies in billowy prairies, with wide stretches of table-land. "The country," writes Bayard Taylor, "is one of the most beautiful I ever looked upon. I am more than ever struck with the great difference between this region and that to the east of the Mississippi. There is none of the wearisome monotony of the prairies, as in Illinois, or swampy tracts as in Indiana or Ohio. The wide billowy green, dotted all over with golden islands of harvest, the hollows of dark glittering maize, the park-like clumps of timber along the course of the streams, these serve the materials which went to the making up of every landscape, and of which, in their sweet harmonious, pastoral beauty, the eye never grows weary."

A similar testimony appears in the report of Mr. Lyman, Agricultural editor of the *New York Tribune*, in his report to the Farmer's Club of New York. He says: "I speak advisedly and not without a full impression upon my mind, of the exceeding attractiveness and fertility of Iowa and Southern Minnesota, when I say that the *most* attractive country I saw is west of the Missouri River. It is bounded on the north by the Platte, on the south by the Kansas, and on the west by the valley of the Republican."

The longest river in Nebraska, the Platte, is 1100 to 1200 miles long.

The soil of Nebraska is almost uniformly a rich, dark loam, containing all the elements of plant growth. According to Professor Aughey's analysis, it forms one of the richest and most tillable soil in the world. In fact, in chemical properties and formation, it comes nearest to the famous deposits in the Valley of the Nile, the plains of Lombardy, and the fertile wheat-fields of the Danube.

In his work *Nebraska as it is*, Mr. Burch says: "The almost universal dark, rich alluvium of Nebraska, with a substructure of loess, which is everywhere mixed with the surface mould, has the greatest versatility of production of any soil with which I am acquainted.

"There seems to be hardly a limit to the wide range of grains, grasses, and vegetables produced here. Not a domestic product of the soil, from the Red River of the north to the Indian Territory, fails of perfect development here. Even the plants and *flora* of the semi-tropical districts make a wonderful showing in this soil, when the climate and altitude are considered.

"Winter and spring wheat, rye, corn, barley, oats, buckwheat, sorghum, flax, hemp, broom-corn, millet, tobacco, beans, peas,

Irish and sweet potatoes, onions, turnips, and all the long list of garden vegetables; all the domestic grasses; apples, peaches, pears, cherries, plums, grapes, and the small fruits; osage orange, and all the endless lists of products of the medium latitudes, flourish in this wondrous, versatile, and ever fertile soil."

The testimony as to the richness and fertility of the soil of Nebraska is uniform and concurrent. Professor Hayden's reports, in connection with the geological surveys, the U. S. Agricultural reports, the reports and surveys made for the two leading railroads that intersect the State, the "Union Pacific Railroad," and the "B. & M. R. R. in Nebraska," taken together with the reports of the State Board of Agriculture, leave no room for doubt on this important question.

The next serious factor and consideration is *the climate*.

The full and comprehensive reports gathered by the U. S. Signal Service Corps, and regularly published, furnish abundant, and what must be regarded as conclusive, evidence on this point. These fully justify the eulogy on the climate of Nebraska indulged in by Mr. Burch, who characterizes it as "an attraction not even second to its wonderful soil."

And, he goes on to add :

"It is more than this, it is an inspiration. Almost uniformly free from excesses, it may be recorded as the equable, delightful mean between the rigorous North, and the extreme heat and humidity of the South. Its mean elevation of 2000 feet above the sea gives a rare, clear, and even radiant atmosphere, with almost perfect immunity from the damp, heavy, murky atmospheric conditions that obtain in the lake and sea-coast States. The Nebraska summer is a long and genial warm season, with delightful breezy days and cool, refreshing nights. The hottest days of July and August are tempered by the almost constant southerly and southwest winds. The high tone and stimulus of the atmosphere of this region are proverbial. A clear case of sunstroke in Nebraska is yet to be recorded. The cool, still nights are a restful and refreshing pleasure experienced in but few regions of the world. The Nebraska winter, as compared to the rigorous, snowy, frost-bound winter of New England, New York, and Wisconsin, is a very mild and pleasant season. Nine-tenths of the cold season is made up of bright, dry, mild weather. The snowfall is light, and rarely lies upon the ground more than a week. February and March give an occasional severe storm of short duration. The best commentary upon the winter of this country, is the grazing of cattle and sheep upon the ranges in the west half of the State, the year round, their only shelter from the storms being the native groves, gulches, and ravines. There is little malaria in Nebraska, for there is so little to produce it. There are no local conditions to generate or foster disease in men, animals, or plants. Only life and health, and the spirit of divine youth, is evoked from the bright skies, clear atmosphere, and pure water of this superb climate. It is but simple justice to Nebraska to say, that it is a poor country for doctors and physic, and comes very near to being a paradise for invalids. The mean temperature of Eastern and Southern Nebraska, in January, February, and March, is 20° above zero. The mean temperature of the same region for June, July, and August, is between 72° to 73° above."

An English journalist, settled in Nebraska, quoted by Mr. Curley in his work on Nebraska, testifies : "The rainfall is marvellously

adapted to meet the requirements of vegetation. It is worth noting that two-thirds of the entire quantity falls during the agricultural months of April to September, and that, therefore, there is abundant moisture for the growth of all crops."

The consideration of soil, climate, and productions thus disposed of, there still remains of course, other important questions to be taken into account by the colonist. The most serious of these, undoubtedly, is that of timber and fuel.

Forests of pine are to be found only in the northwestern part of the State; elsewhere the growth of timber is confined mainly to the bluffs and river banks.

The North Platte counties all have more or less oak, elm, ash, box, elder, cottonwood, walnut, willows, and the like along the streams.

The inducements offered by the U. S. Government for the planting of trees, is everywhere, in the new States and Territories, being availed of, and it is well known that trees grow with exceptional rapidity on the rich soil of the prairie.

Large tracts of government land in Nebraska are still open to entry under the conditions of the "Timber Culture Act," which gives under most liberal conditions 160 acres to a person who will plant timber on the moiety of the land thus given. By the operation of a subsequent amendment to this act, even a less quantity may be entered for the purpose—as 40, 80, or 160 acres, and only *ten acres* need be set out in trees.

Referring to this subject, Mr. Curley says: "Cottonwood, planted four feet apart each way, will bear much thinning for fuel at the end of two years' growth." "Three years at all events," he continues, "should provide any prudent settler with abundance of fuel, and with small poles for temporary fencing, if necessary."

The question of "Fuel Supply" the same author disposes of: "Within reasonable distance of the railways this is not difficult, as the railway companies have an interest in transporting it at a very low price, to encourage settlements, and when one brings a load of grain fifteen or twenty miles to market it will cost him little wear and tear and trouble to take back half a load of coal."

The colonization pamphlet affirms that where coal and timber are not readily available, "wild hay, corn stalks, compressed by a cheap domestic machine into hard bundles, and corn cobs are found to be so good substitutes, that some farmers declare that even if they had abundance of wood growing near them they would not take the trouble to chop it."

Great as are the advantages claimed for Nebraska as a grain-growing country, and certain as seems the prosperity of the settler

in that line, wealth is more easily and more promptly assured in *stock raising*.

Many pages in Mr. Curley's work are devoted to details of the personal experience of persons in Nebraska engaged almost exclusively in this pursuit. Names and figures are given. "Making every allowance," he observes, "for enthusiasm, the figures are perfectly astounding."

But stock raising implies capital at the outset, a resource which few colonists are happy enough to possess.

However, a beginning may be made even by persons of small means, with a few head of young cattle, or with sheep or hogs.

Herds may be formed with neighbors, or herding may be done with other settlers "on shares."

A party of Catholic colonists from Boston who went out to Greeley County last spring are reported to have formed a joint stock company, with a capital stock of limited amount, to be embarked in *sheep raising*.

Here then we have the groundwork, as to Nebraska, for speculation as the conditions on which settlement and colonization may be effected in that State.

If we add that of the Western States and territories which yet offer large bodies of unoccupied land, both government and railroad grant lands, Nebraska is now the nearest and most accessible to the immigrant and colonist from the seaboard, it will be seen that the discussion of its advantages, and the opportunities it offers to the class referred to, is a timely and important question, which may legitimately form the subject of review in these pages.

If Irish and Catholic colonists should go out on the land from the great cities, certainly it is an important inquiry—where can they go to the most advantage to themselves; in what State is their prosperity best assured?

This question cannot be eluded or evaded. Somebody must answer it. Plainly impossible as it is for the masses to attain to the possession of all the facts necessary to arrive at a determination from books and authorities, it is made still more difficult for them by the unreliable and exaggerated accounts put forth by interested railroad and land companies.

Even when the statements thus made are fair and impartial they will scarcely be taken on trust by the class most deeply concerned in their examination.

A measure of distrust naturally enters the mind of the reader; they are published for selfish motives by parties who, in the very nature of things, are *not* disinterested.

Hence, as Bishop Spalding points out in his book, *The Religious Mission of the Irish People*, the need of colonization societies

and bureaus of information. Perhaps he is not extravagant in saying that "a single association of this kind is worth a hundred St. Vincent de Paul societies." Indeed, the Right Reverend author more emphatically insists that "*there is no greater work to-day for the Catholic Church in the United States than that of Catholic colonization.*"

Evidently, then, it was not without matured and thoughtful consideration, and after a full survey of the entire field that the lately founded Irish-Catholic Colonization Association decided to locate its first colony in Nebraska. It was an important step, since the success of the new movement may be said to have been bound up in the fortunes of its pioneer colony.

Sufficient time, of course, has not elapsed since the arrival of the first settlers to fairly test and measure the success of the experiment; but the latest reports of the association show that the prospects are most encouraging. In fact, with the situation as presented, it will be the fault and misfortune of the individual settler if he shall fail to succeed. The local situation of this colony seems to justify all that has been predicted for it in the pamphlets and reports of the association.

Several years ago, General O'Neill, of "Fenian" notoriety, undertook to establish a colony of Irish settlers in Holt County, Nebraska, on the Elkhorn River, still further north than Greeley County, and did finally succeed in founding the *nucleus* of a colony. The conditions and local surroundings were vastly less favorable than those of the Catholic colony in Greeley County, if we except only the fact that government land could be entered by the settlers, and still, notwithstanding the disadvantages, the settlement thus formed is reported to be signally prosperous, and a flourishing, Irish-Catholic population possess farms in and around the vicinity of "O'Neill City." The *nucleus* of colonies of other nationalities are to be found in different parts of the State. There are several promising settlements, composed chiefly of German, Bohemian, and Polish Catholics, and there is a prospect for the establishment of a Swiss Catholic colony.

On the whole, it will be seen that a population of Catholic farmers is taking root in Nebraska, in fair number and proportion, and with the attention which the advantages possessed by that State is sure to command, we may confidently look forward to a very rapid accession to its population from this class the coming years.

The extension of the different lines of railways, and the multiplication of branches, is fast extending the network over the State, and this brings a larger area of land into the market, and makes it available for colonies and settlements.

Already, capitalists are beginning to seize the opportunities thereby presented for profitable investment in land, and we hear of considerable purchases being made by Catholic business men of New York and Chicago, and even from Ireland and England, whose attention to the subject was first drawn by the operations of the Irish-Catholic Colonization Association.

In this particular, great good may be accomplished, both directly and indirectly, in the work of promoting the settlement of Catholics on the land.

Once possessed by Catholics, whether in large or small bodies, for purposes of investment, that fact will lead to its sale to actual settlers, and though these may not be Catholics in all cases, certainly that class will be greatly encouraged and stimulated to purchase farms, with the view to ultimate settlement, and it would be to the interest of the Catholic capitalist to afford every incentive to this laudable desire.

Too much stress then cannot be laid on the importance of seizing the present opportunity to obtain possession of large bodies of land in the agricultural States and territories of the West—an opportunity which plainly is fast slipping away.

The owners of the soil become the rulers of the State, and in this country it is the farmers who influence and control legislation, and who, by their votes and power, mould the future of the State.

It is to recover this power that the Irish people, at home are struggling to-day, and once they obtain control of the land of Ireland, they will thenceforward mould its policy and direct its legislation.

Indisputably great as are the advantages which may reasonably be claimed for Nebraska as a field for the safe and profitable employment of capital in land, and certain as are the results assured to the prudent and energetic immigrant who shall settle in the colonies in that State, it is by no means the intention or design of the writer to claim that Nebraska *alone* offers the necessary conditions to invite capital and colonists.

Nebraska is here referred to merely as an illustration of what is possible and practicable in the work of promoting colonization.

Other States and territories in the West doubtless possess each its own peculiar advantages in soil, productions, climate, railroad, and transportation facilities, and the like. Catholic colonies have been established and carried on successfully in other States.

Minnesota, owing to the indomitable energy and persevering efforts of Bishop Ireland, occupies a front rank position in this regard. The several Catholic colonies founded by him in that State are in a condition of healthy and prosperous growth. Even the "Cormunaria" *canard*, spread with malicious industry the past

winter, failed to arrest the inflow of Catholic immigration to that State, which still continues to a greater extent than ever.

The Roman Catholic immigration into Kansas received a notable impulse from the exertions of Bishop Fink of that State, who has shown himself to be one of the most active and zealous of the Western prelates in encouraging colonization and providing for the wants and necessities of the Catholic settlers.

Dakota is now absorbing a considerable share of the Western stream of immigration, though comparatively a small dribble is reported to be *Irish*. The fame of its enormous yields of wheat, and the comparative cheapness of the lands,—there also being large areas of government land available for entry under the provisions of the homestead, soldiers' bounty, and the timber culture acts; these offer strong inducements to colonists.

Care, however, must be taken to avoid the belt of sterile and comparatively worthless land which lies west of the Missouri River.

Arkansas is another State which is fast looming into prominence as an inviting focus for colonies. The land-grant railroads are offering extraordinary inducements to settlers, and we have reason to believe that negotiations are pending looking to the early establishment of one or more Catholic colonies in that State, under the auspices of the National Association.

In Iowa there are still several hundred thousand acres of the best land in the State along the line of the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad, which still lies open to settlement.

In Michigan and Wisconsin a vast area of timber land, and of agricultural land, is reported in the market. And there is the vast empire of Texas and the Indian Territory.

The area and fields for extended colonization would seem to be without limit, but we are bound to take into account the enormous drafts that are being made on it. The railroads to the West are taxed to the utmost to provide accommodations for the prodigious throng of immigrants daily arriving at Castle Garden and elsewhere, and pressing on, like the columns of a vast army, to the West.

The first comers—the first settlers on the soil generally affect to determine and fix the character of the township or locality for good and aye. This is the experience of every Western community. The law of gravitation is not more inexorable. Race and religious affinities, social and domestic habits and characteristics, serve as a loadstone to draw the immigrant and colonist to the settlement and locality where he will find companionships and surroundings congenial to his tastes and duties.

It may be doubted, however, if colonies formed exclusively on the religion, the race, or the class basis, are, in the nature of things,

to be desired in this country. Probably the sooner the immigrant becomes thoroughly Americanized, using the term in its best sense, the better for himself and the better for the country.

He has to unlearn many old country ideas and customs; he has to acquire the language, the habits, and the training which fit him for the honest and honorable *role* of American citizenship, and enable him to compete, under favorable conditions, with those already in possession, and who are "to the manor born."

The Catholic colonies founded thus far, are not, and were not, intended to be exclusively for Catholics, and for them only. They were designed to be the *nucleus*, the rallying-point for Catholic farming communities, where the Catholic settler would be certain to find the indispensable Church and the necessary Catholic schools; but it was not the aim to bar out other settlers though of a different creed or race, and as a matter of fact, the colonies referred to embrace, in the composition of their different populations, the usual admixtures and varieties seen in all Western communities. And it is better so.

We need not go back to Lord Baltimore and the Maryland colony to demonstrate that the rights of non-Catholics are safe, and will be guardedly respected in the most strictly Catholic settlement.

This question of Catholic colonization is one of wider range and significance than perhaps appears on the surface. It is a question of more than Catholic concern.

As Catholics we are naturally interested in, and cannot be indifferent to, the growth and future of the Church in all parts of this vast country; and we are moved by every incentive of duty, and by every prompting of interest to aid and promote its legitimate spread and expansion, and the propagation of its happy and benignant influences.

That influence is now recognized to be a necessary restraining force on the individual, and a powerful conservator for the good of civil society. The American public begin to acknowledge this, and the still recent *emuetes* and disturbances which for a time threatened social order seemed to illustrate it most significantly. Hence this same public cannot but view with favor, the efforts now being made to direct and encourage the settlement of Catholic immigrants and settlers on the land.

The complaints which are sometimes made regarding "foreign" and "Catholic" influence, though, we believe, generally unjust and unreasonable, is most often, if not exclusively, applied to that influence as felt and shown in the chief cities, where large bodies of this population are thrown together.

Undoubtedly there are evils and mischievous influences at work

in the great centres which affect to demoralize a contingent of the Irish and so-called Catholic population in the maelstrom of city life.

The evils are indeed great and crying; and the best efforts of the friends of the Irish race especially, should be given to the task and duty of arresting and reforming the scandals at which we need not point more specifically.

The movement to promote Catholic colonization is one of the agencies, perhaps it would not be extravagant to say, the most potent agency in the work of reform. Colonization plainly benefits the individual settler, in raising him out of conditions and surroundings,—to say the least,—not calculated to favor his moral or social improvement; it benefits the community in that whatever tends to the welfare of the individual is not only a personal good, but a public gain, and a positive good to the State.

Colonization operates as a twofold agency for good. Like mercy, it is "twice blessed." It confers a positive benefit on the colonist who avails of the advantages afforded to him; it indirectly,—but no less positively,—benefits those who are forced, from choice or necessity, to eke out a livelihood in the cities and manufacturing towns.

Competition is at the root of the grievance which so often forms the burden and complaint of the sons of toil, and undoubtedly in certain employments there is often found to be a superabundance of labor, hence we have the periodic distress among the working classes.

Colonization is a partial remedy for this evil, and is, therefore, to that extent, a boon and a benefit to the mechanic and the laborer.

Catholic colonization is a question and a movement which cannot be blinked or set aside. Within a recent period it has been put before the public in a form, and with a force and emphasis which must command attention.

A national association has been formed, and is in successful operation, the better to effect and promote the end in view.

Archbishops and bishops have given to it their names, their influence, and their personal aid and co-operation, and certainly no light motive would weigh with these distinguished and honored prelates to thus influence and move them to depart from their usual reserve in the cause of a business enterprise; but the necessity was instant and the step indispensable.

The Catholic laymen of the United States, and in a particular manner those who come under the head of "capitalists," have now a plain duty to perform,—a duty which involves no hazard, and calls for no sacrifices.

Either to combine with the existing association in extending and enlarging the scope of its operations, aiding it with the necessary

increase of capital as an investment ; or by forming new combinations under kindred auspices and conditions for a like end and purpose.

It is useless to multiply words to emphasize the importance of this generous and noble work.

The means and the methods are open to all who sympathize with it.

RICHARD CRASHAW.

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"Poet and saint, to thee alone are giv'n

The two most sacred names of Earth and Heav'n."—COWLEY.

THE English history for the first half of the XVIIth century is the record of civil wars, religious persecutions, and sequestrations of property. It was a time of unrest and of jeopardy. Harsh tyranny, bloodthirsty hatred, and sacrilegious covetousness held the Court, the Parliament, and the soldiery. Political strife in Parliament and among the masses, persecution at the altar and at the hearth, the spoliation of churches, the breaking up of households, and, spread over all, the gloom of Puritan intolerance, made a long night over the land. It is well that we can turn from the cry of the mourner and of the persecuted to the song of the poet. When the times were seemingly most unfavorable, poetry flourished at its best. Within this half century, all the great dramatists wrote ; and many of the lyric and sacred poets sang their sweetest and unrivalled songs, and passed away, leaving Lovelace, Cowley, Davenant, Denham, Herrick, and the "mighty" Milton to link the two half centuries.

Among the minor poets of the time was one who sang because

his nature forced him. "Shy, modest, and retiring," Richard Crashaw was of too sensitive and too delicate a nature to meet as others did the shocks of a disturbed society. In solitude that was not splenetic, in study that was not idle, and in prayer that was not pharisaical, he refined yet more a naturally refined temperament. His thoughts were poetic and verse were their natural dress. No verse could be too dainty for his dainty thoughts: no thought too great for his word-painting. During his life, he was loved as a man, revered as a saint, and admired as a poet. In later times he was overlooked or, else, known only to poets and to students. Because he was thus obscure, artificial poets freely borrowed from him. Much as botanists or mineralogists keep in mind a good place for collecting, lesser poets have remembered his power of epithet, his originality, and his epigrammatic force. Until Grosart, Crashaw suffered greatly from the misleading blunders and careless work of his editors; and, hence, not until recently was it possible to see the poet in all the warm beauty of his originality and in the majesty of his power. Of his time and class, no poet better repays study. The verse of many a sacred poet has little merit other than that it is religious; but even the religious verse of Crashaw is true poetry.

The home of the Crashaws was in Handsworth, or Hansworth, near Sheffield, then a small hamlet of England; and the church register of the family covers a period from 1558 to a comparatively recent date. Richard Crashaw, however, was born in London in 1612. This needed fact was not known until Grosart ingeniously took it from the register-entry of Crashaw's age when admitted to the university. William Crashaw, the father of Richard, was a "Preacher of the Temple," a writer with a strange power of fierce invective, and a poet of his own kind. The father is often confounded with the son; but the distinguishing difference is very great. The father was scholarly, and could be impressive, powerful, and eloquent; but spite, rancor, and prejudice marred all his work. "Popery," his mildest term for the Catholic religion, was the object of his gall; and his writings are full of uncharitableness, sarcasm, and hatred. The title-page of his "Jesvites' Gospell" is as follows:

"Loyola's Disloyalty; or the Jesvites' open Rebellion against God and His Church. Whose Doctrine is Blasphemie, in the highest degree, against the blood of Christ, which they Vilifie and undervalew, that they might uphold their Merits. By consequent, encouraging all Traytors to kill their lawfull Kings and Princes. With divers other Principles and Heads of their damnable and erronious Doctrine. Worthy to be written and read in these our doubtfull and dangerous times."

In his last will occur these two sentences, with others of a like nature :

"I accounte Poperie (as it nowe is) the heape and chaos of all heresies, and the channell whereunto the fowlest impieties and heresies that have bene in the Christian Worlde have runne and closelye•emptied themselves. I beleeeve the Pope's seate and power to be the power of the greate Antichrist, and the doctrine of the Pope (as nowe it is) to be the doctrine of Antichrist; yea, that doctrine of devills prophesied of by the Apostles, and that the trve and absolute Popist, livinge and dyeinge, debarres himself of salvation for oughte that we knowe." As a poet, the father had a singular power of epithet and good poetic sense; but no more of his writings is needed to make us understand in what contrast stood the son.

Of Richard's mother, nothing is known; but a step-mother, who died in first child-birth, is celebrated in the writings of the widower and in the funeral discourse of Usher. The prelate speaks of "her singular motherly affection to the child of her predecessor—a rare virtue in step-mothers at this day." It is a pity that such a step-mother was not spared longer than a year to the nine-year-old Richard. The motherless lad "gained admission to the great charter-house school through Sir Henry Telverton and Sir Randolph Crew." The date of admission is not known, and the only clue is in the lines in memory of Robert Brooke, who became "Master" in 1628; but it is probable that Crashaw entered before that date. When he was in his fourteenth year, he lost his father. The will appointed "Mr. Robert Dixon and my sonne Richarde" executors. The will made no especial provision for the boy; but, as only son and child, he was entitled to his portion over and above the legacies. His age did not prevent his being named as executor; for, in those days, even an unborn child was sometimes named for that position. Being a minor, he could not act; and so the will was proved by the other executor. It is strange that Crashaw's writings do not contain any direct reference to either of his parents.

It is not known how long he attended charter-house; but it is certain that he was admitted to Pembroke College, July 6th, 1631, and that he was "matriculated pensioner," March 26th, 1632. A tender incident of this part of his life is to be found in his five win-some laments for the early death of his friend and companion, William Herrys, who died in 1631. Herrys is "the most desired"; "nature's choycest jewell"; Apollo is "not fairer than is hee"; his tongue was "the touchstone of Rhetoric's gold"; he is "the sweetest among men," one whom Death ought to spare; if the Fates could relent,

"Teares would now have flow'd so deepe
As might have taught Griefe how to weepe ;"

and, again,

"Sicknesse would have gladly been
Sick himselfe to have sav'd him ;"

and with him dies "all hope of never dying." The poet's grief was morbid ; and, so, the extravagance of praise and the exaggeration of effect were natural. The grief was real, and the laments throb with the strange earnestness of his bereavement. Very tenderly, indeed, and very poetically could Crashaw embalm the memory of those whom he esteemed. He remembered his teachers or mourned his friends in inspired verse. Later in life, he might sing more divinely, but he could not love his friends more humanly. Apart from a few school pranks, the deaths of Herrys and of some other tenderly mourned friends are the only early incidents recorded in his verse.

Crashaw received the degree A.B. in 1634. The same year he published anonymously a volume of Latin epigrams and other poems. It was a remarkable book for a young man of twenty years. It is certain that he was not an idler ; for these poems were composed carefully, with the exception of a few which may have been the work of idle moments. In the university his poetic ability was early recognized. He was a contributor to the various "collections" published from 1631 to the end of his residence ; and therein, both in Latin and in English verse, he appeared in favorable comparison with Wren, Henry More, Joseph Beaumont, Edward King (Lycidas), Edward Rainbow, Cowley, and kindred. In 1634 he passed from Pembroke to Peterhouse ; was made Fellow in 1637 ; and received the degree A.M. in 1638, intending to become a "Minister" of the Gospel. The next six years, or until the "ejection" of 1644, were passed in such retirement that nothing is known of his life.

From his retreat at Cambridge, during the twelve years of his residence there, Crashaw must have looked sorrowfully at the events of the outside world. To him these were years of study, and, perhaps, of dread ; but they were years of greater dread and unrest to others. The Parliament which was dissolved in March, 1629, was the last Parliament which met in England during eleven years ; and, all this time, the measures of the government became more arbitrary and tyrannical. In 1637 Cromwell, Hampden, and Pym, resolving to leave their native land, embarked for New England ; but their ship, when about to sail, was stayed by an order of the council. They remained ; and "with them," says Macaulay, "remained the evil genius of the House of Stuart." The oppressive measures against the Catholics were increased in 1642. The main object of these measures was the property of the Catho-

lies. To escape further persecution and spoliation by the Reformers, the Catholics had been driven to side with the Royalists; and the reformers, falsely charging the civil war to Catholic intrigue, claimed that its expenses ought to be defrayed from the property of the Catholics. It was ordained that two-thirds of the estate, both real and personal, of every Papist be seized and sold for the benefit of the nation; and the meaning of "Papist" was made inclusive of sympathizers. Having fattened themselves upon the property of the Catholics, the Reformers were now looking with avaricious eyes at the wealth of the Episcopal establishment. To the Puritans the pomp of the prelates of the Established Church was offensive and their pride was hateful. For the Puritans, there came a day of retribution when the Episcopacy was abolished. The churches were stripped of their ornaments; the bishops were accused of crimes or were impeached; and the two houses of Parliament promptly sequestered the livings. The Episcopal Church began to feel how heavy was the hand of the persecutor. The universities did not escape. In Cambridge the ecclesiastics had long before become objects of suspicion. For many a year they had taught the duty of passive obedience; and, during the civil war, they had more than once advanced large sums to the king. In 1642 Cambridge sent to the king the public plate to be coined into money; and it is said that Cromwell, then a member of Parliament from Cambridge, intercepted a part of the treasure. The university had had its day; and in 1644 it became a garrison for the religious soldiers of Cromwell. In their zeal these soldiers, to whom the Episcopalians had become almost as obnoxious as were the Catholics, demolished statutes, painted windows and organs; cut down the groves; marred every beautiful or sacred thing; and stole from St. John's the valuable collection of coins. The spoliation had begun; for in January of that year the ordinance for the reform of the University had been passed. Ten heads of houses, and sixty-five Fellows, including Richard Crashaw, were expelled, or "ejected," because they conscientiously refused to sign the "Solemn League and Covenant." Subsequently a Committee of Reform, to which the work fell after the departure of the temperate Earl of Manchester, carried the number to two hundred. The University lost part after part and gradually wasted away. It was "purified," however; and the Reformers began to build upon what they thought to be a more righteous basis. They believed that they were fighting superstition; and that belief became the frenzy of the day. Neither house of Parliament was superstitious; and so, by ordinance, both houses converted Christmas of 1644 into a day of "fasting and public humiliation."

Driven from the University, Crashaw and his companions took different paths. During twelve years the University had been Crashaw's home; and around it had centred all his dreams, all his pleasures, all his duties. It was a harsh change. Strong in his attachment to the place, and without a disposition to make new friends, he could not expect to find in a new life or in a change of any kind a compensation for the violence to his imagination and to his affections. But he was no "pining mourner." Duty made him courageous; and he bore, without improper sign of weakness, this last spoliation and desecration. Alone, unknown, and unfriended, he left England and went to France; and, in Paris, suffered without murmuring that neglect which was likely to beset a gentle, retiring scholar.

In 1646 the "Steps to the Temple" and "Delights of the Muses" were published; but it is worthy of note that these titles were given by the unknown editor and friend of the author. The editor, explaining the titles, gives us curiously an insight into the author's life:

"Reader, we stile his Sacred Poems Steps to the Temple, and aptly, for in the Temple of God, under His wing, he led his life, in St. Marie's Church neere St. Peter's Colledge: there he lodged under Tertullian's roofof angels; there he made his nest more gladly than David's swallow neere the house of God, where, like a primitive saint, he offered more prayers in the night than others usually offer in the day; there he penned these poems, Steps for happy soules to climbe Heaven by, and those other of his pieces, intituled The Delights of the Muses (though of a more humane mixture) are as sweet as they are innocent." The editor, who held "against Suarez on the subject, divine poetry to be the language of the angels," is quaintly enthusiastic in Crashaw's praise: "Oh! when the generall arraignment of poets shall be, to give an account of their higher soules, with what a triumphant brow shall our divine Poet sit above, and looke downe upon poore Homer, Virgil, Horace, Claudian, etc.? who had amongst them the ill-lucke to talke out a great part of their gallant genius, upon bees, dung, froggs, and gnatts, etc., and not as himself here, upon Scriptures, divine graces, martyrs, and angels." This turgid preface is strangely at variance with Crashaw's mode of thinking and of writing.

In 1648 a second edition of these poems, with much new matter, was published. The first edition is noteworthy, as showing the author's conversion to the Catholic Church; for it contained the "Apologie" for his hymn in honor of St. Teresa. In a later edition, of 1652, this poem was more fully described: "An apologie for the foregoing Hymne, as having been writt when the

author was yet among the Protestantes." Some time, then, before 1646 Crashaw had formally become a Catholic. The reasons for his change of religion have been often misstated. He has been charged with a desire for gain; but, inasmuch as nothing could be worse than the condition of English Catholics at that time, the charge is without force. In a worldly sense, he had nothing to gain by the change, but everything to lose; for he had wealthy Protestant uncles and aunts who could have helped him after the "ejection." His intense, sympathetic admiration for St. Teresa has been given as another cause of the change; but no mere admiration of a saint, even such as Teresa, will make a man sacrifice home, position, relatives, and friends. Like many others, Crashaw had been slowly tending to the Catholic Church, and his action was not hastily conceived or adopted. He was not the only distinguished churchman whom religious wrangling and party strife made reflect. Even Chillingworth, sometimes called the immortal, and Jeremy Taylor had "gone over" to the Catholic Church for short periods. Until about his twenty-second year, Crashaw appears, from some of his earlier poems belonging to 1631-33, to have been sufficient of a Protestant to satisfy his father; and it has been shown that his father was the "Protestant of Protestants." Until about that age he retained even his father's strange vocabulary of wrath. Thus in his poem on the "Gunpowder Treason," he cries out:

"Reach me a quill, pluckt from the flaming wing
Of Pluto's Mercury, that I may sing
Death to the life. My inke shall be the blood
Of Cerberus, or Alecto's viperous brood."

The change in his later language, shown by the absence of vituperation, and the change in his religion seem to have been gradual during his years at Cambridge. This may be seen from his study of St. Teresa, for whom he came to have such a holy passion that no earthly love could take its place. In one of his epigrams, he says:

"I would be married, but I'de have no wife;
I would be married to a single life."

The author of the "Hymne to the name and Honor of the admirable Sainte Teresa" may have been "yet among the Protestants;" but his sympathies and his feelings, if not his reason, appear to have been with the Catholics. Undoubtedly his admiration for the saint was antecedent to the change, but did not cause it. The true reason lies elsewhere. He was a student, and his reading was extensive. His familiarity with the dead and living languages gave him the means for scriptural research and for controversial writings not then to be found in English. His

moral nature was finally attuned; and he had the courage necessary to face ridicule and wrath. He needed not the influence of his friends and companions. For conscience sake he could offend even them. He acted with the deliberation of a logician; and he bore the ensuing poverty, disgrace, and contumely with the fortitude of a martyr. He had nothing of that weakness which makes us consent to the wrong, because we fear to do the right. His conscience bade him go; and he majestically went into exile and into the Catholic Church.

It was in Paris, probably, that Crashaw was received into the Catholic Church. There, unknown, he lived in undeserved obscurity, and, perhaps, in penury. There, too, were written his delicate poem, upon sending two green apricots, "Time's Tardy Truants," to his friend the poet Cowley; and his own alternate poem on "Hope," which Coleridge pronounced superior to Cowley's. In 1646, after the battle of the civil war at Naseby, Cowley, who was then secretary to Lord Jermyn, went to Paris and found Crashaw in poverty; and it is intimated, but it is not certain, that, from his own abundance, he relieved the needs of Crashaw. Cowley usually has the credit of introducing Crashaw to the English Queen, then a fugitive in Paris. It has not been satisfactorily proved, however, that it was he, or that it was necessary for him to do it; for, through his many royal panegyrics, Crashaw must have been already known to the Queen. With the Queen's letters of recommendation to Italy, Crashaw went to Rome, there to end life's labors.

The known facts of Crashaw's life in Italy are unfortunately very few. At Rome he obtained the post of "secretary" to the Cardinal Palotta. The Cardinal was a man of angelic life; but some of his attendants or followers were corrupt. The pious Crashaw, becoming aware of the wrong-doing, fearlessly and promptly informed the Cardinal. By this act he won the esteem of Palotta, but excited the hate and threats of the guilty attendants. To shield him from revenge, and to give him a quieter life with higher duties, the good Cardinal made him a beneficiary of the Basilica Church of Loretto. Thither Crashaw went, and cheerfully began his new work. In 1650, after a three months' residence, an Italian fever stopped his heart and stilled his voice forever. He was buried within the chapel of the "Holy House," near to his God and afar from the world of strife. By the best of every class in life he was tenderly mourned, while Cowley wept poetic tears:

"How well, blest swan, did Fate contrive thy death,
And made thee render up thy tuneful breath
In thy great mistress's arms! Thou most divine
And richest off'ring of Loretto's shrine!
Where, like some holy sacrifice t'expire,
A fever burns thee, and Love lights the fire."

—*On the death of Crashaw.*

Inspired poets are very few. The imitators are numerous; but the best of these succeed only as to the form, and fail as to the spirit. The inspired poet is creative, and gives life as well as form: the unimpassioned poet gives the form, but not the life. The passion and imagination of the one gives living form; the intellect and ingenious skill of the other brings forth a wonderful still-born coldness. The intellect cannot do the work of the sensibilities. In the inspired poet the two must be combined. Inspired poets have written many a lifeless verse, and uninspired poets have written many a life-glowing line; but no writer can be ranked by an occasional defect, or by an occasional excellence. Hence there are two classes of poets. In England, the poets of the second class, whom Samuel Johnson inaptly called "metaphysical poets," clustered in the seventeenth century, and established an artificial school, which Pope, in the eighteenth century, brought to its highest power. They were skilful workmen, but the exquisiteness of their workmanship was their main claim to praise. They were ingenious or mechanical rather than passionate or inspired. Their rhetoric was odd or startling rather than natural or wonted. Their ideas were distorted, their phraseology was fantastic, and their meaning was obscure. Their poetry was marred by cold "conceits," born of the vanity of their mere skill. They delighted to give a factitious value of expression or of situation to what was poetically low. Rhyme and rhythm were faultless; but the poetry was dead. Their verse was pretty, glittering, corruscating; but it awakened no deep feeling. "Conceits" were the fashion of the time; and these poets supplied what a public perverted taste demanded. They subserved a purpose, however, and better poets gained something from them. With Petrarch and Marino, in Italy, and with Herrick, Suckling, Lovelace, Carew, Waller, Cowley, and kindred, in England, Richard Crashaw is placed in this class. It is a goodly company; but in so many respects is Crashaw an exception to his companions, that the classification seems somewhat inexact. His conceits are not cold, and his verse is rarely passionless. Creative imagination, natural tenderness, refined sentiment, and delicate imagery give great living beauty to his lines. His faults are not glaring; and, though they sometimes make passages obscure, they never spoil the fresh woodland charm of his original ideas. The masterly melody of his versification and the luxuriousness of his expressions please without cloying. He does more than please; his thought-laden verse awakens noble feelings, high resolves, and deep-felt veneration.

Crashaw attempted no great single poem; but his writings in English, in Latin, and in Greek are many. In character his poems are mostly sacred; and all such thrill us with the rapture of adora-

tion. Not Diana, or other Pagan deity, but the Virgin Mary was his Muse. "It is miraculous," says the Rev. Alexander Grosart, the best editor of Crashaw, "how he finds words wherewith to utter his most subtle and ravishing emotion. Sometimes there is a daintiness and antique richness of wording that you can scarcely equal out of the highest of our poets, or only in them."

The poems "In the Nativity of ovr Lord God, a Hymn svng as by the Shepherds," and "In the Glorious Epiphanie, a Hymn svng as by the three Kings," show the poet's grandeur, power, originality, and tenderness. Their lyric music flows from a master's hand. The unity of each is so close that making an extract seems like picking to pieces a mosaic. The conceit with which "The Nativity" opens that the joy of the shepherds at finding our Lord is stolen, because the sun had not yet arisen, mars but little the wonderful poem. The "chorus" "wake the sun that lyes too long," and call upon the shepherd Tityrus to tell to the cheated sun where he has been, and upon Thyrsis to tell what he has seen :

TITYRUS.

"Gloomy night embrac't the place
Where the noble Infant lay.
The Babe look't up and shew'd His face;
In spite of darkness, it was day.
It was Thy day, Sweet, and did rise
Not from the East, but from Thine eyes.
Chorus.—It was Thy day, Sweet.

THYRSIS.

"Winter chidde aloud, and sent
The angry North to wage his warres.
The North forgott his feirce intent,
And left perfumes instead of scarres.
By those sweet eyes' persuasive powrs
Where he mean't frost, he scatter'd flowrs.
Chorus.—By those sweet eyes.

BOTH.

"We saw Thee in Thy baulmy-nest,
Young dawn of our aternall day!
We saw Thine eyes break from their East
And chase the trembling shades away.
We saw Thee; and we blest the sight;
We saw Thee by Thine own sweet light.
* * * * *

FVLL CHORUS.

"Wellcome, all wonders in one sight!
Aeternity shutt in a span!
Sommer in Winter, Day in Night!
Heauen in Earth, and God in man!
Great, little One! Whose all-embracing birth
Lifts Earth to Heauen, stoops Heau'n to Earth.

" Wellcome, though not to gold nor silk,
 To more than Cæsar's birthright is;
 Two sister-seas of virgin-milk,
 With mony a rarely-tempered kisse,
 That breathes at once both maid and mother,
 Warms in the one, cools in the other.
 Shee sings Thy tears asleep, and dips
 Her kisses in Thy weeping eye;
 She spreads the red leaves of Thy lips,
 That in their buds yet blushing lye;
 She 'gainst those mother-diamonds, tries
 The points of her young eagle's eyes.

* * * * *

" Yet when young April's husband-showrs
 Shall blesse the fruitfull Maja's bed,
 We'll bring the first-born of her flowrs
 To kisse Thy feet and crown Thy head.
 To Thee, dread Lamb, whose loue must keep
 The shepheards, more than they the sheep.
 To Thee, *meek Majesty, soft King*
Of simple graces and sweet loves,
 Each of vs his lamb will bring,
 Each his pair of sylver doues;
 Till burnt at last in fire of Thy fair eyes,
 Ourselues become our own best sacrifice."

Grandeur yet, sublime in thought and in wording, and full of mighty epithets is the "Epiphanie." The genius of the poet flames into full brightness. Hear the Kings, in their adoration, acknowledging their past mistake:

- 1 Kinge.* We who strangely went astray,
 Lost in a bright
 Meridian night,
2 Kinge. A darkness made of too much day,
3 Kinge. Becken'd from farr
 By Thy fair starr,
 Lo, at last haue found our way.
Chorus. To Thee, Thou Day of Night! Thou East of West!
 Lo, we at last haue found the way
 To Thee, the world's great vniuersal East,
 The generall and indifferent¹ Day.
1 Kinge. All-circling point! all centring sphear!
 The World's one, round, aeternall year:
2 Kinge. Whose full and all-vnwrinkled face
 Nor sinks nor swells with time or place;
3 Kinge. But euerywhere and euery while
 Is one consistent, solid smile:
1 Kinge. Not vext and tost
2 Kinge. 'Twixt spring and frost:
3 Kinge. Nor by alternate shreds of light,
 Sordidly shifting hands with shades and night.

¹ "Indifferent" is used in the old sense of "impartial," not in the present sense, "unconcerned."

Chorus. O little all! in Thy embrace
The world lyes warm, and likes his place;
Nor does his full globe fail to be
Kist on both his cheeks by Thee.
Time is too narrow for Thy year,
Nor makes the whole World Thy half-sphear.

* * * * *

1 Kinge. Farewell the world's false light!
Farewell, the *white*
Aegypt; a long farewell to thee
Bright idol, black idolatry:
The dire face of inferior darkness, *his't*
And courted in the pompus mask of a more specious mist.

2 Kinge. Farewell, farewell
The proud and misplac't gates of hell,
Perch't in the Morning's way,
And double-guilded as the doors of Day:
The deep hypocrisy of Death and Night,
More desperately dark because more bright.

3 Kinge. Welcome, the world's sure way!
Heavn's wholsom ray.

* * * * *

1 Kinge. The deathless Heir of all Thy Father's day!
2 Kinge. Decently born!

Embosom'd in a much more rosy morn:
The blushes of Thy all vnblemisht Mother.

3 Kinge. No more that other
Aurora shall sett ope
Her ruby casements, or hereafter hope
From mortall eyes
To meet religious welcomes at her rise."

Prophesying, the Kings declare that the darkened nations will recognize the new Light. They foresee a dimming of the sun at the Crucifixion.

"*1 Kinge.* Time has a day in store
When this so proudly poor
And self-oppressed spark, that has so long
By the loue-sick world been made
Not so much their sun as shade:
Weary of this glorious wrong,
From them and from himself shall flee
For shelter to the shadow of Thy tree:

Chorus. Proud to haue gain'd this *pretious losse*
And chang'd his false crown for Thy crosse.

2 Kinge. That dark day's clear doom shall define
Whose is the master-fire, which sun should shine:
That sable judgment-seat shall by new lawes
Decide and settle the great cause
Of controuerted light:

Chorus. And Natur's wrongs rejoice to doe Thee right.

3 Kinge. That forfeiture of Noon to Night shall pay
All the idolatrous thefts done by this Night of Day.

And the great Penitent presse his own pale lipps
With an *elaborate loue-eclipse* :

To which the low world's lawes
Shall lend no cause,

Chorus. Save those domestick which He borrowes
From our sins and His own sorrowes."

They foresee a second dimming at the conversion of St. Paul:

"1 *Kinge.* As by a fair-ey'd fallacy of Day
Miss-ledde, before, they lost their way;
So shall they, by the seasonable fright
Of an vnseasonable night,
Loosing it once again, stumble on true Light:

2 *Kinge.* And as before His too-bright eye
Was their more blind idolatry;
So his officious blindness now shall be
Their black, but faithfull perspective of The.

* * * * *

2 *Kinge.* By the oblique ambush of this close night
Couch't in that *conscious shade*,
The right-ey'd Areopagite
Shall with a vigorous guesse invade
And catch Thy quick reflex; and sharply see
On this dark ground
To descant Thee.

3 *Kinge.* O prize of the rich Spirit! with what feirce chase
Of his strong soul, shall he
Leap at thy *lofty face*,
And seize the swift flash, in rebound
From this *obsequious cloud*,
Once called a sun
Till dearly thus vndone."

The poem ends with the prophetic assurance of the undimmed glory of the True Light:

"*Chorus.* Therefore to Thee and Thine, auspicious ray,
Dread Sweet, lo thus
At last by vs,
The delegated eye of Day
Does first his scepter, then himself, in solemne tribute pay.

Thus he vndresses
His sacred vnshorn tresses;
At Thy adoréd feet, thus he layes down

1 *Kinge.* His gorgeous tire
Of flame and fire,

2 *Kinge.* His glittering robe,
3 *Kinge.* His sparkling crown;

1 *Kinge.* His gold,
2 *Kinge.* His mirrh,

3 *Kinge.* His frankincense.

Chorus. To which he now has no pretence;
For being show'd by this Day's light, how farr
He is from sun enough to make Thy starr,

His best ambition now is but to be
Something a brighter shadow, Sweet, of Thee.
 Or on Heaun's azure forehead high to stand
 Thy golden index ; with a duteous hand
 Pointing vs home to our own sun
 The world's and his Hyperion."

In this poem some obscurity of meaning arises from the double reference to the second dimming and from an imperfect expression of the lesser lights which the chorus call "twin-suns." The obscuring lines are few ; but it is a pity that they admit many interpretations. Elsewhere the thought is expressed with strength, simplicity, and majesty. Even in the omitted portions every line shows originality of idea or of expression ; as when mention is made of the sun "hiding his vex't cheeks in a hir'd mist." The poem is a work of genius ; and the few seeming obscurities may prove merely the coldness of the reader and not the imperfection of the impassioned poet.

"The hymn to the name and honor of the Admirable Sainte Teresa," is suffused by an excited imagination. Its lovely simplicity gives it a power over the affections of the reader ; and its "touch of nature" makes the poet dearer. The warmth and loveliness seem to lie in the story itself, but only as the human form in the uncut block of marble. In his unstinted praise of this poem, Coleridge generously says: "These verses were ever present to my mind whilst writing the second part of *Christabel* ; if, indeed, by some subtle process of the mind, they did not suggest the first thought of the whole poem." The poet was imbued with admiration for St. Teresa ; and in the poem love fires his genius. The alternative title of the poems reads : "Fovndresse of the Reformation of the discalced Carmelites, both men and women ; a Woman for angelical height of speculation, for masculine courage of performance more than a woman ; who yet a child, outran maturity, and durst plott a Martyrdome." The plotting of the martyrdom is the main incident of the poem ; but the whole story of the plot is worth the retelling. When eight or nine years of age, Teresa, from much reading of the lives of the saints, became aglow with the desire for martyrdom. Apostle-like she fired her brother Roderick, her senior by a year or two, to join in her project to go to the Moors, avow their faith, and so win a glorious death. The novice-martyrs stealthily steal away from their home in the Spanish town of Avila, traverse the city, pass through the gates, and begin, on foot, without guide or map, and with only a few bits of bread for provisions, the four hundred miles' journey to Africa. Unexpectedly met by an uncle, and unwillingly led back to their anxious mother, Roderick's fear makes him repent, and boy-like he throws

the blame upon his sister; but Teresa, radiant with her holy purpose, accepts the blame, and gives this heroic justification: "I ran away because I want to see God, and because I must die before I can see him." If the whole of this story were known to the poet, he contented himself with the main fact. He seizes upon the idea that love is the

"Absolute sole lord
Of life and death,"

and would prove it, not by the great martyrs, but by

"The mild
And milky soul of a soft child,"

Then thus he tells the story:

"Scarce has she learn't to lisp the name
Of martyr; yet she thinks it shame
Life should so long play with that breath
Which spent can buy so brave a death.
She never vndertook to know
What Death with Love should have to doe;
Nor has she e'er yet vnderstood
Why to show loue, she should shed blood,
Yet, though she cannot tell you why,
She can love and she can dy.

"Scarce has she blood enough to make
A guilty sword blush for her sake;
Yet has she a heart dares hope to proue
How much less strong is Death than Love.

"Be Loue but there; let poor six yeares
Be pos'd with the maturest fears
Man trembles at, you straight shall find
Love knowes no nonage, nor the mind;
'Tis love, not years or limbs that can
Make the martyr, or the man.
Love touch't her heart, and lo it beats
High, and burnes with such braue heates;
Such thirsts to dy, as dares drink vp
A thousand cold deaths in one cup.
Good reason; for she breaths all fire;
Her white breast heaves with strong desire
Of what she may with fruitless wishes
Seek for amongst her mother's kisses.

"Since 'tis not to be had at home
She'l traual to a martyrdom.
No home for her confesses she
But where she may a martyr be.

"She'l to the Moores; and trade with them
For this vnualved diadem:
She'l offer them her dearest breath,
With Christ's name in't, in change for death:

She'l bargain with them; and will giue
 Them God; teach them how to liue
 In Him; or, if they this deny,
 For Him she'l teach them how to dy;
 So shall she leaue amongst them sown
 Her Lord's blood, or at least her own.

"Farewell, then, all the World! adieu!
 Teresa is no more for you.
 Farewell, all pleasures, sports, and ioyes
 (Never till now esteemed toyes)
 Farewell, whatever dear may bee,
 Mother's arms or father's knee;
 Farewell house, and farewell home!
She's for the Moores, and martyrdom."

Knowing the fate reserved for her, the poet tenderly says:

"Sweet, not so fast! lo thy fair spouse
 Whom thou seekest with so swift vows,
 Calls thee back, and bids thee come
 To embrace a milder martyrdom.

* * * * *

Thou art Love's victime; and must dy
 A death more mysticall and high;
 Into Loue's armes thou shalt let fall
A still-seruicing funerall."

He sees her transports of love:

"How kindly will thy gentle heart
 Kisse the sweetly-killing dart!
 And close in his embraces keep
 Those delicious wounds, that weep
 Balsom to heal themselves with: thus
 When these thy deaths, so numerous
 Shall all at last dy into one,
 And melt thy soul's sweet mansion;
 Like a soft lump of incense, hasted
 By too hott a fire, and wasted
 Into perfuming clouds, so fast
 Shalt thou exhale to Heaun at last
 In a resolving sigh, and then
 O what? Ask not the tongues of men;
 Angells cannot tell; suffice
 Thy selfe shall feel thine own full ioyes,
 And hold them fast forever there."

Rapturously does the poet describe her entrance into heaven;
 and then, thus ecstasically concludes:

"Those rare workes where thou shalt haue writt
 Love's noble history, with witt
 Taught thee by none but Him, while here
 They feed our soules, shall clothe thine there.

Each heaunly word, by whose hid flame
 Our hard hearts shall strike fire, the same
 Shall flourish on thy browes, and be
 Both fire to vs and flame to thee;
 Whose light shall liue bright in thy face
 By glory, in our hearts by grace.
 Thou shalt look round about, and see
 Thousands of crown'd souls throng to be
 Themselves thy crown: sons of the vowes
 The virgin births with which thy souering spouse
 Made fruitfull thy fair soul.

* * * * *

Thou with the Lamb, thy Lord, shalt goe
 And whereso'ere He sett's His white
 Steps, walk with Him those ways of light,
 Which who in death would live to see,
 Must learn in life to dy like thee."

The same subtlety of emotion is found in the "Apologie," wherein the poet's admiration for St. Teresa outruns usual limits of language:

"Thus have I back again to thy bright name,
Fair fload of holy fires! transfus'd the flame
 I took from reading thee: 'tis to thy wrong,
 I know, that in my weak and worthlesse song
 Thou here art sett to shine where thy full day
 Scarse dawnes. O pardon, if I dare to say
 Thine own dear bookes are guilty. For from thence
 I learn't to know that Loue is eloquence.

* * * * *

Souls are not Spaniards too: one friendly fload
 Of baptism blends them all into a blood,
 Christ's faith makes but one body of all souls,
 And Loue's that body's soul; no law controll's
 Our free traffique for Heau'n; we may maintaine
 Peace, sure, with piety, though it come from Spain.
 What soul so e're, in any language, can
 Speak Heau'n like her's, is my soul's country-man.
 O 'tis not Spanish, but 'tis Heau'n she speaks!
 'Tis Heau'n that lyes in ambush there, and breaks
 From thence into the wondering reader's breast;
 Who feels his warm heart hatcht into a nest
Of little eagles and young loues, whose high
 Flights scorn the lazy dust, and things that dy.
 There are enow whose draughts (as deep as Hell)
 Drink up all Spain in sack. Let my soul swell
 With the strong wine of Loue: let others swimme
 In puddles; we will pledge this seraphim
 Bowles full of richer blood than blush of grape
 Was euer guilty of. Change we our shape,
 My soul; some drink from men to beasts, O then
 Drink—we till we proue more, not lesse, than men,
 And turn not beasts but angels. Let the King
 Me euer into these His cellars bring,

Where flowes such wine as we can haue of none
 But Him who trod the wine-presse all alone :
 Wine of youth, life, and the sweet deaths of Loue
 Wine of immortall mixture, which can proue
 Its tincture from the rosy nectar ; wine
 That can exalt weak earth ; and so refine
 Our dust, that at one draught, *Mortality*
May drink itself vp, and forget to dy."

As regards the use of "seraphim" for "seraph" and of the double-plural "seraphims," it is to be remembered that Crashaw followed the misuse and the misspelling of the common English Bible.

The kindred poem, "The Flaming Heart: vpon the book and picture of the seraphical Saint Teresa, as she is vsually expressed with a seraphim beside her" throbs with an emotion which could not be more poetic in idea or in expression. In an ecstasy of feeling, the poet finds fault with the painter :

" Painter, what didst thou vnderstand
 To put her dart into his hand ?
 See, euen the years and size of him
 Showes this the mother seraphim,
 * * * * *
 O most poor-spirited of men !
 Had thy cold pencil kist her pen,
 Thou couldst not so vnkindly err
 To show vs this faint shade for her.
 Why, man, this speaks pure mortall frame ;
 And mocks with female frost Loue's manly flame.
 One would suspect thou meant 'st to paint
 Some weak, inferiour, woman-saint.
 But had thy pale-fac't purple took
 Fire from the burning cheeks of that bright booke.
 Thou wouldst on her haue heap't vp all
 That could be found seraphicall ;
 What e're this youth of fire, weares fair,
 Rosy fingers, radiant hair,
 Glowing cheek, and glistening wings,
 All those fair and fragrant things,
 But, before all, that fiery dart
 Had fill'd the hand of this great heart.

" Doe then, as equall right requires,
 Since his the blushes be, and her's the fires,
 Resume and rectify thy rude design,
 Vndresse thy seraphim into mine ;
 Redeem this injury of thy art,
 Give him the vail, give her the dart.
 Give him the vail ; that he may cover
 The red cheeks of a riual'd louer.
 Asham'd that our world now can show
 Nests of new seraphims here below."

The poet would

“ Give her the dart, for it is she,
Fair youth, shootes both thy shaft, and thee ”;

but if this cannot be, he begs that she be left the flaming heart :

“ Leave her that ; and thou shalt leave her
Not one loose shaft but Loue's whole quiver.
*For in Loue's field was neuer found
A nobler weapon than a wound.*
Loue's passiues are his actiu'st part,
The wounded is the wounding heart.
O heart ! the aequall poise of Loue's both parts
Bigge alike with wound and darts.
Liue in these conquering leaues ; live all the same,
And walk through all tongues one triumphant flame.
*Liue here, great heart ; and loue and dy and kill ;
And bleed and wound ; and yield and conquer still.*”

The poem ends with an enraptured outburst of prayer to the “undaunted daughter of desires,” “fair sister of the seraphim,” to aid him to make his life like hers.

Rich, but not exceptional, in its softened loveliness is the poem “In the Glorious Assumption of ovr Blessed Lady.” Listen to the call of the “immortal Doue :”

. . . “ Rise vp, my love !
Rise vp, my fair, my spotless one !
The Winter's past, the rain is gone ;
The Spring is come, the flowrs appear,
No sweets, save thou, are wanting here.
Come away, my loue !
Come away, my doue !
Cast off delay ;
The court of Heau'n is come
To wait vpon thee home ;
Come, come away !
The flowrs appear,
Or quickly would, wert thou once here.
The Spring is come, or if it stay
'Tis to keep time with thy delay.
The rain is gone, except so much as we
Detain in needfull tears to weep the want of thee.
The Winter's past
Or if he make lesse hast,
His answer is, why she does so,
If Sommer come not, how can Winter goe ?
Come away, come away !
The shrill winds chide, the waters weep thy stay ;
The fountains murmur, and each loftiest tree
Bowes low'st his leauy top, to look for thee.”

The sweetness of this is excessive, but in harmony with Crashaw's

devotion. He sings of the Virgin as might a seraph ; and when he ends it is with a confession of powerlessness :

. . . . " And when
Our weak desires haue done their best,
Sweet angels, come and sing the rest."

Elsewhere, too, Crashaw often poetically loses himself in the rapture of his devotion. The swell of cathedral organ is more limited than seems to be his majestic rising into the sublimity of adoration. Take the wonderful hymn, "To the Name Above Every Name, the Name of Iesus." The poet bids his soul,

" Goe, and request
Great natvre for the key of her huge chest
Of Heau'ns, the self-inuoluing sett of sphears
(Which dull mortality more feeles than heares),
Then rouse the nest
*Of nimble Art, and traaverse round
The airy shop of soul-appeasing sound ;*
And beat a summons in the same
All-soueraign name,
To warn each seuerall kind
And shape of sweetnes, be they such
As sigh with supple wind
Or answer artfull touch ;
That they conuene and come away
To wait at the loue-crowned doores of this illustrious day."

And thus he continues passionately :

" Wake lyte and harp, and euery sweet-lipp't thing
That talkes with tunefull string ;
Start into life, and leap with me
Into a hasty fitt-tun'd harmony.
Nor must you think it much
T'obey my bolder touch ;
I haue authority in Love's name to take you,
And to the worke of Loue this morning wake you.
Wake, in the name
Of Him Who neuer sleeps, all things that are,
Or, what's the same,
Are musicall ;
Answer my call
And come along.
Help me to meditate mine immortal song.
Come, ye soft ministers of sweet sad mirth,
Bring all your houshold stuffe of Heau'n on earth ;
O you, my Soul's most certain wings,
Complaining pipes, and prattling strings,
Bring all the store
Of sweets you haue ; and murmur that you have no more.
Come, ne're to part
Nature and Art !
Come ; and come strong
To the conspiracy of our spatious song."

* * * * *

Hear him, in the sublimity of excited feeling, singing these exquisite lines :

“ Come, royall Name ! and pay the expense
 Of all this pretious patience ;
 O come away
 And kill the death of this delay !
 O, see *so many worlds of barren yeares*
Meltd and measured out in seas of teares ;
 O, see *the weary liddes of wakefull Hope*
(Loue’s eastern windowes) all wide ope
 With curtains drawn
To catch the day-break of Thy dawn.
 O, dawn at last, long-lookt for Day !
 Take Thine own wings, and come away.”
 * * * * *

And now his adoration is seraphic :

“ Sweet Name, in Thy each syllable
 A thousand blest Arabias dwell ;
 A thousand hills of frankincense,
 Mountains of myrrh, and beds of spices,
 And ten thousand paradises,
 The soul that tastes Thee takes from thence.
 How many vnknown worlds there are
 Of comforts, which Thou hast in keeping !
 How many thousand mercyes there
 In Pitty’s soft lap ly a-sleeping !
 Happy he who has the art
 To awake them,
 And to take them
 Home, and lodge them in his heart.
 * * * * *
 Little, alas, thought they
 Who tore the fair breasts of Thy freinds,
 Their fury but made way
 For Thee, and seru’d them in Thy glorious ends.
 What did their weapons but with wider pores
 Inlarge *Thy flaming-brested louers,*
 More freely to transpire
 That impatient fire,
 The heart that hides Thee hardly covers ?
 What did their weapons but sett wide the doores
 For Thee ? *fair purple doores of Loue’s deuising ;*
The ruby windowes which inricht the East
Of Thy so oft-repeated rising !
 Each wound of theirs was Thy new morning,
 And reinthron’d Thee in Thy rosy nest,
 With blush of Thine Own blood Thy day adorning ;
 It was the witt of Loue oreflowd the bounds
 Of wrath, and made Thee way through all those wovnds.”

Even in calmer moods, Crashaw attained grandeur by a path to which only his feet were fitted. Take this, the third and last, stanza of the short poem “Vpon Easter Day :”

"Life, by this Light's nativity
 All creatures have ;
 Death onely by this Daye's just doome is forc't to dye ;
 Nor is Death forc't ; for may he ly
Thron'd in Thy grave,
Death will on this condition be content to dye."

Under rare poetic fancy and imagery he conveyed tenderness strangely sweet ; as in this stanza from "The Weeper :"

"The dew no more will weep
 The primrose's pale cheek to deck ;
 The dew no more will sleep
 Nuzzled¹ in the lilly's neck ;
 Much rather would it be thy tear
 And leaue them both to tremble here."

Crashaw's great power as a poet lies in his perfect insight into nature. Nature was what he studied, felt, and expressed. There are no truer insights into nature than those of Crashaw ; and when, as is generally the case, these insights are informed by an excited imagination, they are the perfection of poetry. His insights were not gleaned from books ; but they came from his' experience of life, his study of things, and his introspective meditation. His experience was that of a master ; and it demanded that giant-power of English which he possessed. Consider the lines "On a Foule Morning," when the poet was about "to take a journey :"

"Where art thou, Sol, while thus *the blind-fold Day*
Staggers out of the East, loses her way
Stumbling on Night? Rouze thee, illustrious youth,
 And let no dull mists choke thy Light's faire growth.
 Point here thy beams : O glance on yonder flocks,
 And make their fleeces golden as thy locks,
 Vnfold thy fair front, and there shall appeare
 Full glory, flaming in her owne free spheare.
 Gladnesse shall cloath the Earth, we will instile
 The face of things, an universall smile.
 Say to the sullen Morne, thou com'st to court her ;
 And wilt command proud Zephirus to sport her
 With wanton gales : his balmy breath shall licke
 The tender drops which tremble on her cheek ;
 Which rarified, and in a gentle raine
 On those delicious bankes distill'd againe,
 Shall rise in a sweet Harvest, which discloses
 Two ever-blushing beds of new-borne roses.
 Hee'l fan her bright locks, teaching them to flow,
 And friske in curl'd maeanders : hee will throw
 A fragrant breath suckt from the spicy nest
 O'th' pretious phoenix, warme upon her breast.
 Hee with a dainty and soft hand will trim
 And brush her azure mantle, which shall swim
 In silken volumes ; wheresoe're shee'l tread,
 Bright clouds like golden fleeces shall be spread.

¹ "Nuzzled" here means "nestled" or "nourished."

" Rise, then, faire blew-ey'd maid ; rise and discover
 Thy silver brow, and meet thy golden lover.
 See how hee runs, with what a hasty flight,
 Into thy bosome, bath'd with liquid light.
 Fly, fly, prophane fogs, farre hence fly away,
 Taint not the pure streams of the springing Day
 With your dull influence ; it is for you
 To sit and scoule upon Night's heavy brow,
 Not on the fresh cheekes of the virgin Morne
 Where nought but smiles and ruddy joyes are worne.
 Fly then, and doe not thinke with her to stay ;
 Let it suffice, *shee'l weare no maske to-day.*"

Then take these verses "To the Morning: satisfaction for Sleepe," and see what sort of an acquaintance he had with nature :

" What succour can I hope my Muse shall send
 Whose drowsinesse hath wrong'd the Muse's friend ?
 What hope, Aurora, to propitiate thee,
 Vnlesse the Muse sing my apologie ?

" O in that morning of my shame ! when I
 Lay folded up in Sleepe's captivity,
 How at the sight did'st thou draw back thine eyes,
 Into thy modest veyle ? how did'st thou rise
 Twice dy'd in thine owne blushes ! and did'st run
 To draw the curtaines, and awake the sun !
 Who, rowzing his illustrious tresses, came,
 And seeing the loath'd object, hid for shame
 His head in thy faire bosome, and still hides
 Mee from his patronage ; I pray, he chides :
 And pointing to dull Morpheus, bids me take
 My owne Apollo, try if I can make
 His Lethe be my Helicon : and see
 If Morpheus have a Muse to wait on mee.
 Hence 'tis, my humble fancie finds no wings,
 No nimble rapture starts to Heaven, and brings
*Enthusiasticke flames, such as can give
 Marrow to my plumpe genius, make it live
 Drest in the glorious madnesse of a Muse,
 Whose feet can walke the milky way, and chuse
 Her starry throne ; whose holy heats can warme
 The grave, and hold up an exalted arme
 To lift me from my lazy vrne to climbe
 Vpon the stooped shoulders of old Time,
 And trace Eternity—*But all is dead,
 All these delicious hopes are buried
 In the deepe wrinkles of his angry brow
 Where Mercy cannot find them : but O thou
 Bright lady of the Morne ! pitty doth lye
 So warme in thy soft brest, it cannot dye.
 Have mercy then, and when he next shall rise
 O meet the angry God, invade his eyes,
 And stroake his radiant cheekes : one timely kisse
 Will kill his anger, and revive my blisse.
 So to the treasure of thy pearly dew,

Thrice will I pay three teares, to show how true
 My grieve is; so my wakefull lay shall knocke
 At th' Orientall gates, and duly mocke
 The early larkes' shrill orizons, to be
 An anthem at the Daye's nativitie.
 And the same rosie-fingered hand of thine,
 That shuts Night's dying eyes, shall open mine.

"But thou, faint God of sleepe, forget that I
 Was ever known to be thy votary.
 No more my pillow shall thine altar be
 Nor will I offer any more to thee
 My selfe a melting sacrifice; I'me borne
 Againe a fresh child of the buxome Morne,
 Heire of the sun's first beames. Why threat'st thou so?
 Why dost thou shake thy leaden scepter? goe
 Bestow thy poppy upon wakefull Woe,
 Sicknesse and sorrow, whose pale lidds ne're know
 Thy downie finger; dwell upon their eyes,
 Shut in their teares; shut out their miseries."

Crashaw's command of language is so great that he seems to frolic through difficult descriptions. In describing, he plays with his subject in a manner which, with less abundance and originality of ideas, would be tiresome show. His ideas are so many and so varied as to indicate exhaustless wealth; and the reader is in no fear that the poet will be unable to sustain his power. With equal skill, grace, and truth Crashaw depicted the grandeur of nature, the beauty of health, and the true loveliness of woman. Each of these descriptions was made resplendent with the exaltation of his own moral nature. His imaginary love, for example,

must have

"That not impossible she"

"Smiles, that can warme
 The blood, yet teach a charme,
 That chastity may take no harme.

"Blushes, that bin
 The burnish of no sin,
 Nor flames of ought, too hot within.

"Joys, that confesse,
 Vertue their mistresse,
 And have no other head to dresse.
 * * * *

"Dayes, that need borrow,
 No part of their good morrow,
 From a fore-spent night of sorrow.

"Dayes, that in spight
 Of darknesse, by the light
 Of a cleere mind are day all night.
 * * * *

“ Life that dares send
 A challenge to his end,
 And when it comes say, Welcome, friend !”
 * * * * *

Of Crashaw's numerous epigrams, not one is without point or sparkle. In conception and in expression, his epigrams are bits of masterly work. Not Martial himself could have improved some of them, if, indeed, he could have conceived them. They meet all the demands of the highest epigrams, as they create and satisfy surprise. Among our modern poets, the epigram is a disused or lost art; and yet it is to a kind of epigrammatic power that some of the later poets owe their popularity. Quite apart from its sentiment, many a verse lives in the minds of the people, because of its pointed force and terseness. Tennyson and, perhaps, Longfellow furnish many a line for daily quotation; but no one quotes, except laboriously, from Morris or Bryant. Almost any of Crashaw's epigrams might be given as an example of his unusual power; but where there are so many in Latin, in Greek, and in English, it is not surprising that there are some in which the naturalness of the thought is sacrificed to the mere ingenuity of the expression. The thought, however, is never lost or weakened in intricate mechanism. There are “conceits,” and, at times, a dull-witted play upon names even sacred; but the verse ever swells with its thought and flows with liquid ease. Even the weakest of the epigrams show forth the beauty of the man: the strongest are resplendent with the genius of the poet. Crashaw wrote most of his epigrams in Latin; but he translated many into Greek or into English, while some appear in the three languages. Take the first epigram:

PHARISÆUS ET PUBLICANUS.

“ En duo templum adeunt, diversis mentibus ambo.
 Ille procul trepido lumine signat humum:
 It gravis hic, et in alta ferox pénétralia tendit.
 Plus habet hic templi; plus habet ille Dei.”

TWO WENT UP INTO THE TEMPLE TO PRAY.

“ Two went to pray! O, rather say,
 One went to brag, th' other to pray.
 One stands up close, and treads on high,
 Where th' other dares not send his eye.
 One neerer to God's altar trod:
 The other to the altar's God.”

This epigram could not be simpler, neater, or more pointed. It satisfies every requirement. See the same success in the following:

IN OBOLUM VIDUÆ.

“ Gutta brevis nummi, vitæ patrona senilis,
 E digitis stillat non dubitantis anus;
 Istis multa vagi spumant de gurgite census:
 Isti abjecerunt scilicet; illa dedit.”

THE WIDOW'S MITES.

"Two mites, two drops—yet all her house and land—
Falle from a steady heart though trembling hand:
The other's wanton wealth foams high and brave.
The other cast away; she only gave."

In point of tenderness, as well as in mere skill, how exquisite is the following!

NON SUM DIGNUS UT SUB TECTA MEA VENIAS.

"In tua tecta Deus veniet; tuus haud sinit illud
Et pudor atque humili in pectore celsa fides.
Illum ergo accipies, quoniam non accipis: ergo
In te jam veniet, non tua tecta Deus."

I AM NOT WORTHY, ETC.

"Thy God was making hast into thy roofe;
Thy humble faith and fear keepes him aloofe.
Hee'll be thy guest, because He may not be;
Hee'll come—into thy house? No, into thee."

The same tenderness warms inexpressibly the following; and its wonderful originality moves us profoundly:

IN BEATAE VIRGINIS VERECUNDIAM.

"In gremio, quaeris, cur sic sua lumina Virgo
Ponat? ubi melius poneret illa, precor?
O ubi, quam caelo, melius sua lumina ponat?
Despicit, at caelum sic tamen illa videt."

ON THE BLESSED VIRGIN'S BASHFULNESS.

"That on her lap she casts her humble eye,
'Tis the sweet pride of her humility.
The faire starre is well fixt, for where, O where,
Could she have fixt it on a fairer speare?
'Tis Heav'n, 'tis Heav'n she sees, Heaven's God there lyes;
She can see Heaven, and ne're lift up her eyes.
This new guest to her eyes new lawes hath given:
'Twas once looke up, 'tis now looke down to Heaven."

Within the last lines, a whole poem is condensed. But equally skilful, pointed, tender, and original is the epigram upon the burial-place of our Lord:

ECCE LOCUS UBI JACUIT DOMINUS.

"Ipsum, ipsum, precor, o potius mihi, candide, monstra;
Ipsi, ipsi o lacrymis oro sit ire meis.
Si monstrare locum satis est, et dicere nobis,
En, Maria, hic tuus en hic jacuit Dominus;
Ipsa ulnas monstrare meas, et dicere possum,
En, Maria, hic tuus en hic jacuit Dominus."

COME, SEE THE PLACE WHERE THE LORD LAY.

"Show me Himselfe, Himselfe, bright Sir, O show
Which way my poore tears to Himselfe may goe.
Were it enough to show the place, and say,
Looke, Mary, here, see where thy Lord once lay;

Then could I show these armes of mine, and say,
Looke, Mary, here, see where thy Lord once lay."

VPON THE SEPULCHRE OF OUR LORD.

"Here, where our Lord once laid His head,
Now the grave lies buried."

And now, for sake of contrast, compare the two following "humane," or secular, epigrams :

VPON VENUS PUTTING-ON MARS HIS ARMES.

"What, Mars his sword? faire Cytherea, say,
Why art thou arm'd so desperately to-day?
Mars thou hast beaten naked; and O then,
What needst thou put on armes against poore men?"

VPON THE SAME.

"Pallas saw Venus arm'd, and straight she cry'd :
Come if thou dar'st; thus, thus let us be try'd.
Why, foole! saies Venus, thus provoke'st thou mee,
That being nak't, thou know'st could conquer thee?"

Here the power of physical beauty as opposed to physical and intellectual force agreeably surprises us. A word more, and the surprise would be indelicate.

But the most celebrated, though not exceptionally good, epigram is "*Aquæ in vinum versæ*." This Crashaw gave only in Latin :

"Unde rubor vestris, et non sua purpura lymphis?
Quæ rosa mirantes tam nova mutat aquas?
Numen, convivæ, præsens agnoscite Numen:
Nympha pudica Deum vidit, et erubuit."

This epigram has been translated into English by many writers. As early as 1682, its point was rendered by Clement Barksdale, as follows :

"See, O my guests, a Deity is here :
The chaste nymph saw a God, and blusht for fear."

By Dryden :

"The conscious water saw its God and blushed."

By Aaron Hill :

"See! cried they, while in red'ning tide it gush'd,
The bashful stream hath seen its God and blush'd."

By the Rev. J. H. Clark :

"Haste, guests, and own your Visitant divine;
For the chaste Nymph hath seen her God and blush'd."

By Thomas Ashe :

“ Mark, mark, gay guests, a present Deity !
The conscious water blush'd its God to see.”

And by the Rev. Alexander B. Grosart, here as elsewhere faithful :

“ All the guests in tumult rush'd :
The shy Nymph saw her God, and blush'd.”

During a long time, the credit for this well-known line was given to Dryden. The credit belongs wholly to Crashaw ; and yet he does not seem to have been the first to use the conceit. Grosart asserts the earlier use in Vida's *Christiad* (Lib. II., 431 ; III., 984), and in a hymn of St. Ambrose ; but does not quote the lines. In the second book of Vida, we find the following :

“ Canam hi liquère modo atra
Miratam puras in vina rubescere lymphas.”

And in the third book :

“ Fontis aquam latices Bacchi convertit in atros.”

In the hymn “ *Crudelis Herodes*,” which is found in the Roman Breviary, for the feast of the Epiphany, and which, probably, is the one referred to by Grosart, are the following lines :

“ Novum genus potentiae :
Aquæ rubescunt hydriae,
Vinumque jussa fundere,
Mutavit unda originem.”

The earlier poetical use of the fact is established, and the common use of “ *rubescere* ” is interesting ; but Crashaw cannot be said to have borrowed anything from either St. Ambrose or from Vida, and it is very doubtful that he knew of the earlier use.

Of the numerous epigrams which Grosart printed for the first time, there are many fully equal to those here given. They would not, however, better illustrate the poet's tenderness, sparkle, power, and originality. Instead of another epigram, take one of the poet's epitaphs ; for there is a connection, at least of origin, between epigrams and epitaphs. Crashaw wrote many inspired epitaphs ; but the best and of its kind unequalled by other poet, is “ *Upon a Young Married Couple Dead and Buried Together* : ”

“ Peace, good reader, Doe not weep.
Peace, the louers are asleep.
They, sweet turtles, folded ly
In the last knott that Loue could ty.
And though they ly as they were dead,
Their pillow stone, their sheetes of lead ;
(Pillow hard, and sheetes not warm)
Loue made the bed ; they'l take no harm ;

Let them sleep, let them sleep on,
 Till this stormy night be gone,
 And the aeternall morrow dawn;
 Then the curtaines will be drawn
 And they wake into a light,
 Whose Day shall neuer sleepe in Night."

In his translations, Crashaw's creative imagination, sublimity, strength, insight into nature, mastery of words, richness of color, and rhythmical skill found unlimited scope. He was not a mere translator: he was an inspired interpreter. He so infused his own genius into what he undertook that his work, though closely following the original, became his own by virtue of superior creative power. Where the original was but mere form, Crashaw breathed the life of passion into it; and where the original had life Crashaw added sublimity. He increased the delicacy; he gave breadth to passion; he enlarged the power; and he clothed all with majesty. Every line, showing his master hand, pulsates with his genius. His "Suspicion of Herod," "Musick's Duell," "Hymn of St. Thomas," and "Dies Irae" are the principal translations; but his other hymns, like the "Stabat Mater," his paraphrases, like that of Apocalypse XII., 7, and his psalms, like the CXXXVII, are secondary only in the sense that they are shorter poems.

Marino's "Sospetto d'Herode" is a great poem in the original. It is said that Milton knew the poem, and that he took from it suggestions for "Paradise Lost;" but Milton knew Crashaw's expansion of the original and borrowed from Crashaw rather than from Marino. Milton had no personal acquaintance with Crashaw; but it seems certain that he recognized Crashaw's grandeur. It is a matter of regret that Crashaw translated only the first book of the Italian poem; for the reader is left in a state of unsatisfied excitement and of a longing for more which can never be gratified. This book brings before us Satan, his fear of the coming Messiah, his soliloquy on the impending end of his reign, his attendants, and his choice and dispatch of Alecto as a messenger to arouse, during sleep, the suspicion of Herod. Crashaw's description of Satan fascinates us by its power. We see Satan where

. . . . "Close about him clings
 A curl'd knot of embracing snakes, that kisse
 His correspondent cheeks: these loathsome strings
 Hold the perverse prince in eternall ties
 Fast bound, since first he forfeited the skies:

* * * * *
 "He fills a burnisht throne of quenchlesse fire;
 And for his old faire robes of light, he weares
 A gloomy mantle of darke flames."

* * * * *

The eyes are the principal fear-inspiring feature :

*" His eyes, the sullen dens of Death and Night,
Startle the dull ayre with a dismall red :
Such his fell glances, as the fatall light
Of staring comets, that looke kingdomes dead."*

Here, as elsewhere, the grandeur belongs to Crashaw. To see how Crashaw remade Marino, let us compare Crashaw's interpretation of Stanza X. with a literal translation. The literal translation, as given by Grosart, reads:

*" O, wretched Angel, once fairer than light,
How thou hast lost thy primeval splendour !
Thou shalt have from the eternal Requirer
Deserved punishment for the unjust crime :
Proud admirer of thy honours,
Rebellious usurper of another's seat !
Transformed, and fallen into Phlegethon,
Proud Narcissus, impious Phaethon."*

Of which Crashaw's interpretation is as follows :

*" Disdainefull wretch, how hath one bold sinne cost
Thee all the beauties of thy once bright eyes !
How hath one black eclipse cancell'd and crost
The glories that did gild thee in thy rise !
Proud morning of a perverse day, how lost
Art thou unto thyself, thou too selfe-wise
Narcissus ! foolish Phaeton, who for all
Thy high-aym'd hopes, gaind'st but a flaming fall."*

Crashaw's originality is evident. Not here alone, but everywhere, does Crashaw show his superiority. Milton recognized the fact ; for, from the following lines of Crashaw, and not from the original of Marino, does he seem to have borrowed his portrait of Satan :

*" From Death's sad shades to the life-breathing ayre
This mortall enemy to mankind's good
Lifts his malignant eyes, wasted with care,
To become beautifull in humane blood."*

Now, to see something of the fulness of Crashaw's power, take the soliloquy of Satan. Of this it has been justly said that the grandeur and simplicity of wording are not surpassed by anything in Milton :

*" Hee has my heaven (what would he more ?) whose bright
And radiant scepter this bold hand should beare :
And for the never-fading fields of light,
My faire inheritance, He confines me here
To this darke house of shades ; horror and night,
To draw a long-liv'd death, where all my cheere
Is the solemnity my sorrow weares,
That mankind's torment waits upon my teares."*

"Darke, dusky Man, He needs would single forth,
 To make the partner of His Owne pure ray:
 And should we powers of Heav'n, spirits of worth,
 Bow our bright heads before a king of clay?
 It shall not be, said I, and clombe the North,
 Where never wing of angell yet made way:
 What though I mist my blow? yet I strooke high,
 And to dare something, is some victory.

"Is He not satisfied? meanes He to wrest
 Hell from me, too, and sack my territories?
 Vile humane nature means He not t'invest
 (O my desptight!) with His divinest glories?
 And rising with rich spoiles upon His brest
 With His faire triumphs fill all future stories?
 Must the bright armes of Heav'n rebuke these eyes,
 Mocke me, and dazzle my darke mysteries?

"Art thou not Lucifer? he to whom *the droves*
Of stars that gild the Morne in charge were given?
 The nimblest of the lightning-winged loves,
 The fairest, and the *first-borne smile of Heav'n?*
 Looke in what pompe the mistrisse planet moves
 Rev'rently circled by the lesser seaven:
 Such and so rich, the flames that from thine eyes,
 Opprest the common-people of the skyes.

"Ah wretch! what bootes thee to cast back thy eyes,
 Where *dawning hope no beame of comfort shoves?*
 While *the reflection of thy forepast joys,*
Renders thee double to thy present woes:
 Rather make up to thy new miseries,
 And meet the mischief that upon thee growes.
 If Hell must mourne, Heav'n sure shall sympathize;
 What force cannot effect, fraud shall divide.

"And yet whose force feare I? have I so lost
 Myselfe? my strength too with my innocence?
 Come try who dares, Heav'n, Earth, what ere doth boast
 A borrowed being, make thy bold defence.
 Come thy Creator too: What though it cost
 Me yet a second fall? wee'd try our strengths:
 Heav'n saw us struggle once; as brave a fight
 Earth now should see, and tremble at the sight."

When Alecto, "fourth of the cursed knot of hags," is called by Satan, the effect is thus grandly described by Crashaw:

"Thrice howl'd the caves of Night, and thrice the sound,
 Thund'ring upon the bankes of those black lakes,
Rung through the hollow vaults of Hell profound:
 At last her listning eares the noise o're takes,
 She lifts her sooty lampes, and looking round,
 A gen'rall hisse from the whole tire of snakes
 Rebounding, through Hell's inmost cavernes came,
 In answer to her formidable name."

Sublime, too, is Crashaw's picture of Alecto's ascent to earth and the time of her arrival :

"Heav'n saw her rise, and saw Hell in the sight :
The fields' faire eyes saw her, and saw no more,
But shut their flowry lids for ever : night
And winter strow her way : yea, such a sore
Is she to nature, that a generall fright,
An universal palsie spreading o're
The face of things, from her dire eyes had run,
Had not her thick snakes hid them from the sun.

"Now had the night's companion from her dew,
Where all the busie day she close doth ly,
With her soft wing wipt from the browes of men
Day's sweat ; and *by a gentle tyranny*
And sweet oppression, kindly cheating them
Of all their cares, tam'd the rebellious eye
Of sorrow, with a soft and downy hand,
Sealing all breasts in a Lethæan band."

In this poem Crashaw often translated closely, as both Willmott and Grosart have shown ; but, however closely he translated, he everywhere left the unmistakable stamp of his genius.

"Musick's Duell," too, shows Crashaw's originality and poetical superiority. Here he translated, expanded, and almost remade the Jesuit Strada's beautiful poem of the contest between the lute-player and the nightingale. The Latin text of Strada lacks the grandeur and the word-painting of Crashaw's translation. Beside Crashaw's interpretation, Ford's use of the poem in "Lover's Melancholy" is weak ; and weaker yet are all other translations. Crashaw's power infuses itself into every line. Thus, of the nightingale, Crashaw says :

. "Straightway she
Carves out her dainty voyce as readily,
Into a thousand sweet distinguish'd tones
And reckons up in soft divisions,
Quicke volumes of wild notes
Trayles her plaine ditty in one long-spun note
Through the sleeke passage of her open throat,
A cleare unwrinkled song."

The musician "straines higher yet :"

. "The grumbling base
In surly groans disdaines the treble's grace ;
The high-perch't treble chirps at this, and chides
Untill his finger (Moderatour) hides
And closes the sweet quarrell, rowing all,
Hoarce, shrill at once ; as when the trumpets call
Hot Mars to th' harvest of Death's field, and woo
Men's hearts into their hands."

Of the nightingale, Crashaw exquisitely says :

. . . . " Her supple brest thrills out
 Sharpe aires, and *staggers in a warbling doubt*
Of dallying sweetnesse, hovers o're her skill,
And folds in wav'd notes with a trembling bill
The plyant series of her slippery song ;
 Then starts shee suddenly into a throng
 Of short, thicke sobs, whose thund'ring volleys float
 And roule themselves over her lubrick throat
 In *panting murmurs*, 'still'd out of *her breast*,
That ever-bubbling spring ; the sugred nest
 Of her delicious soule, that there does lye
 Bathing in streames of liquid melodie ;
 Musick's best seed-plot, whence in ripen'd aires
 A golden-headed harvest fairely reares
 His *honey-dropping tops*, *plow'd by her breath*,
 Which there reciprocally laboureth
 In that sweet soyle ; it seemes a holy quire
 Founded to th' name of great Apollo's lyre,
 Whose silver-roofe rings with the sprightly notes
 Of *sweet-lipp'd angel-imps*, *that swill their throats*
In creame of morning Helicon, and then
 Preferre soft-anthems to the eares of men,
 To woo them from their beds, still murmuring
 That men can sleepe while they their mattens sing :
 (Most divine service) whose so early lay
Prevents the eye-lids of the blushing Day !
 There you might heare her kindle her soft voyce,
 In the close murmur of a sparkling noyse,
 And lay the ground-worke of her hopefull song,
 Still keeping in the forward streame, so long,
 Till a sweet whirle-wind (striving to get out)
 Heaves her soft bosome, wanders round about,
 And *makes a pretty earthquake in her breast*,
 Till the fledg'd notes at length forsake their nest,
 Fluttering in wanton shoales, and to the sky
 Wing'd with their owne wild echos, prattling fly.
 Shee opes the floodgate, and lets loose *a tide*
Of streaming sweetnesse, *which in state doth ride*
On the wav'd backe of every swelling straine,
Rising and falling in a pompous traine."

* * * * *

Thus high, thus low, *as if her silver throat*
Would reach the brazen voyce of war's hoarse bird ;
 Her little soule is ravisht ; and so pour'd
 Into loose extasies, that she is plac't
 Above her selfe, Musick's Enthusiast."

But the musician is unwilling to be conquered :

. . . . " His hands sprightly as fire, he flings
 And *with a quavring coynesse tastes the strings*.
 The sweet-lip't sisters, musically frighted,
 Singing their feares, are fearefully delighted,
Trembling as when Apollo's golden haire

*Are fan'd and frizled, in the wanton ayres
Of his own breath ; which marryed to his tyre
Doth tune the sphæares, and make Heaven's selfe looke higher.*

* * * * *

"The lute's light genius now does proudly rise,
Heav'd on the surges of swolne rapsodies,
Whose flourish (meteor-like) doth curl the aire
With flash of high-borne fancies : here and there
Dancing in lofty measures, and anon
Creeps on the soft touch of a tender tone ;
Whose trembling murmurs melting in wild aires
Runs to and fro, complaining his sweet cares,
Because those pretious mysteres that dwell
In Musick's ravish't soule, he dares not tell,
But whisper to the world."

In the vain attempt to equal the "wild diversities of chatt'ring strings," the nightingale fails, and, falling upon the lute, dies of sweet shame ; and thus, too, dies criticism upon the poem.

Tenderly and mightily does Crashaw interpret St. Thomas's hymn "Ecce Panis Angelorum, Adoro Te." The naked simplicity of the hymn fills one with awe. Take these stanzas :

"With all the powres my poor heart hath
Of humble loue and loyall faith,
Thus lowe (my hidden life !) I bow to Thee
Whom too much loue hath bow'd more low for me.
Down, down, proud sense ! discourses dy !
Keep close, my soul's inquiring ey !
Nor touch, nor tast, must look for more,
But each sitt still in his own dore.

"Your ports are all superfluous here,
Saue that which lets in Faith, the eare.
Faith is my skill : Faith can beleue
As fast as loue new lawes can giue.
Faith is my force : Faith strength affords
To keep pace with those powrfull words.
And words more sure, more sweet than they,
Love could not think, Truth could not say."

* * * * *

"Help, Lord, my faith, my hope increase,
And fill my portion in Thy peace ;
Giue loue for life ; nor let my dayes
Grow, but in new powres to Thy name and praise.

* * * * *

"Come, Loue ! come, Lord ! and that long day
For which I languish, come away.
When this dry soul those eyes shall see,
And drink the unseal'd sourse of Thee :
When Glory's sun, Faith's shades shall chase,
And for Thy veil giue me Thy face. Amen."

Crashaw was the first English translator of "Dies Irae." Roscommon, who borrowed from Crashaw, won the praise of a people

eager to extol any appearance of talent in a nobleman of his day. Johnson, too, had sweet words for the nobleman, but not a recognition for Crashaw; and yet Roscommon was but an imitator of Crashaw. The following stanzas sufficiently show Crashaw's originality:

"Hear'st thou, my soul, what serious things
Both the Psalm and sybill sings
Of a sure Judge, from Whose sharp ray
The World in flames shall fly away.

"O that fire! before whose face
Heaun and earth shall find no place.
O those eyes! Whose angry light
Must be the day of that dread night.

"O that trump! whose blast shall run
An euen round with the circling sun,
And vrge the murmuring graues to bring
Pale mankind forth to meet his King.

* * * * *

"Mercy, my Judge, mercy I cry
With blushing cheek and bleeding ey:
The conscions colors of my sin
Are red without and pale within.

"O let Thine Own soft bowells pay
Thyself; and so discharge that day.
If sin can sigh, Loue can forgiue:
O say the word, my soul shall liue.

* * * * *

"Though both my prayres and teares combine,
Both worthlesse are; for they are mine.
But Thou Thy bounteous Self still be;
And show Thou art, by sauing me.

* * * * *

"O hear a suppliant heart, all crush't
And crumbled into contrite dust.
My hope, my fear! my Judge, my Freind!
Take charge of me, and of my end."

Crashaw's Latin and Greek verses show the highest poetic ability. Here and there the versification limps; but such poems as "Lectori," "Bulla," and "Arion" are masterpieces. The Latin royal and commemorative pieces, too, disclose unexpected touches of genius; but, like all such of other poets, their interest has passed. Such poems, however, as "Priscianus," "Stomachus," and "Heymnus Veneri," coming from Crashaw, startle the reader; but it is to be remembered that they were written in the poet's early years, when his humor was untrained and his imagination imperfectly developed. Happily for us, religion, later in his life, curbed his humor, and expanded in a right direction his imagination; or else, we might have had from him the erotic songs of a Pagan poet. Crashaw remade himself. Tenderly and grandly he mourned the deaths of friends, not shamelessly bewailed the loss of

mistresses. He excited others to virtue and stirred to resolution, as in that singularly poetic and thoughtful verse-letter to the Countess of Denbigh; and he glorified no weakness by singing the praise of lewdness.

By later poets Crashaw was used and then abused. Pope, in "Eloisa to Abelard," borrowed from Crashaw's tender but minor poem of "Alexias: the Complaint of the Forsaken Wife of Sainte Alexis," and from other poems of the same poet meanly took ideas; but, in his unfair and unjust criticism, he overlooked all Crashaw's greater poems, and all the good things of the lesser poems. Coleridge was generously appreciative; but Coleridge not having Pope's strong hatreds and mean prejudices, was more fitted for true criticism. It is poor criticism, which, in spite of Crashaw's power, finds no impassioned originality, but only a strained conceit or obscuring inversion. It is no injustice to the others of his class to rank Crashaw above them; for he excelled them in imagination, in delicate emotion, in originality, and in power of expression. From Crashaw, not only Pope, Young, and lesser poets, but even Milton drew something. Shelley, too, has many similarities of idea or of expression; but, though Shelley may have known Crashaw, as did Leigh Hunt, it is not probable that he consciously borrowed.

The thirty-eight years of Crashaw's life contained nothing lurid, nothing dramatic. His life was retired, scholarly, and saintly. It had the same chance of heroism which falls into every humble life—to do duty unflinchingly. He was great as a poet, by reason of natural gifts perfected by study. He was great as a man, by reason of his rightly developed nature, not by reason of outside events making him a central figure. He was simple, temperate, abstemious, upright, pure, and pious. He forced to the highest use every talent and accomplishment. Of foreign languages, he knew Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, and Spanish. His memory was remarkable; and he could quote aptly and readily from alien or from home writers. He was accomplished in music, drawing, engraving, and painting; and he quaintly designed and engraved vignettes for his poems. As a poet, he chose the highest themes, and strove for perfection. His poems show the improvement which comes only from study. The mere pleasantry of his early compositions became the wit and sparkle of his later writings; and the rank exuberance of his boyhood's fancy was perfected by manhood's creative imagination. A longer life and a larger experience with the world of passion might have made him a poet of the first class; for his defects were the results of his contracted associations. He lived a blameless life; he died a saintly death; and he has left behind him poetry which sweetens our lives, calls forth our admiration, and stirs us to noble purposes.

THE LATEST OF THE REVISIONS.

*English Protestant Version of the New Testament*¹ (extant in the Polyglott N. T. of Elias Hutter. Nuremberg, 1599. Two vols. fo.)

The Same. Editions of 1562, 1577, 1579.

King James's Bible, 1611 and 1683.

Errata of the Protestant Bible. By Thomas Ward, Esq. New York: Sadlier & Co.

The Revised Version of the New Testament. New York: Harpers' American Edition, 1881.

Companion to the Revised Version of the New Testament, explaining the reasons for the changes made on the Authorized Version. By Alexander Roberts, D.D., Professor of Humanity, St. Andrew's, and Member of the English New Testament Company. With Supplement by a Member of the American Committee of Revision. Authorized Edition. New York: I. K. Funk & Co., Publishers. 1881. 8vo., pp. 117.

Anglo-American Bible Revision. By Members of the American Revision Committee. Philadelphia: American Sunday-school Union. 1879. 12mo., pp. 192.

THE publication of this newly corrected and amended version must prove a rude shock to those who fancifully connect together as cause and effect the two things, King James's Bible and the Protestantism of English-speaking peoples. Some vague notion of this kind dwells habitually in the minds of all non-Catholics, while for many of them it is a cherished, unshaken point of belief, from which they cannot be driven by any amount of facts or reasoning to the contrary. They will not examine the facts nor listen to the reasoning. It could not well be otherwise. For this is sedulously taught in the Sunday-school, inculcated from a thousand pulpits, and daily re-echoed by books and periodicals without number. And when it is remembered that most persons have no other source of religious knowledge than the preaching-desk and the newspaper, it ceases to be a wonder that this foolish fancy should have taken possession of the minds, generally, of those outside of the Church. It is a new proof, if any were needed, of the unbounded credulity that may exist in our age of progress by the side of its boasted spirit of inquiry.

¹ In this Polyglott (*opus rarissimum*, Le Long calls it in his *Bibliotheca Sancta*), Hutter does not specify the editions from which he has drawn the respective translations. Le Long affirms that the English translation is taken from that of Geneva, 1562. This, however, must be incorrect, as they differ in some places of importance, as I. John v. 21 and elsewhere. It represents some older edition.

Yet never was there a greater delusion, as impartial history most plainly shows. The Bible of King James was no cause of the Protestantism of Great Britain, not even, properly speaking, one of its effects, but simply an incident in its history. The Bible that helped, to some extent, to advance the Protestant cause in England and Scotland and root out the old religion from the land, was not the Bible of King James, but the Presbyterian or Puritan Bible of Wittenberg and Geneva. It had for powerful auxiliaries confiscation, imprisonment, the rack and the gibbet, and without their aid would not have been very successful. Yet it did some share of the work. But how? The answer should bring a blush to any Christian cheek that has not lost all sense of shame. By the most wicked and deliberate perversion and corruption of God's Holy Word. The language of revelation was of a set purpose falsified by mistranslation. Glosses, favoring the new errors, or aimed at Catholic truth, were foisted into the sacred text, sometimes with sly cunning, at others with brazen-faced assurance. The language of sectarian rancor and hate was blasphemously put into the mouth of Prophets and Apostles, or, to speak more truly, of the Holy Ghost, who uttered his divine oracles through these interpreters. It is needless to prove this at any length. This has been already done by the REVIEW in a series of articles on Beza, whose corruptions (intentional and deliberate by his own avowal) form the groundwork of most, if not all, that is blameworthy in the Presbyterian Bibles that came from the wicked workshop of Geneva. And these were the Bibles, it must never be forgotten, that mainly contributed to open the eyes of the English people to the so-called light of the new Gospel, long before King James's Bible came into existence. Lest, however, we be suspected of denouncing them unjustly, we shall add a few proofs of their malicious, systematic tampering with God's Holy Word.

We should never lose sight of the fact, though some are only too anxious to dismiss it from their minds and memories, that the so-called "Church of England," which dates from the times of Henry VIII. and Edward VI., was in her beginnings very different from what is known as Episcopalianism in our days. The Anglican Church, as reformed by Cranmer, Cromwell, and their subsidiary horde of court parasites, titled robbers, and fanatical preachers, became, when she got definite shape under Edward VI., simply Calvinistic. She had bishops, but they were such only in name. Not one of them pretended to, or cared for, any descent from the Apostles through a line of legitimate predecessors. He was not God's minister, but the King's or the Queen's, as the case might be. Indeed, his idea of his office was far below that of an appointee of the Geneva consistory. The latter maintained that he had a spiritual character, which gave him a right to dictate to the State; the

former rather gloried in his shame, and found his proudest title in being the creature and slave of his temporal lord. And so it was with their other doctrines. They were sheer Calvinism. And the test of highest merit for each new opinion seems to have been the degree to which it receded most from the ancient creed of Christendom. The Lutheranism that Archbishop Cranmer imported, together with his hidden wife, Osiander's niece, from Germany, soon dwindled down in his speculation or profession—for it would be unsafe to credit him with religious belief or a conscience—to the bald theories of Zurich and Geneva. Calvinists from abroad, Peter Martyr, Paul Fagius, and the wily Bucer, “cat by name and cat by nature,”¹ trained the young theologians of English universities. The oracles of the High-priest of the new system, Calvin himself, were eagerly sought and reverently accepted by the Court and highest Church dignitaries.²

As with their doctrines, so it was with their policy. It was identical with that of continental Protestantism. Everywhere in Europe, excepting those places where the change in religion was made originally by the supreme power of the State, we may distinguish three successive stages in the reforming policy of the leaders of the new sects. First, they began by clamoring for toleration, or what would now be called religious liberty. When, by fair means or foul they had secured this, their next cry was for religious supremacy. Successful in this, as they were too often, by tumult, rebellion, and crime, the third effort was to procure the extermination of the adherents of the old creed. This third step was common to all countries, whether the Reformation had grown upwards from the people, or downward from the throne. This is the history, not only of every State, but of every imperial city in Germany, and of every town and borough in Europe, where the Reformation was introduced. It is a fond fancy, studiously instilled from early childhood into the minds of non-Catholics and cherished by them in after life more warmly, perhaps, than any article of their scanty religious creed, that the Reformation of the sixteenth century was the gradual growth of Gospel light that began to stream out upon the world from subterranean dungeons where it had been imprisoned for centuries, and that its establishment throughout Europe was the result of spontaneous conversion, of rational adhesion, on the part of the masses, to the new doctrines. This is the perpetual strain of the

¹ Sir William Hamilton.

² Amongst other counsels given from the Genevan tripod to the Lord Protector Somerset, was that he should repress by the sword Papists and Anabaptists. “Tous ensemble meritent bien d'estre reprimés par le glayve qui vous est commis, veu qu' ils s'attachent non seulement au Roi, mais a Dieu.” *Life of Calvin*, by Thomas H. Dyer, London (Murray), 1850, p. 285.

religious newspaper, the Sunday-school book, and the pulpit. It is devoutly believed in by many, but not by all who repeat it, whether in the pulpit or in print. They know, as well as we do, that such an assertion is a most shameful libel on the truth, as any reader who wishes to find out for himself may easily discover from history, even that written by the Reformers themselves, and their earliest partisans. The judicious Hallam, amongst others, allows no Protestant prejudice to blind him to the fact. Speaking of the reproaches cast by Catholic writers on the origin and progress of the Reformation, their continually repeated charge that it was brought about and established by first promising and then denying liberty of conscience, by intemperate and calumnious abuse of the old Church, by crime, by outrages, by tyranny and persecution, he candidly answers: "These reproaches, it may be a shame for us to own, can be uttered and cannot be refuted."¹ And he adds, with quiet sarcasm, the more pungent because seemingly unintentional: "But, without extenuating what is morally wrong, it is permitted to observe that the Protestant religion could, in our human view of consequences, have been established by no other means."² This is an extraordinary avowal, however conscientiously made by a learned Protestant, whose name is illustrious in both hemispheres. It says substantially this: The Christianity of the old Church and of the Gospel had its beginning, its growth, and its final triumph by the exercise of every virtue, submission to lawful authority, peace, gentleness, humility, love of all mankind—even of enemies; by undergoing, not by inflicting stripes, bonds, and death. But the pretended Reformation of that Christianity of the old Church and of the Gospel began, grew, and finally triumphed by tumult, by calumny, by falsehood, and bad faith, by crime, by inflicting persecution. These were necessary to bring about and maintain its life and growth, for it could have been established by NO OTHER MEANS. Is it any longer a matter of wonder that passages breathing this, or a like spirit, should have been carefully expunged from Hallam's works by some of our pious American publishers, whose tender consciences could not bear that their readers should be offended by the sight of these unpleasant truths, so fatally at variance with the great anti-Catholic tradition? But we must not lose sight of our purpose.

To justify what we called above the third step in the Reformation, viz., the total abolition of the Catholic religion, and to prepare

¹ An allusion to the lines of Ovid (*Metam.* I.):

Pudet hæc opprobria nobis,
Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli.

² Hallam's *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the XVI. and XVII. Centuries.* New York (Armstrong & Son), 1880, Vol. I., p. 378.

the public mind for its final accomplishment, the help of theologians and controversial writers was called in, and amongst these, not the least serviceable were the interpreters and translators of Scripture, who abounded at the time. Accordingly the latter set to work with the twofold purpose of justifying the wicked unreasoning iconoclasm that was long the fashion and the glory of reformed churches, and also of paving the way for the contemplated extermination of Catholics. And here perversion of the text by artful mistranslation was made to second their designs in a wonderful way. The whole Bible bears testimony against the sin of idolatry, while the Old Testament, especially in its earlier books, teems with denunciations of idolaters, and inculcates the duty of the people of God to root them out of the land. The new sectaries coolly assumed as an indisputable fact that they were the saints, God's "chosen people." But how were Catholics to be identified with idolaters? Their Church, it was known, received the Old Testament and held to the Decalogue delivered on Mount Sinai. She taught that God alone was to be adored with a supreme degree of worship that could not be given to any created being. But she taught at the same time that God's saints, as His friends and members of His heavenly court, since He honors them, may be lawfully honored by us; and that not only they, but their relics and pictures, by just inference, may receive *relative* honor of the same kind. Above all, that the Cross of Christ, the instrument and emblem of our redemption, is entitled to the love and veneration, and even to the external reverence of all Christians. Here was the sectarian translator's lucky opportunity. If he could only drag into the vernacular text of Scripture that a picture and an idol were the same thing, then Catholics were idolaters and to be rooted out of the land. Hence, with cool deliberation, wherever it suited him, especially in the New Testament, when the word *idol* occurred, or *idolatry*, viz., adoration of heathen Gods, he wickedly altered them into "image" and "worshipping of images." This was done to confound and identify in the popular mind Pagan idolatry with the veneration of saints, and their pictures with the idols of false Gods. They were idolaters; therefore to be exterminated. The New Testament taught the first part of this enthymema; the second was clear from the Old.

They were cunning, as well as bold, in their wickedness. The Catholic Church has, and has always had, a special word set apart to express the supreme honor due to God alone. It is the word *adore*, or *adoration*, corresponding to the *λατρεία* of the Greeks. The General Councils of the Church, in defining the difference between the supreme honor due to God alone, and the inferior reverence due to saints are rigorously careful in the use of this term.

Thus the Seventh General Council (Second of Nice) in its seventh session speaks of "adoration, properly so called, which none but the Divine nature may claim."¹ And the Council of Trent teaches that we are to *adore* Christ and venerate the saints.² This term, because too clearly expressive of Catholic truth, was cautiously avoided by the new translators. Indeed, so effectually was it *tabooed* that it does not appear even once from Genesis to Revelation in any Protestant Bible. It might be suggested that, perhaps, they avoided it, as they did other words of Latin origin, because unfamiliar to the popular ear. This excuse will not answer the purpose in the case of translators, who used freely such words as *amity*,³ *augment*, *confederation*, *convocation*, *supplication*, *variableness*, *putrefying*, *similitude*, *magnifical*, etc., all Latin terms, and at that day little better than Greek or Hebrew to the multitude. The word *adore* was good English from the days of the gentle Surrey (murdered by the royal founder of English Protestantism) all along down to those of Shakespeare, Dryden, and Pope. By what word did they replace it? By *worship*,⁴ a vague term which means anything, from the honor accorded by a husband to his wife, or by citizens to an alderman or magistrate,⁵ up to that highest honor of adoration, which belongs to God alone. It was intended thus to obliterate from the popular mind the idea implanted by Catholic teaching from the beginning, that to God belongs adoration, or supreme honor, which no creature can share with Him; and, further, to insinuate, by use of an indistinct, indeterminate word, that all honor of high and low degree, absolute and relative, belongs to God exclusively. It was their aim not to shed light upon the Scripture, but to confuse its meaning and bewilder the understanding for their own ends. Is this the Spirit of God, or is it not, rather, the spirit of the enemy of God and our souls, whose delight and whose gain it is, as the Holy Fathers say, to fish in troubled waters?

¹ Even the Latin translation retains here the Greek term "*veram latrariam, quæ secundum fidem est, quæque solam naturam divinam decet.*" Mansi's collection, Florence, 1767. Tom. xiii., col. 378.

² "Ita ut Christum *adoremus* et sanctos veneremur." Conc. Trid. Sess. xxv., De Invocat.

³ *Amitie* for friendship is found in the Puritan Bibles (James iv. 4), "Know ye not the amitie of the world is the enmitie of God." King James's Bible has substituted *friendship*. But it retains some of the others, which have been swept away by the Revisers of to-day.

⁴ Even this word of their own choice, they without scruple, vary or distort to suit their general purpose, as we shall see hereafter.

⁵ "With my body I thee *worship*" (Marriage Service of the Anglican Church). The mayor and aldermen of large cities in Great Britain were, and are yet, called "*Worshipful*." The name lingered even in the lodge of the Freemasons; and the devout Protestant adept yields cheerfully to a sinful man, what he bluntly refuses to the spotless Mother of God, to Peter and Paul and the other Princes of His Heavenly Kingdom.

Thus, by sheer trickery, by mistranslation and artful substitution, did they manage to obscure the Catholic doctrine touching the worship due to God and the honor given to his Saints, the difference between the abominable idols of false gods and the sacred images of the Mother of God and His chosen friends. And with the aid of the new doctrine thus dragged into the Sacred Books by force or fraud, they not only gratified their hatred of the Old Church, but, what lay next their heart, paved the way for the extermination of Catholics as idolaters. Trusting to the ignorance and fanaticism of their readers, they did not care whether they made the Scriptures contradict themselves or not. They knew very well that Almighty God had never forbidden the use of images, save where they were meant to be turned into idols, viz., objects of divine worship. And they knew full as well that He had, on the contrary, commanded or allowed many images, graven or molten, to be made, as the cherubim near the Ark, the serpent in the wilderness, the figures of lions and oxen in the temple, the carvings of cherub, tree, and flower, with which Solomon adorned the temple-walls (Exodus xxv. 18; Numbers xxi. 8; III Kings vi. 23, 29; vii. 25, 29, 31, etc.). Of this contradiction, which not the original text but their own wicked ingenuity had contrived to fasten on the Scripture, they took no account; for, though they pretended great reverence for God's Holy Word, their action shows that it was only a hollow pretence. Scripture was for them, what it had been for Martin Luther, a mere tool, valuable only inasmuch as they could bend it to their will, and make it subservient to their purposes.

We proceed to give a few specimens of the abuse they have made in their translation of the word "image," as our space will not admit, nor does our immediate scope require, a full treatment of the subject. Without saying anything of the liberty they take in introducing gratuitously the addition of "image" after "carved," "graven," "molten," as in Deut. iv. 16, 23; vii. 25 (Isaiah xxx., 22; xl. 19; xlii. 17, and more than threescore other places), we may inquire, why did they translate in Exod. xx. 4, the one Hebrew word *pesel* by two, "graven image." There is no doubt that its meaning is absolutely the same as the Latin *sculptile*, or a "graven" thing. And this is the way in which it was rendered by the great scholars of antiquity, both Greek and Latin, before Christ, and after his coming, the Hellenist interpreters, the Itala and St. Jerom (*ἔιδωλον*, *sculptile*.) The latter followed the strict literal, the former the moral meaning of the word. Both were taught by their good sense, that where one word sufficed, two were unnecessary; but above all, they were candid, honest interpreters, trying to convey God's word, pure, and as it came from Him, to

their readers, not to intrude upon them, under cover of that word, their own private opinions. Our Puritan divines, however, seeing in this text the fundamental precept against idolatry, thought it wise to get in surreptitiously a condemnation of all *images*. Their reason was this: "Images" is the technical word (*cultus imaginum*) used by the Catholic creed and catechism in explaining our doctrine of relative worship; and, therefore, "images" had to be forced into the text, to make it appear that they were condemned by the Most High. If called to account for adding to the text, they would not imitate the bold, dictatorial dogmatism of Luther, who gave his "*sic volo, sic jubeo*" as a sufficient answer to all questioning. They would, with meek condescension, give an answer to the adversary, however unworthy. They would allege that the sense calls for the addition of this or a like word. But even if this were true, why select, of all others, the word *images*? Why not use *figure*, *likeness*, or some other quite harmless, yet sufficient word? To this question their whole habitual conduct in dealing with this point, were it translated from action, into speech, could be no other than this. "Wherever *images* are commanded or allowed in Scripture, we will call them *figures*² or something else of the kind, or we will blind the eyes of the reader by some outlandish word of which he knows nothing,³ but where *idols* of false Gods are

¹ "So I will it, so command it, and for reason stands my will." This is the only answer that Luther gave, and ordered his disciples to give Catholic theologians (asses, mules, Pope-Asses in his polite vocabulary) who ventured to question his right to interpolate *nur* and *allein* (*only* and *alone*) into the text of St. Paul. See his "Send-schreiben von Dolmatschen," published in every collection of his works, from the earliest at Wittenburg down to the latest in our own day at Erlangen. His old disciples were so blinded that they could not see the character of this work, one of the most arrant specimens of dogmatism and arrogance that has appeared in eighteen centuries. His modern devotees, though they despise his teaching and his claims to infallibility, yet feel bound to hold him up to veneration as the legitimate father of modern Freethinkers.

² This is no exaggeration. When it is question of the cherubim, etc., as in III. Kings vi. 29, they translate "carved *figures* of cherubims," and in verse 32 simply "*carvings*," and in vii. 31, "*gravings*."

³ The Latin term "*similitudo*" was sufficiently obscure to help them occasionally in their effort to hide what Catholic doctrine might be disclosed by a clearer word. For example, they object to us the law of Exodus and Deuteronomy, which forbids making the *likeness* of anything in heaven or on earth. But the difficulty arises, Why then did God command or approve making the likeness of cherubim, oxen, etc., and placing them in the temple? Here comes the dark word to their relief, "Under it (the molten sea in the temple) was the *similitudo* of oxen." (II. Paralip. iv. 3.) Again they reproach us with having in our temples the likenesses of Angels, of the Eternal Father, the Holy Ghost, etc., which they say is unscriptural. We refer them for answer to Daniel vii. 9 and x. 5, 6; Mark i. 9 and other places, where the very appearance, vesture, etc., of the Ancient of Days, and His Angels are fully described. We even appeal to passages like Num. xii. 8, Dan. x. 16, where there is express mention of holy men beholding God or His Angels in their *likeness*. But they cunningly have been beforehand with us. Thus on turning to Num. xii. 8, we find, "With him will I speak mouth to mouth even apparently . . . and the *similitudo* of the LORD shall

meant, we will call them *images*." In other words, "we intend to decry and misrepresent the doctrine of the old Catholic Church of fifteen centuries, and we are glad that God's word in the vernacular gives us an opportune, safe vehicle for such misrepresentation." This, of course, they never said, but it is what they must have said, had they spoken the truth, and unless they repented before their last hour, it is what they will confess before an assembled world on the great judgment day.

As they add "image" to *pesel*, "graven" (and its plural, *pesilim*), so they add "image" also to *massecah*, "molten," Deut. ix. 12; xxvii. 15 (and in many other places). But growing bolder as they go on, they venture to translate both *pesel* and *massecah* by the simple word *image*. Thus in Habacuc ii. 18, "What profiteth the image (*pesel*), for the maker thereof hath made it an image (*massecah*) and a teacher of lies." Well may they translate *lies* in the plural (though the original Hebrew has the singular *moreh sheker*, "teaching falsehood"), for they have not only falsified the prophet's words, but have also marred the beauty and point of his hemistich, as is clear from the distinctive accent over the preceding word *yossero*.

But in the New Testament, which was more intended for popular reading, they became yet more reckless. If the Hellenists (Jews scattered abroad through the pagan world before and after the coming of our Lord), and their Christian descendants had in their language a word, which most clearly expressed the object of that false worship which pagans gave to their false gods, it was evidently εἰδωλον (*eidolon*), the original of our Christian word "idol." To represent the image or likeness of a relative or friend, of one distinguished by dignity, renown, or holiness, they had quite another εἰκών (*eicon* or *icon*), whence comes our name for those detestable heretics, the Iconoclasts or image-breakers of the Byzantine Empire. They were driven to make this distinction by religious necessity. It matters not whether the two words were originally

he behold." See how artfully the likeness is hidden under "the similitude!" nor was that big Latin adverb "apparently" put in without a motive. The Hebrew word *marech* occurs ninety-eight times in the Old Testament, and it is here only that they have sought to cover up its meaning by this Latinizing big word. It means properly *sight* or *countenance*. Luther translates correctly: "Mündlich rede ich mit ihm, und er siehet den Herrn in seiner Gestalt." We paint Angels under human form out of necessity, indeed—for how else could spirit be represented to human eyes? but not without warrant of Scripture. Raphael and Gabriel, who stand next to God's throne, appeared in human shape, according to the sacred historian. Of Gabriel it is expressly said (Dan. x. 16) that his *likeness* was that of a man. How does the Presbyterian version render this? "And behold, one *like the similitude* of the sons of men touched my lips!" We may safely put it to any honest conscientious man: Was this translation meant to elucidate or to darken the sense of Scripture? Luther again translates correctly, "Und siehe, Einer, gleich einem Menschen, rührte meine Lippen an." But Luther, bad as he was, had no iconoclastic prejudices.

of like meaning or not. Their significations were diverted by force of circumstances, in other words, by the exigencies of Jewish or Christian revelation, into new channels, and they settled down forever in peaceful possession of the diverse meanings they had gradually acquired. *Idol* (ἰδωλον) was a stock or a stone, no matter how gracefully wrought, representing a false god or the devil, for, as the Psalmist says *Dii gentium dæmonia* (the gods of the Gentiles are devils); *image* (εἰκών) was the image, real or conjectural, of a parent, friend, monarch, of one illustrious on earth or exalted in heaven. And so it was with all other words that had acquired a peculiar Christian meaning, differ as it might from its pagan, or primitive, etymological signification. When Christianity was born into the pagan world, she was like God's people of old, of whom the Psalmist says: "*linguam quam non noverat, audivit.*" She met with strange tongues, whose religious vocabulary could not express the deep meaning of her revealed truth. She had to create a language of her own, and this she did by the aid of analogy, by appropriate selection, above all by setting apart certain words, and stamping them with the seal of her consecration. To give an example, no Latin Christian hearing from a pulpit, or reading in a Christian book, such words as *Presbyter* (our *Priest*), *Sacrament*, *Sacrifice*, *Altar*, *Grace*, *Charity*, *Confession*, etc., could possibly understand them in the way they were uttered and understood by his pagan ancestors. To his mind they conveyed far nobler and holier concepts than they had ever awakened in what we might call with Scripture the "uncircumcised ears and hearts" of his unbelieving countrymen, past or present. In this way it came to pass that Christianity gave her Christian language to all converted peoples, and when she conquered the whole of Europe, there was but one religious tongue in all Europe down to the sixteenth century. *Terra erat labii unius ac sermonum eorundem*, as the sacred writer appropriately remarks (Gen. xi. 1) before proceeding to narrate the confusion of tongues brought about by man's pride and wickedness. The Reformers attempted to erect a tower of Babel. They, and especially the Calvinistic portion of them who introduced the new religion into England, knew nothing, or rather were unwilling to know anything, of this Christian language that had prevailed in Europe for fifteen hundred years. Or, not unlikely, what makes them yet more resemble their Babelite predecessors, their ignorance was God's punishment of their sinful pride, in attempting to defy God and his Spouse of the New Covenant, and to laugh at His threats and promises.

At all events, blinded by hatred of the old Church, and determined to compel the sacred text to be their ally and instrument in identifying the Catholic Church with Pagan idolatry, they perverted every passage of the New Testament that suited their pur-

pose. The terms "idol," "idolater," and "idolatry," were carefully perverted into "images," "worshippers," and "worshipping" of images. Thus they translated 1 Cor. x. 7, "Be not worshippers of images," instead of, "Be not (or become not) idolaters" (*εἰδωλολάτραι*); and 2 Cor. vi. 16, "How agreeth the temple of God with images?" for "what agreement hath the temple of God with idols (*μετὰ εἰδωλῶν*)?" Again, the last verse of St. John's First Epistle, "Little children, keep yourselves from idols (*ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων*)" was perverted into "Babes, keep yourselves from images." The injunction thus falsely put into the mouth of an inspired Apostle, seemed to them such a formidable weapon and sure prophylactic against Popery, that they caused it to be printed as a supplement to the Decalogue, on the walls of the Churches they had unlawfully seized, denuded of every Catholic emblem, profaned by their iconoclasm, and desecrated by their newly invented service. Clearly they had forgotten their own text, "How agreeth the temple of God with images?" For by what other name than that of false image or idol can we call a painted tablet set up in God's temple for the veneration of Christians, which pretends to be God's actual law, and is, after all, but a lie and deceit, impiously put into His mouth by human knavery? Besides, it might be asked, what induced them to put into the text just quoted that unusual word, "babes?" It really looks as if they intended to warn infants, or their parents, rather, against the sign of the cross in baptism, the use of which sign dating from the Apostolic age, they presumed to condemn as idolatry. This is not judging rashly; for the man who has even in one instance had the impiety to set about deliberately mangling God's Holy Word for unholy purposes, is neither in law nor in charity entitled to further favorable judgment. That the translator had a design is evident from another passage of this same Epistle (1 John iii. 18), where the same Greek word (*τεκνία*) is rendered not "babes," but "little children." The fact is that *τεκνία*, *παιδιά* and *ἀγαπητοί* (*children*, *little children*, and *beloved*), are all synonymous throughout this epistle of the Loving Disciple.

Rather than refrain from gratifying this wicked whim of theirs, they are content, without any possible gain to their cause, to darken and almost make nonsense of St. Paul's teaching. Thus in Eph. v. 5, where the Apostle calls the covetous man an "idolater" (*εἰδωλολάτρης*) they coolly turn him into a "worshipper of images." So, too, in Colos. iii. 5, where by a parallel phrase covetousness is styled idolatry (*εἰδωλολατρεία*) they have recourse to their favorite substitute, "the worshipping of images." Here the wicked spirit of hate seems to have made their right hand forget its cunning. For, while a few minutes' reflection, aided by God's grace, may enable any Protestant to see that his covetousness is a species of idolatry, since he transfers his love and service from the Creator to

the creature, yet the joint labors of a dozen Presbyterian consistories for a decade of years will fail to convince him that any amount of covetousness can ever turn his stanch Protestantism into Papistry, or what he has been told is its chief characteristic, the "worshipping of images." His private spirit would rather suggest that Paul, as they have taught him irreverently to style the Apostle, is here slightly mistaken.

For these old Puritan interpreters there was something magical in the word *images*. Such is the potency of its spell, that it does service in English for no less than thirteen words in the Hebrew, and for nine in the Greek original.¹ Besides, such is its pliancy under their dexterous manipulation, that it can be made to enter a text where not even its shadow could previously be found, or to disappear at the touch of the Calvinistic wand from a text where it unquestionably existed. Lest this should appear to be jesting in a serious matter, we furnish the proof. Where St. Paul says (Rom. xi. 4), "I have left me seven thousand men who have not bent the knee to Baal" (οὐκ ἔκαμψαν γόνυ τη βάαλ), they unblushingly change the last two words into five, "to the *image* of Baal!"² Again, in the deuterocanonical portion of Daniel (xiv:4), where the original has "I worship not *idols* made with hands" (ἐίδωλα χειροποίητα), they lord it over the Scripture by knocking out altogether the word εἰδωλα, and translating "I worship not *things that be made with hands*." Here the last six words, "things that be made with hands," are the literal rendering of the one Greek adjective, χειροποίητα. The word εἰδωλον has vanished out of sight, and neither "idols" nor the pet "images" takes its place.³ Why did they leave it out? We cannot suspect these men of acting without a motive. It was most likely because they sought or found here an opportunity of condemning at one fell swoop all objects of Catholic veneration, such as medals, crosses, pictures, rosaries, etc., which are necessarily the fruit of man's handiwork. It may have been some other motive, for it is hard to track the sectarian fox through all his doublings; but we are justified in suspecting that it was nothing good or honest that prompted his course. He who deliberately sits down to take away from or add to the words of

¹ This observation has been also made by Dr. Lingard in his reply to Dr. Ryan's Analysis.

² This wicked interpolation, emanating from Geneva, was retained with open eyes by King James's Episcopalian translators, though a dignitary of that Church in our day (Bloomfield) confesses that it is wholly unwarranted. The revisers of 1881 have honestly cancelled the obnoxious words.

³ Even the translators of King James were ashamed of this gross perversion, and corrected it properly in their revision of 1611. But *cui bono*? Since then, by the tacit law of custom, and by formal decree of the Bible Society, the Deuterocanonical portions of Daniel and Esther, with the entire books of Judith, Tobias, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, etc., have been excluded from all editions of the Protestant Bible.

Scripture for purposes of his own, labors under a twofold curse, pronounced by God himself (Apoc. xxii. 18, 19), and has lost all title in law to be judged by the ordinary rules of Christian charity.

In the same deceitful spirit they render σεβάσματα (Acts xvii. 23) by the word "devotions," though its unquestionable meaning is *idols* or objects of Pagan worship.¹ But "devotions" being the technical name amongst Catholics for voluntary external acts of religion, whether public or private (outside of the Holy Sacrifice), they thought it a good chance to make out that Scripture condemns our "devotions" or acts of piety as being no better than Pagan practices. Paul reproving the popular "devotions" of a Pagan city seemed to them, or they hoped would be accepted by their readers as a very appropriate type of John Knox² or one of his fellow-ruffians of the new gospel making his appearance in a Catholic city of Scotland or England, and exciting the iconoclastic zeal of the mob to put an end by hammer and axe to all Catholic devotions.

We have alluded before to their substitution of the word *worship* for *adore*, and *worshipping* for *adoration*, with the incidental remark that they were willing enough to give the go by even to this their new term, whenever it suited their sectarian purpose to do so. The Hebrew word most commonly used for *adore* is the Hithpael or seventh conjugation of *shahhah*.³ Now, whenever it is question of adoring the true God or false gods, they are careful to stick to the word *worship*; but where there is mention of any external object of reverence, such as the altar, the ark, the Lord's footstool, the "head of the bed," or "the top of a rod," they either falsely interpolate the word "God" after "worship," as in Gen. xlvii. 31; Hebr. xi. 21; or else abandon their pet term "worship," and replace it by "bow oneself," "bow down," or "fall down," as they do in Ps. xcvi. (Heb. xcix.) 5, and Ps. cxxx. (Heb. cxxxii.) 7. This is not done without a purpose. The use of the words "fall down," "bow down," etc., necessitates in English the use of a

¹ King James's Bible would not give up this corruption, but it has been surrendered by the revisers of 1881.

² Dr. Johnson deserves credit for having fastened indelibly on this wicked man the epithet of "the Ruffian of the Reformation." What would he have said, had he further known, what the registers of the town council of Edinburgh have lately brought to light, that this holy apostle of a purer religion lived habitually for years in sinful intercourse with the woman he called his wife and with her daughter! Thus, does true history, from day to day, contribute to strip off from sectarian idols the false colors with which they were painted by their devotees of former centuries.

³ The Hiphil of 'assab (with *hain* for the first radical) and the Aramaic verb *sagad* (used by Isaiah) are also employed in the sense of *adoration*. For the meaning of 'assab (which occurs only in Jer. xlv. 19) we are indebted to St. Jerome, who has authoritatively fixed it by translating *ad colendum* eam. *Sagad* is found only four times (in the 44th and 46th chapters of Isaiah), and means exactly the same as the Biblico-Chaldaic word *Segid* (Dan. ii. 46), or the common Syriac term *Sged*.

preposition "at," "before," or "towards," which is quite gratuitously assumed as the equivalent of the Hebrew *Lamed prae*fixum. In true heretical style they have managed even to poison the dictionaries. And it is a matter of regret to see that their traditional falsehood has been unthinkingly accepted by such a man as Gesenius, who is a thorough scholar and has no particle of religious bigotry. To his rationalistic intelligence Luther and Calvin are no better, no worse, than Moses, St. Peter, St. John, Mahomet, or Zoroaster. Yet, though no sharer of their religious prejudices, he has allowed himself to be led astray by the influence of his Calvinistic predecessors in lexicography, and defines it as something fixed and certain; that *hishtakhavah* takes after it the *Lamed* of person, thereby evidently intending to exclude the *Lamed* of thing. What is his authority for this? None whatever, but the *dictum* of the Calvinist dictionary-makers who went before him, and who wickedly transfused into grammars and vocabularies the same corruptions that they had endeavored to put into the sacred text.¹ We find the verb in Hebrew repeatedly with *Lamed* of the *person* and *Lamed* of the *thing*. What else, it may be asked, were the stocks and stones that the heathens worshipped, but *things*? In the same way we find its Biblical Chaldee representative *segid* used constantly for *adore* in the Book of Daniel with the *Lamed* of person or thing. And its counterpart, the Syriac *sged*,² is used constantly in the

¹ John Forster, an honest old Lutheran, who taught in Luther's day, at the University of Wittenberg, was brought up in the old Rabbinical fashion and knew nothing of this Calvinistic refining. In his *Dictionarium Hebraicum Novum*, Basileae, 1567, p. 838, he simply remarks what is true, and what he had learned from his Jewish and Catholic teachers, that the Hithpael of *shakhah* is used indifferently in Scripture to express *latría* and *dulça*, the worship given to the Most High, and the reverence paid to holy men or to legitimate authority. But Gusset, a thorough Calvinist, who came a century later, has treasured up in his *Hebrew Lexicon* all the anti-Catholic lore of the sectarian translators of the Old Testament, just as Hedericus, Patrick, Ernesti, Wendler, Larcher, Bastius, Pfinzger, and Passow have contrived to get into their Greek Lexicons all the false meanings that Beza had fastened on the Greek of the New Testament. Speaking of the *Lamed prae*fixum used with verb, he coolly takes for granted that it is an abbreviation of the preposition *El*, and that its meaning is purely material and expresses no moral intention whatever! "Descriptio situs corporei materialiter ac in se sumpti et occasionalis tantum, *sine ulla intentione morali*" (we quote from the edition with supplement, by Clodius, Leipsic, 1743, p. 1617). Whence did he evolve this nonsense, except from the depths of his anti-Catholic prejudice? Why should David or Isaiah speak of worshipping at or before the temple, the altar, the place where God's footsteps had been, unless there was a local sanctity on which their mind, in other words their moral intention was fixed? Why should Joshua or David prostrate themselves before the ark unless they considered it a holy place, a shrine hallowed in a special way by the divine presence?

² In the Syriac Liturgy "to adore Christ or His Cross" is indifferently *mesgad lamshihho* or *lasslibo* with *Lomad* of person or thing. In the Maronite office for Sunday (Rome, 1830, p. 33, line 6), we find "On the first day of the week the Church saw Thee, and to Thy Cross (*lassliboch*) bent her knee, adoring (*bercat segdat*)." In the Tuesday office at Matins (p. 107, line 11), it is said that "when Gabriel came to the Blessed One, he bent his head and adored her" (*wasged loh*). St. Ephrem in his *Necrosima*

Bible by St. Ephrem, St. Isaac, and other fathers indifferently as to person or thing, with or without the Lomad of Dative or Accusative. And so it has been rendered by the Itala, Seventy, and Vulgate. Gesenius was innocent, because unsuspecting; but his Calvinistic predecessors were not. They were confronted by the fact that the Bible represented the patriarchs as adoring, or invited the people to adore or worship some external or material thing. Of course, in Catholic theology, where the knowledge of absolute and relative worship exists in a well-defined shape, there can be no difficulty for any reader. To adore God's footstool, or His ark, or His altar, is to adore Himself by outward prostration to the supposed place of His presence. To adore the top of Joseph's rod is to adore, or honor with due limit, viz., to pay respect to, Joseph's tribal sceptre, either as father of the Ephraimites, or much more probable as a type of Our Blessed Lord, which he certainly was, and so the Fathers explain it.¹ How St. Paul came to mistake the "head of the bed" for the "top of the rod" may puzzle Protestant interpreters who feel themselves bound in conscience to make a *fetish* of the Hebrew Bible text, but it presents no difficulty to Catholics. We know that there is no divine warrant for the genuineness of the Hebrew text as given to us by the Masoreths; and we know at the same time that the Septuagint version has been consecrated by habitual use on the part of our Lord and His Apostles. Yet common decency would seem to demand from these Calvinistic interpreters that they should not have added interpolated words in order to set St. Paul's text in fuller and more open contradiction with Genesis from which he professes to quote. In Genesis (xlvi. 31) they translate "Israel worshipped God (of this word *God* there is not the slightest vestige in the original Hebrew text) towards the bed's head."² But in Hebr. xi. 21, where the Apostle quotes this very passage, and where, according to their polite conjecture,

(Roman ed. of 1743, vol. iii. p. 299) has a beautiful poem, in which he represents the Cherub, Guardian of Eden, *adoring* (*soged chun*) the souls of pious Christians that have just come forth from their bodies. Sometimes the Lomad is varied by *kdom* or *kudmat* (ante) as in the Antiochene office (Rome, 1853, p. 187, l. 7), "O Holy Martyrs, kings adore," *i. e.*, prostrate themselves before you. *Malche sogdin kudmaicun*. Or in a parallel passage from the Maronite office, p. 93, line 6, kings *adore*, *i. e.*, prostrate themselves before your bones, *kudmat garmaicun*. And Abul-Pharajy (Berhebraeus in his X Dynasty, Ed. Bruns) has it without *kdom* or Lomad, or any adjunct whatsoever, *sogdai ssalme*, "worshippers of images," *lit. adorantes idola*.

¹ Even Calvin has no difficulty in admitting that the honor was paid to Joseph. See his Commentary on the New Testament, Tholuck's edition, Berolini, 1834, vol. viii., p. 126.

² The Hebrew text as it now stands reads thus: "Swear unto me, and he swore unto him and Israel adored upon the head of the bed." It is true that St. Jerome translates, "Adoravit Israel Deum, conversus ad lectuli caput." But St. Jerome was an honest interpreter, who had but one intention, viz., to give the genuine meaning of God's word. And whether he was right or wrong in the present case, we shall allow no dishonest translators to take refuge under the wing of a Catholic Saint.

Paul, misled by the Seventy, mistook the Hebrew word *mittah* (a bed), for *matteh* (a rod), they translated "leaning on the end of his staffe worshipped God." Here all is perverted. The two words, "leaning" and "God" are gratuitous interpolations; both designed to get rid of the testimony of Scripture to those external signs of religious worship which are perfectly legitimate according to Catholic doctrine.

We have sufficiently shown, we think, that the translators of that Bible, to which England owes in part, at least, her Protestantism, went to work persistently and systematically, with the intention of rooting out of the sacred book whatever was favorable to the Old Religion, and introducing into it whatever might give countenance to their newly-invented systems. We have, thus far, said nothing of their many other doctrines, confining our remarks to one point,—their errors as to the proper worship of God. We have seen how studiously they endeavored to eliminate from the Bible every trace of the doctrine taught there that worship of inferior degree may be given to God's angels and saints, and proportionate relative honor may be given to pictures and other sacred emblems. We have seen, further, how, by every dishonest artifice of mistranslation, of adding to or taking away from the text at will, they sought to confound our Christian worship, dating from the apostles, with pagan idolatry, so that one might pass for the other in the minds of all readers of their corrupt Bible. And this, no doubt, was their main purpose, for it logically prepared the way for our destruction. Protestant sects, however extravagant their tenets, might be entitled to some measure of toleration, but there can be no toleration for the idolater. His doom is announced in the Old Testament. He is to be rooted out of the midst of God's people. The very origin of the word *Protestant*, little known to most readers of history, is a proof of what we are saying. The States, or governments that took that name (*die Protestirenden Staaten*), were not so called, as most people imagine, because they protested against doctrines, or errors if you will, of the Roman Catholic Church. No; but they were so called, because they protested against some measures of compromise, of mutual forbearance and toleration proposed by Charles V., and, wisely or unwisely, accepted by the Catholic princes and States. But the so-called Evangelical States protested that their conscience forbade all toleration of the Catholic religion. It was impious and idolatrous, and its existence could not be tolerated in their territory. Any one may learn this from reading the words of the "Protest," and may learn, at the same time, how a word, which is commonly supposed to be the symbol of free conscience, free opinion, etc., is stamped indelibly in its origin with the most disgraceful intolerance.

But, without going to other parts of Europe, let us confine our-

selves to England, and listen to the words of an Englishman (and a republican, too, after the fashion of Oliver Cromwell and his patriots), who lived at a day when the Protestant Bible had already brought forth its legitimate fruits, the fruits designed by the translators. He tells us freely, what the Bible-makers might have told us at the beginning, had they been honest enough to avow their aims.

"As for tolerating the exercise of their religion (popery), I answer, that toleration is either public or private, and the exercise of their religion, as far as it is idolatrous, can be tolerated neither way; not publicly, without grievous and unsufferable scandal given to all conscientious beholders; not privately, without great offence to God, declared against all kind of idolatry, though secret." Then, after quoting several verses of the eighth chapter of Ezekiel, he continues: "And it appears by the whole chapter, that God was no less offended with these secret idolatries than with those in public, and no less provoked than to bring on and hasten his judgments on the whole land for these also." . . .

"Having shown thus that popery, as being idolatrous, is not to be tolerated, either in public or in private, it must be now thought, how to remove it, and hinder the growth thereof. . . . First, we must remove their idolatry, and all the furniture thereof, whether idols, or the Mass, wherein they adore their God under bread and wine, for the commandment forbids to adore, not only 'any graven image, but the likeness of anything in Heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down to them, nor worship them, for I, the Lord, thy God, am a jealous God.' If they say, that by removing their idols we violate their consciences, we have no warrant to regard conscience which is not grounded on Scripture (John Milton, *Of True Religion, Heresie, Schism, Toleration*; Works (Pickering), London, 1851, vol. v., pp. 413, 414).

Here is the whole argument in a nutshell. They make an English Bible to suit themselves. By forgery and corruption they pervert its contents in such way as to make us out idolaters. They then tell us we are to be removed, or, in plain language, "exterminated," because our conscience has no rights grounded on Scripture, the Scripture they have made to order. In a word, by wicked falsehood they fasten on our brow the brand of Canaan and Amalec, and then bid us not complain of the penalty.

The Presbyterian Bible fulfilled the purpose of its authors. And when we speak of the Presbyterian Bible, we do not restrict our meaning to the Geneva Bible, first published by Rowland Hill, in 1560,¹ and supposed to have been chiefly the work of Calvin's

¹ It is supposed that one, two or more editions of it were reprinted annually down to the year 1612. See "Old Bibles," by I. R. Dore, London: Pickering, 1870, p. 65.

relative, Dean Whittingham. We include in the term all the old English Protestant Bibles that appeared before the revised version of 1611, viz., Tyndal's, Coverdale's, Grafton's "Great Bible" of 1539 (called sometimes, but improperly, Cranmer's Bible), Cranmer's revision of the great Bible, and not excluding even the Bishop's Bible, printed under Parker's superintendence, in 1568. Though the latter was not quite as bad as its predecessors, it was not much improved except by the omission of strongly-colored sectarian notes. Very little or no care was taken to remove the anti-Catholic corruptions of the text. It was meant to be on a smaller scale, like the version of 1611, a compromise between the growing power of the Episcopalian faction in the Anglican Church and their Puritan enemies. All of these versions were inspired by the low Protestantism or fanatical hatred of everything Catholic that marked the new sects in Continental Europe, and even Parker himself is known to have been tinged with Puritanism. Tyndal, not to mention others, always translates "church" by "congregation," and "priest" by "seniour," and "charity" by "love," like our revisors of 1881. Of course pagan *idols* are for him always "images." But it is when the text gives him a chance to rail at our sacraments, that his foul mouth spurts its worst venom, "Anointing," or unction, is for him only "smering" (smearing); to "consecrate" becomes "to charm;" "sacraments," are but "ceremonies," and "ceremonies" themselves are impiously caricatured as "witchcraft," by this unprincipled translator.

The Presbyterian Bible, as we said before, accomplished its mission. It trained up generations to misunderstand, under pretence of understanding the Sacred Books, to find in them a help to unlearn the old creed, and to learn new heresies, such as that good works were worthless, and that Catholics were to be exterminated as idolaters. During the first twenty years of the seventeenth century, there was little left of Catholicity in England. The nobles and gentry had been exiled, or driven, by fines and confiscation, to save some remnant of their own, into the Anglican Church; the poorer class had lost their faith from fear, evil example, and the absence of the Catholic ministry, for no priest could live in England unless in a hiding-place, like the priests and bishops of the early Church

Indeed it seems to have been popular in England down almost to the Restoration under Charles II. Milton, in some of his controversial pamphlets, seems to sneer at, or at least to talk lightly of the New Version, made by King James and his churchmen. The Geneva version seems to have held its ground in New England for a still longer time. See a learned and most instructive article on the "Bible in American History," by John Gilmary Shea, Esq., in the *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, for January, 1878. Even should the frontispiece of a Geneva Bible be lost, it can always be distinguished from others by two marks. The word "aprons" (Gen. iii., 7), is translated "breeches," and the word "manger" in St. Luke (ii. 16), is always rendered "cratch," which seems to be Yorkshire dialect for a large basket.

in pagan times. The statute-books teemed with laws for the repression of Catholic worship, known legally as treason and idolatry, and there was very little danger that it could again lift its head. But the Presbyterian Bible, the human instrument that had brought about this desired result, like all human instruments lost its credit by age, and was rejected by the very men to whom it had been such a source of gain in the religious sense. And this brings us to an examination of the second revision, or translation rather, of the Protestant Bible, which was made by church authority—such authority as exists in a church that boasts of being human and fallible—and confessedly because the existing versions were incorrect and corrupt.

In the days of King James I., when the High Church faction was no longer the inconsiderable handful of former days, but had grown up to be a power in Anglicanism, they began to express their contempt of the Presbyterian Bible,—that very Bible, it must be remembered, which had helped to bring about the Protestantizing of the country. To that Bible they owed everything, their usurped sees, their ecclesiastical revenues, unincumbered by provision for the poor, their freedom from canon law, from Rome's supervision, in a word, from every restraint that might gall a carnal-minded man, whose lines have fallen in the pleasant places of church preferment. But there was a spectre in their path. It was the Puritan who wanted more liberty for himself, and clamored for restrictions on Episcopal power, which he declared unscriptural. The Puritan had his Bible at his back. As long as he had decried the Catholic Church of past ages by calling it a "congregation," her bishops "overseers," and their vestments "rags of the Babylonish woman," their enemies had nothing to say; they found no fault. But when their own growing, princely state, which they had only lately discovered, was called in question, they came to the conclusion that it was desirable to put down the Puritan and his Bible. But, though anxious to do this, for awhile they were afraid to move in the matter, fearing that a new translation would damage their cause, since Presbyterian divines also were anxious to have one, and seemed to have gotten the ear of the King. But they took heart and consented to a new translation, when James I. abandoned the Presbyterians, who seemed sure of his protection, and came round to the side of the Bishops, giving them the amplest assurances as to what he intended the new version to be. The royal Solomon had found out, he said, that regal as well as episcopal authority was menaced by the Puritan faction. As he himself curtly expressed it: "No Bishop, no King." He had read the notes of the Geneva translators, and had found them "untrue, seditious, full of disloyalty, and treasonable." He had examined all current English Bibles, and

decided that none of them were good, but that the Genevan was worst of all.¹

Here we have a general decision pronounced by the official head of the Anglican Church, that all its Bibles, without exception, were bad; in other words, did not contain the pure word of God which they pretended to have introduced into the country. It may be said that James was no scholar. Such, surely, was not his own opinion, nor that given out by his flatterers in Church and State. He was, in any case, Head of the Church, and none of those who held him to be such, would dispute his right to make a translation himself, or to adopt and authorize one made by others as if it were his own, and to enforce its use by pains and penalties. But whatever may be thought of King James's theological or biblical knowledge, it is certain that there must have been some of it among the thousand ministers of the Church of England, who addressed what is known as the "millenary" petition to King James, praying him to grant some redress of abuses in the English Church. They seem to have been a middle element between the Episcopal and Puritan party. They acknowledge the King's supremacy, but yet look for, as they profess, "not a disorderly innovation, but a due and godly reformation." They pray for a fresh translation on the ground that all existing translations were unfaithful. "May it please Your Majesty" (they say) "that the Bible be newly translated, such as are extant not answering the original." Of the Bible translation which the Communion Book maintained, they declare it "a most corrupt translation." We say nothing of individual theologians, such as Dr. Reynolds, of Oxford, or Broughton, of Cambridge, whom Strype calls "the greatest scholar of his age for Hebrew," and who discovered in the "Bishop's Bible" what he calls "many errors, traps, and pitfalls." Now, if this corrupt "Bishop's Bible" (or Parker's) was an improvement on Tyndal's and Coverdale's, what must be thought of their corruption? What must be said, above all, of Tyndal's New Testament, which Cranmer himself stigmatized as "crafty, false, and untrue" (Dore, *Old Bibles*, p. 74). Thus do they all bear testimony to each other's corruptions. In King James's rules for his new translators, it was laid down as a principle that the Bishop's Bible was to serve as a standard, and to be as little altered as the truth of the original would permit. It was further provided that Tyndal's, Coverdale's, the Geneva, etc., should be used in preference, when they agree better with the text. What

¹ Jeremy Collier's *Ecclesiastical History of Great Britain*, with Barham's Notes, London, 1840, vol. vii., Book viii., where all the sayings and doings of the royal theologian are reported, and a full account of the Hampton Conferences and the subsequent translation is given. Collier is, on the whole, a conscientious writer, though no friend to the Puritans, and sufficiently anti-Catholic to keep up his character of Protestant historian.

was this but an acknowledgment, that in spite of so many attempts, they had not yet succeeded, and that their last effort (the Bishop's Bible, which was considered "as the work of the Church, and not of private men") did not agree always with "the text" or with "the truth of the original?"

The labors of King James's translators, forty-seven in number, began in 1604, and lasted down to 1611. Had they been sincere in doing their work, they might have given us a far better version than they did. We hear sometimes pity expressed for their lack of critical data, and this is made an excuse for their imperfect work. Much of that pity is thrown away, and is merely a foil to set off the excellence of the revision of 1881. They had in their possession two of the most important critical helps, of which our late revisers have availed themselves. They had the Latin Vulgate, one of the noblest monuments of Christian antiquity, and they had a sufficient stock of quotations from the Fathers, Greek and Latin, to turn to some good account. But their sectarian hatred made them overlook or contemptuously fling away these treasures. They despised the Latin Vulgate, and they abhorred the very name of the Fathers. The former was the consecrated storehouse, not only of the ancient revelation, but also of Rome's sacred language; and the idea that she had Romanized God's Word grew up naturally in the breasts of those who were themselves adepts in the wicked art of Bible-corruption. The Fathers were witnesses to Catholic truth, and were therefore set down as worthless, because they had been carried away by what the irreligious slang of the day styled the delusions of "the great apostasy." But apart from this rancor against Rome and the Fathers, it did not enter into the intention of the translators to make a good or critical version. It was merely a contest between the Episcopal and Puritan wing of the translating body, to see which could get most of its special doctrine into the new edition, and, as usually happens in such contests, where honesty of principle is wanting, the result was compromise and mutual concession. Thus, in Timothy it is "a bishop," who is allowed to have one wife; but, in Acts xx. where he is set by the Holy Ghost to govern the Church of God, he is degraded into an "overseer." *Priest*, too, is always rendered "elder," though King James had given them the proper rule, viz., "The old Ecclesiastical words to be retained." But this rule, so agreeable to equity and common sense, was not observed save in one case, the uniform substitution of "church" for the Presbyterian corruption, "congregation." The King had specially insisted on this change, otherwise, the obnoxious word would have been retained in some places.

For the priesthood, eldership was substituted, and, in return, Presbyterian interpolations about the election of church officers by vote of the people, were allowed to be stricken out. And

what the anti-Puritan faction considered, no doubt, a great triumph, the Royal supremacy was introduced, or craftily insinuated in 1 Peter ii. 13: "Be subject, therefore, . . . to the King as supreme." This was not quite as good as what was read in the Bible printed under Henry VIII. and Edward VI., viz., "Be subject to the King, as to the CHIEF HEAD;" but it was some improvement on the Geneva Bibles, some of which read, "Be subject to the King, as having pre-eminence," others, "as the superior."

Thus, by a system of mutual giving and taking, they hoped to patch up a book which might satisfy both sides. But this disgraceful proceeding is proof sufficient that it was not their aim to give a translation which should represent God's pure unadulterated Word, but to make the truths of that Word a matter of shameful traffic and barter in the interests of party. How fairly they dealt with each other may be seen by a little anecdote, which comes to us on good authority. Sir Henry Saville had charge of the translation of St. Peter's Epistles. In one of these (1 Peter iii. 18, 19) is a passage, which Catholics have always insisted is favorable to the doctrine of Purgatory, and is supported by the Apostles' Creed. Bishop Montague, of Chichester, who leaned towards Catholic doctrine, seeing the passage, as printed in the edition of 1611, reproached Saville with having perverted its meaning, whereupon Saville candidly told him that he had translated the passage fairly and as it should be, but that two other members of the board, Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Smith, Bishop of Gloucester, had taken it up after it left his hands, and dishonestly given it a sectarian color.¹ But if the fears and interests of the two factions brought about some mutual forbearance in their joint labor of 1611, they had no such reason to show tenderness to the Old Church, or to reject the numerous anti-Catholic corruptions with which former English Bibles were teeming. It suited both parties to retain them, and so they did. Most of the mistranslations on free-will, justification, good works, the Sacraments, were retained, and perhaps some new ones added, out of deference to Beza. But, in some places, the fraud was so glaring, that they thought it expedient to win some credit for honesty by eliminating

¹ Ward's Errata of the Protestant Bible, Author's Preface, p. 22, of New York (Sadlier) edition, printed about forty years ago, though no year is given on the title-page. Well may Ward add, that if Abbot laid hand so freely on God's Holy Word, there is no reason to think that any scruple would prevent himself and his scribe, Mason, from fixing up (as they evidently did) the Lambeth Records to make out Parker's consecration.

Sir Henry Saville was the editor of St. John Chrysostom's works, and one of the most learned Greek scholars of his day. His edition of St. Chrysostom (Eton, 1612), is considered in many respects preferable to the great edition of the Benedictine Montfaucon. His persistent refusal of all preferment in the Anglican church would seem to indicate that he did not heartily embrace her new doctrines.

it from their new Bible. To this Gregory Martin had contributed not a little by his Catholic-English version, known as the Rhemish and Douay Bible; and likewise Drs. Bristow and Worthington, by their notes, respectively, on the New Testament, of Rheims (1582), and the Old, of Douay (1609-10.)¹ In their notes, Bristow and Worthington pointed out the many errors and corruptions, arising not out of ignorance, but design, which disgraced all the pretended translations existing in English up to that day. Dr. Gregory Martin went still further, and made it the subject of a most elaborate and learned work, entitled *A Discoverie of the Manifold Corruptions of the Holy Scriptures, etc.*, and printed at Rheims in the same year as his New Testament, 1582. These indignant protests, seconded by the writings of other theologians, who took up the pen, in English, to warn their countrymen, or, in Latin, to lay bare such fraud to learned Europe, could not remain unknown or unheeded in England, during the thirty years that passed between the date of the Rhemish version and the completion of King James's new Bible. They were known, but they were not heeded to the extent that just complaints should be by honest men. The translators condescended to knock out a few places that had been perverted to identify our creed with idolatry. Are we to thank them for this? These corrupt Scriptures had already wrought their intended purpose. They had made us out idolaters, achieved and justified our extermination. Our religion was proscribed, our priests hunted to death like wild beasts. To teach our faith at home or learn it abroad was a felony, and to secure its extinction, it was enacted that there should be neither marriage nor baptism outside of the Protestant Church.² Having attained their end, they could well afford to show a little respect for truth, that would do us no good and them no harm. They could, without any great loss, restore a trifling part of God's word to its original meaning,

¹ It is a rare thing to find a complete set of these venerable tomes. The writer has the New Testament ("printed at Rhemes, by John Fogny," 1582) and the first volume of the Old ("printed at Doway by Lawrence Kellam, at the Signe of the Holie Lambe," 1609). But the second volume of the Old Testament belongs to the reprint of "John Cousturier, Rouen, 1631." The Library of the Seminary of St. John the Baptist, in Charleston, S. C., had the Old Testament of Rouen (Cousturier), 1635, two volumes, and the New (same place and publisher), 1633. The St. Charles's Seminary Library, of Philadelphia, has the first volume of Douay, 1609, though a title-page has been lost. The second volume is wanting. The third volume, or New Testament, also lacks the title-page. It certainly is not that of Rheims, 1652. It may be the reprint of Douay (1600), or of Antwerp (1630), but not that of Rouen (1633). For its type does not resemble that of Cousturier. Both in Roman and italic (which is profuse) it approaches very closely that of Rheims. There is a Paris edition also of 1633, mentioned by some, which might have been printed at Rheims with the false date of Paris, as was then no unusual thing among printers. We do not pretend to decide in the absence of sufficient data.

² See the seventy new articles added to the Penal Code by two bills of James's Parliament, in 1605.

by altering a few passages, where *idols* had been perverted into *images*, or *idolatry* into *image-worship*. That they were not honest as men or interpreters, is proved by the fact that they corrected only a few places, while common honesty and decent respect for God's Word demanded the correction of all. Thus to give one example out of a thousand, they could reject the two interpolated words ("graven images") from II. Paralip. xxxvi. 8; but to propitiate the Puritan they had no scruple to retain "image" in Rom. xi. 4, where the Apostle never wrote it.¹

And thus King James's Bible came into the world with the false pretence of being a new and accurate rendering of the Revealed Word, while it was in reality, on the one hand, a shift to preserve peace or patch up a hollow truce between rival factions; on the other a deliberate attempt to maintain and perpetuate many and the worst of the anti-Catholic corruptions of its predecessors. The latter has been amply shown by many of our controversial writers, by none better than by Ward in his well-known work *Errata of the Protestant Bible*. Many divines have attempted to answer this book, but none of them proved a match for our Catholic laymen.² Amongst his other merits he keenly analyzes and unerringly points out the wicked motives that lay at the bottom of each and every attempt to pervert the text. And this is what seems to make some of our opponents very indignant. They are quite outspoken in their denunciation of the wickedness and uncharitableness of our diving into the hearts of those translators, that we may find there and draw out hidden motives to hold up to the world's condemnation. This deserves a word or two of remark.

With all due respect to these inculcators of Christian charity, we think a Catholic theologian is as competent as any one else to decide, *when* a Biblical mistranslation means simply an error arising from ignorance, and *when* it means fraud prompted by malice. The former he knows how to pity or excuse, the latter he must not only expose but condemn. For example, when the Protestant interpreter of whatever date translates *semamit* (Prov. xxx. 28) by "spider," we do not blame the writer, but pity his want of prudence in not consulting St. Jerome, who would have given him the true meaning, *stellio* or "lizard," as all now admit. So, too, when (ibid. v. 25) he gives us "conies" for *shepanim* (the hyrax or Ierboa), or "peacocks" for "ostriches" (*renanim* Job xxxix. 13), we call them errors, or marks of human frailty. He can have meant nothing wrong, for the question would naturally occur

¹ This interpolation was not found in all the Genevan Bibles. It is absent from that contained in Hutter's Polyglott of 1599, where the reading is correct, "bent the knee to Baal."

² Since his death fresh attacks have been made upon his work. But they have been ably refuted, and Ward's accuracy thoroughly established, by two of our most illustrious theologians, Lingard and Milner.

"cui bono?" But when we see him tampering with the text to insinuate that God is the author of sin and reprobation, that faith is all-sufficient, that good works have no merit, that we cannot keep the commandments, etc.,—when we see this done, not once or twice, but persistently and systematically, so as by the aid of mistranslation to commend every point of his own creed and condemn every point of our own,—we must be very good-natured or very silly to imagine that he has done this ignorantly or innocently. In private life or social intercourse the precept of Christian charity is very stringent, and extends to a man's motives. But in law, and proportionally in the domain of history, the guilty man, that is, one whose wrong-doing stands revealed before the public, can put in no plea, nor his friends or counsel on his behalf, that he is to be judged by the rules of Christian charity. No; he is to be judged by the maxims of common law. Hence the internal motives of the accused are to be determined by his outward actions, whenever these have been proved by incontrovertible evidence; and his only subterfuge lies in his being able satisfactorily to answer, or to evade, the all-important legal question of *cui bono*? Can any one of our Protestant translators make any show of either answering or evading this question? None surely; nor have they ever made the attempt. It can be, and has been a thousand times, sufficiently proved that their deliberate departure from the original Hebrew or Greek was in the interest of the new and against the old doctrine. They not only changed and falsified the actual meaning of Bible words, but introduced into the text new words never revealed to the Sacred Writer. This they cannot deny, for, without making actual comparison with the originals, the Revision of 1881 (though confined to the New Testament) sufficiently proves it. Nor will they presume to deny that the uniform result of all such changes has been to give plausibility to the new opinions, or cast blame on the belief of Christ's Church for many preceding centuries. This is answer enough to the legal question of "*cui bono*?" and the *animus rei*, the motive which prompted the accused, in their action, is irrevocably settled by law.

It would be enough for us to show that they had done this *once*, for then we could validly plead against them the axiom of Roman law: *Semel malus semper malus præsumitur in eodem genere mali*.¹ "He who is once a wrong-doer is presumed ever afterwards to be a wrong-doer, provided it be in the same kind of wrong-doing."

¹ This axiom, in the abbreviated form in which it is sometimes quoted, "*Semel malus semper malus*," is liable to misapprehension, and is often misapplied. Neither in canon nor civil law, nor by individuals, can Cajus be suspected of murder, because he was once a thief. But if Cajus is detected ten times in the crime of uttering forged paper, when he presents the eleventh paper, not only the law, but any private citizen is justified in suspecting him of forgery. This is exactly the case of our English translators.

And this would justify us in suspecting them of evil intention, whenever they tamper with a text which concerns Catholic doctrine, even though through ignorance or bungling they may have failed to pervert such text successfully enough to suit their wicked will.¹ Our *presumption* against them is fully made out by the rule of law just quoted. It says *once* is enough, *semel malus*. What if he be found not *semel*, but *centies malus*, guilty not once, but scores and hundreds of times? And do not these translators stand convicted of altering the sacred text, not once or twice, but a hundred times, and always in the interest of their sect? What, then, becomes of the wretched plea that we should make Christian charity the test, whereby to try and judge these wicked falsifiers of God's Word? But, worthless as the plea is, they have debarred themselves from its benefit by their own voluntary confession. In the words of the Roman orator: *Habemus confitentes reos*. Luther and Beza, who were princes and leaders in this vile work, and whose translations have exercised a constant and deadly influence on all English versions of the Bible, were not ashamed to acknowledge that they had corrupted the text by interpolation, or other arbitrary way. And, not content with confessing the misdeed, they avow also their criminal motive, which was to put Lutheranism into the mouth of an inspired Apostle, or to wrest this or that text from the hands of the "Papists." As far as Luther is concerned, let any one read his *Sendschreiben von Dolmetschen* (Circular Letter on Translation), in which he not only lets out facts, but the *principles* that guided him in translating Scripture. As to Beza, the reader may consult *The Four Gospels*, by George Campbell, D.D. (vol. i., Prelim. Dissert., x.), a book easily found in this country, having been reprinted in New York or Andover (from the latest London edition) in 1837.²

King James's Bible met with the fate of most compromises. It failed to satisfy both parties. The Puritans, like all unruly spirits, who clamor for liberty, that they may lord it over others,³ became vexed that they had sacrificed anything to their Episcopalian opponents. But the King's power was a restraint, which fettered their wishes and designs, and which they could not overcome. Some may think that the revision of 1881 is the first since 1611; but this is not exact. There was one not only contemplated but commenced and partially executed, though never completed, in the year 1656. When the establishment of the Commonwealth had put the Puritan party in power, and their own supremacy in

¹ There are not a few of such texts both in the Old and New Testament, where we see bad-will, but can only speculate as to their precise motive.

² This subject has already been discussed in the REVIEW, and we shall return to it in a concluding article on "Beza as Interpreter."

³ "License they mean when they cry liberty," as one of their poets has said.

religion and the Church had been substituted for the royal headship, they thought it a good time to carry out their design. Accordingly the "Grand Committee of Religion" laid plans for a "new translation," which was to be intrusted to the hands of Dr. Walton¹ and five other divines; and meetings in furtherance of the design were held at Speaker Balstrode Whitlock's house. Though they called it a translation, they would probably have taken King James's Bible as a text, and merely reinserted in it the corruptions of the Geneva editions. But the project fell through owing to Cromwell's death. So that Protestants are indebted to Charles II., and the "blessed" Restoration, for not possessing a rival Cromwell Bible by the side of King James's.

We have dealt at such length with the earlier or "Presbyterian" family of English Bibles, and their successor, the King James's version, that our readers may think we have lost sight of the Revision. But the fact is, no proper criticism of the value of the latter was possible, without a history of its predecessors, and of their doctrinal corruptions, which are far more important in such a book than mere uncritical readings. One of the greatest benefits conferred by the revision on the English Protestant world, though very few, or none seem to realize it, is that all the wicked translations, whether by falsification of meaning, or by interpolation, or by foisting of glosses into the text, that we have mentioned above as existing in the Presbyterian Bible, and retained by King James, all, without exception, have been ruthlessly swept away by the critical besom of the revisers. And why? Solely on the ground that they were *corruptions*. They do not explicitly say *sectarian* corruptions, nor need we insist on their saying it; but they recognized them as such, and every honest man, every friend of religious truth must be thankful that they have with unsparing hand driven these unholy abominations out of the Book of God's revelation. This proves that their honesty was wholesale, not partial, or interested.

They have further done homage to true science and honored themselves by the honor they have rendered, indirectly at least, to St. Jerome and our Latin Vulgate. It is a noble gloss, though from Protestant hands, on the text of the Tridentine decree, which declares the Vulgate *authentic*. The early translators in their ignorance and conceit railed at the Vulgate, and by implication at the oldest and best copies of the original whence it was drawn; and this railing has continued with more or less of virulence down to our day. But see what wonders time and the progress of science effect! Every new discovery of old biblical texts, every im-

¹ It was wise of them to turn their eyes to this man of most eminent learning, and who thought very highly of the Vulgate. But he would have been overruled, no doubt, by the fanatics, as Sir Henry Saville was by the unprincipled prelate, Archbishop Abbot.

partial scientific research in biblical lore has brought about more and more the persuasion, that the genuine text can be recovered only by receding as far back as possible from the *Textus Receptus* (or *Corruptus*) that underlies the Protestant version. What is this but going back to the Vulgate? Science, then, true science, has in this case done what it always has power to do: it has led them out of the shameful hereditary error to which they had clung for centuries, and has brought them—shall we say to our feet? God forbid that we should indulge in such idle, sinful boast! No! but it has led them, willing captives, to kneel at the foot of Truth. And for such result, though it come not up to the full measure of our hopes and prayers, we heartily thank God.

Our want of further space compels us to postpone to a future number some remarks upon the more important changes made by the Revisers, and an *animadversion* or two on some few errors which they failed to correct.

THE IRISH LAND BILL.

IT may not be in the highest degree practical to analyze a bill which an eminent British Liberal, Mr. Matthew Arnold, describes as “a miracle of intricacy and complication;” to which three thousand amendments are on file, many of which are sure to be adopted and which may never pass the House of Lords.

But there is a sense of satisfaction in knowing what features of the bill are to be amended, and what is the general character of the measure which may be discarded by the upper house. It is interesting to know what bill represents to-day the opinion of the most advanced section of the English Liberals towards Ireland, and it will be especially curious to compare this measure of 1881 with the bill introduced and carried through by the same eminent minister in 1870. We will get at least a test of the growth of British statesmanship on the chief question which makes the present hostile attitude of Ireland toward her government.

At the opening of the session in 1870 Mr. Gladstone stated that “the duty of the government in regard to the condition of Ireland was absolutely paramount and primary. With regard to Fenianism, he believed it would receive its death-blow from the passing of good and just laws for removing the evils accompanying the tenure and cultivation of land in Ireland.” When the subject next

came up, and the bill of that year was brought forward "in a crowded house," says the authorized biographer of the minister, Mr. George Barnett Smith, "Mr. Gladstone alluded to the predictions of the opponents of the Irish Church bill twelve months before, that it was the land and not the church which lay at the root of Irish grievances. He therefore trusted that the opposition would approach the subject with a due sense of its importance. The necessity of sealing up the controversy was admitted by all fair-minded and moderate men on both sides."

Then he proceeded to dissipate some "misapprehensions which prevailed as to the condition of Ireland;" he denied that the Irish were prone to disorder; he denied that the land laws ought to produce the same result in England and Ireland because they appeared to be the same; he denied that the Irish people had no cause for discontent. He admitted that the course of legislation for fifty years had been detrimental to the interests of the workers of the soil. He admitted that after England "had been legislating for a century in favor of Ireland, it was a matter of doubt whether, as far as the law was concerned, the condition of the occupier was better than before the repeal of the Penal Laws." It is not worth while now to inquire whether in making this extraordinary confession the first minister intended to reflect on the sincerity or the intelligence of English legislators for Ireland.

But he was sure that his bill of 1870 would remedy all the ills that had continued to exist in spite of the "century of favorable legislation." It would reverse the presumption of law in favor of yearly tenancies, and "would not leave owners and occupiers full freedom of contract." He passed his bill. Three hundred amendments were offered to it; that was thought very remarkable. He made his great speeches on insecurity of tenure, "which paralyzed the occupier's industry and vitiated his relations with his landlord, with the state, and with society at large." It is a singular fact that there is no essential feature in the bill before Parliament to-day except one,—the provision, almost wholly impracticable, for the creation of peasant proprietary,—which he did not claim to have in his bill of ten years ago!

That bill pretended to make the Ulster tenant right the law for all Ireland; so does this. That bill pretended to give compensation to the tenant for improvements which increased the permanent value of the land; so does this. That bill pretended to provide damages for evictions; so does this. That bill created what was really a land court; so does this. In concluding one of his best and most powerful speeches during the session of that year, the minister expressed sentiments almost identical with those to be found in his more recent deliverances.

There is no reason to doubt that he believed that his bill would,

if it became a law, change the Irish tenant into a loyal subject. He did not realize the magnitude of the evils underlying a system which centuries of wrong had matured into a machine of torture far surpassing all the cruel devices which the malicious ingenuity of man had ever contrived for the destruction of men; a machine which was not humane enough to kill at once, but which kept its victims barely living, and made their lives one frightful story of misery. A machine which made men hate order, hate thrift, detest industry, abhor economy; which transformed virtue into vice and made sin wear a mask which resembled duty; a system which rendered ignorance compulsory, disorder inevitable, sloth a necessity, idleness universal. A system which exiled capital from the country, which sent the fruits of the soil to the cities of the continent or the shops of London; and which preserved in serfdom millions of white men and women whose slavery was without a hope so long as they remained in their native land.

"If I am asked," said Mr. Gladstone, "what I hope to effect by this bill, I certainly hope we shall effect a great change in Ireland, but I hope also and confidently believe that this change will be accomplished by gentle means. Every line of the measure has been studied with the keenest desire that it shall import as little as possible of shock or violent alteration into any single arrangement now existing between landlord and tenant in Ireland. There is no doubt much to be undone; there is no doubt much to be improved; but what we desire is that the work of this bill shall be like the work of Nature herself, when she restores on a desolated land what has been laid waste by the wild and savage hand of man. Its operations will, we believe, be quiet and gradual. We wish to alarm none; we wish to injure none. What we wish is that where there has been despondency there shall be hope; where there has been mistrust there shall be confidence; where there has been alienation and hate, there shall, however gradually, be woven the ties of a strong attachment between man and man. This we know cannot be done in a day. The measure has reference to evils that have been long at work; their roots strike far back into bygone centuries, and it is against the ordinance of Providence, as it is against the interest of man, that immediate reparation should in such cases be possible; for one of the main restraints of misdoing would be removed if the consequences of misdoing could in a moment receive a remedy. For such reparation and such effects it is that we look from this bill, and we reckon on them not less surely and not less confidently because we know they must be gradual and slow; and because we are aware that if it be poisoned by the malignant agency of angry or of bitter passions it cannot do its proper work. In order that there may be a hope of its entire success, it must be passed, not as a triumph of party over

party, of class over class, not as the lifting up of an ensign to record the downfall of that which has once been great and powerful, but as a common work of common love and good-will to the common good of our common country. With such objects and in such a spirit as this, this house will address itself to the work and sustain the feeble efforts of the government. And my hope at least is high and ardent that we shall live to see our work prosper in our hand, and that in Ireland, which we desire to unite to England and Scotland by the only enduring ties,—those of free will and free affection,—peace, order, and a settled and cheerful industry will diffuse their blessings from year to year, from day to day over a smiling land."

The bill which was to accomplish these beneficent designs was passed. Not one of the blessings prophesied has been realized. Its author is now laboring to carry through another measure for the same objects. The landlords in Ireland found no difficulty in evading the law; it was a loosely constructed fence which some crept through and others climbed over, and still others boldly demolished; the courts—of what avail to the tenant were courts in which his landlord sat as judge, either in person or by proxy? Well indeed may Mr. George Barnett Smith cry in the biography of the minister that the "bill did not confiscate a single valuable right of the Irish landlord!"

Especially did it not confiscate any of the rights which he holds most dear. It did not give security of tenure; it did not make Ulster tenant right the law of the country; it did not abolish evictions; it did not place landlord and tenant on an equality before the tribunals of justice; it did not provide any way by which the misfortune of a bad harvest should be shared by the landlord with the tenant. The condition of the tenant grew rapidly worse and worse, and has culminated in a state of surly and morose silence or open rancor, which has not been calmed by the suspension of the primary civil rights guaranteed by constitutional governments in all parts of the world. Mr. Gladstone has not only the same problem before him for settlement in 1881 that he believed he had solved in 1870, but that problem presents new and elusive factors which did not appear ten years ago.

The new bill does indeed attempt to deprive the Irish landlord of some of his valuable rights. He may be equally successful in rescuing them from destruction should the bill pass.

The bill of 1881 may be divided into two parts. The first attempts to abolish tenancies at will by substituting a tenure of fifteen years, under certain statutory provisions. The second part refers the entire subject to a commission of three, who will constitute a court from whose decision there will be no appeal.

The substitution of fifteen years' tenure for tenancy at will is

another fair-weather law. It will work satisfactorily so long as the harvests are good and the means are on hand to pay the rent. Rent agreed upon between landlord and tenant may not be increased for fifteen years without the consent of the tenant, and during that period he cannot be deprived of his holding if he pays the rent; provided, however, he does not injure the property; provided the landlord does not want it for garden purposes, or to build cottages, or for public uses; and if any dispute arise between the landlord and the tenant, it is to be settled in the land court,—in the court established by the land commission for the county. The fifteen years' tenure, therefore, is far from a settlement of the land question, even for that limited period.

In England the rule established by custom is a tenure for twenty-one years. In India there is perpetuity of tenure, granted by British law. The fifteen years' tenure is too short. A thrifty tenant will have only fairly gotten hold of his land, will have learned its peculiarities, will have strengthened it by alternation of crops, by enrichment of the weak places; he will have reclaimed its deserts and drained its bogs; and then, when the work is finished, and he may reasonably expect to make some profit out of it, the lease is out, and the landlord may turn him upon the highway.

But he will get compensation for his improvements says the bill. So said the bill of 1870. The principle of compensation for improvements has been in the land law for ten years. How many tenants obtained any benefit from it? The arrears of rent have first to be satisfied after the court makes the award. A tenant who is evicted for non-payment of rent has not the means to employ lawyers; and in Ireland lawyers do not work for nothing. In Ireland litigation is not a popular pastime. It is not even in as great favor as in the United States. In this country, the judiciary of the States being generally elective, or appointed by an elective executive, the bench is really a bench of the people; it does not represent the government as against the people. The government must go into an American court on the same terms as any other plaintiff or defendant. The court is indifferent between the government and the people; therefore a citizen has every reason to go in with confidence and the government no reason for anticipating the judgment.

This clear judicial atmosphere has never been breathed in Ireland. The people are deeply convinced that in courts presided over by mere servants of the crown, the commands of the crown are the law and the precedents. Centuries of judicial crimes have fastened the conviction of dishonesty so far down in the belief of the Irish people, that it will take at least years of palpable justice to remove it. Lives have been taken by judges sitting on the Irish bench with the heed-

lessness with which a man plucks a cherry off the tree in his own orchard. Property has been stolen by decree. The penal code and its confiscatory provisions destroyed the intuitive law of property right in Ireland. Land became the possession of the strongest robber, or the most obsequious favorite. Courts have existed in Ireland since the overthrow of the old Breton code, and the intrusion of British statutes in lieu of it; and the people have known these courts only as hypocritical spies of the crown, to accomplish, under the grim pretence of equity, the most infamous travesties upon justice. The Irish tenant who, until within a few years, would have presumed to enter an action against his landlord, had he the means to do so, would have been considered a madman by his neighbors. They would have told him that courts existed in Ireland to punish, not to protect him.

Upon the poverty of the tenants first, and upon the cowardice, the venality, and the servility of the courts afterwards, the Irish landlords depended to defeat the compensation for improvements clause in the land law of 1870. Most of them were quite correct in their anticipations. The tenant who was not evicted was too happy in the consciousness of his good fortune to quarrel with the landlord; if he was not evicted, he had no claim for compensation. If he was not able to pay the rent, he suffered the loss of the farm, the loss of all labor which had added to its permanent value, and he had no money to take a lawyer into court for him. The case of a tenant against Lord Lucan, recently decided, has been held extremely remarkable,—not because the decision was against the law, but because it was in accordance with it, and because a tenant had the means to call the landlord into court.

The tenure for fifteen years, with its qualifying provisions, is, it must be admitted, a weak fortification for the tenant. It will serve well enough during prosperous seasons; it will fail in the first emergency. It is not a final remedy for landlordism; it is only another means of postponing the adjustment of a question which will never be settled until it is settled right,—until the law makes the tiller of the soil the rightful owner of the product of his toil.

All the other provisions of the bill of 1881 are referred for administration to a commission of three, "one of whom must previously have been a judge of the supreme judicature of Ireland." The powers of this commission surpass in scope and moral influence, any other confided to three men in time of peace. They are to settle the conditions of tenancies when landlord and tenant cannot agree. They may determine how much rent shall be paid, how it shall be paid, and when. They may create subcommissions wherever they please, to act for them in adjusting disputes. They will award compensation for disturbance, and fix the amount of compensation

for improvement. They may advance money to reclaim waste lands, and to promote emigration. In a word, the outcome of the land agitation in Ireland depends largely on the mere will of these three men.

Tremendous as are the responsibilities involved, the government has treated them almost flippantly. If such a commission were being created to accomplish labors so arduous, and to discharge duties so high and so far reaching in their effects, for the English land system, or for any other similar purpose, the government would be at pains to select its ablest jurist, its most experienced and keenest man of affairs, its most painstaking and methodical accountant. A jurist it has selected; and a man of affairs; and an accountant. They are not named in the bill; but it is an open secret that they are selected.

The member of the supreme judicature of Ireland is Judge Lawson, whose name is as detested by the people as that of Judge Keogh, and for the same reason. Their coupled names have been hissed thousands of times in public, and are execrated in every poor home in Ireland. The man of affairs is Lord Monck. The accountant is Mr. Ball Greene, who is described as a courteous and honorable clerk, and who will carry no weight in the deliberations of the commission. No serious objection has been made to the appointment of Lord Monck.

It is to be observed that in the selection of the commission, the government shows either complete unconsciousness of the right of the tenants of Ireland to be represented on it, or perfect indifference to that right. It would have been an act of gratuitous courtesy to give the tenants one member out of three; but even that bit of politeness, which would have smoothed, if it could not satisfy, has been withheld. It is a landlord commission. The tenantry will have no confidence in it from the beginning. It will have to win their confidence by its course; and it remains to be seen whether its disposition will be in that direction.

Even in fixing the pay of the commission, the government has shown the flippancy of its feeling toward the gravity of the task it is imposing. Each of the commissioners is to have two thousand pounds a year, without extra allowance while on duty, or pension afterwards. This makes the commission an exception to all the other civil servants of the crown; denying them retiring allowances is almost a gruff and surly way of telling them that they have been engaged in work exceedingly unwelcome to the crown, and that they must suffer a mulct on account of it. Or shall they look to the landlords for fees? Such a course appears childish to us in this country, where issues are settled in a practical matter of fact way and not by puerile sentiment; but Ireland has never been governed like any other country, in great things or in small ones.

Besides peevishly withholding the pensions of the commissioners, the bill is censured by both its foes and friends for the inadequacy of the compensation, as compared with that paid other judicial officers. There are twenty Irish judges, whose salaries range from three thousand to ten thousand pounds a year. No one of them has the labor or a tenth of the responsibility which will belong to the land commission. This clause in the bill is a curious illustration of the difference of judgment which an English ministry exercises in correcting the evils which law has created in Ireland, and in curing those which may exist in other parts of the empire.

The severest criticism which has been made upon the bill is its want of clearness and coherency in defining the functions and limiting the discretion of the commission.

The commission has absolute power to dispose of all appeals made to it under the law, and the only restrictions, in addition to the fifteen years' tenure, are these :

The tenant is to have the right of free sale of the tenant-right, that is, any tenant wishing to give up his holding, may dispose of it to the highest bidder.

But if the purchaser be not acceptable to the landlord, the sale is null, the landlord having the right to object to any offering tenant on the score of incapacity or unfitness; the commission is to decide, if the dispute be referred to it.

On being evicted for non-payment of rent, or any other cause, the tenant is to be allowed compensation for improvements effected by him on the land, the court to fix the amount, if landlord and tenant cannot agree.

When a new tenant, who obtains a holding by purchase of the tenant-right, takes possession, the landlord is to have the right of fixing a new rent, and if the tenant deem it excessive, he may appeal to the commission for arbitration, the decision of the commission being final.

But the bill does not prevent the reopening of disputes, after they have been once settled ; it does not prescribe any clear method of arriving at decisions in any of these contingencies ; it leaves too much to the arbitrary will or prejudice of the members, who, in turn, will leave too much to their subordinates to be appointed to sit in various localities to hear complaints.

The commission is empowered to use public money to move families out of closely crowded sections, and even to arrange for their transportation across seas, and the commission may also recommend the use of public money for reclaiming land.

The commission may aid a tenant to become a purchaser on the following terms: If a landlord desires to sell to the occupiers, the commission may fix the price at a certain number of years' purchase, the government advancing three-fourths of the amount, the

tenants to pay the other fourth, or give a mortgage to the landlord for it.

There are many more details in the clauses creating the commission; these are the chief, and are sufficient to indicate how vast are its prerogatives.

It is obvious that the purchase clause is not going to work a great change, unless the conduct of the commission shall be very favorable to the tenants. Matthew Arnold condemned the bill for this reason: he thinks the purchase clause the weakest in it, and declares that the record of landlordism in Ireland fully warrants the scheduling of the landlords into classes for expropriation, and the advancing of public money to put the tenants in possession. Even the angry Duke of Argyle, who pronounces revolutionary the right of sale by every tenant of the tenant-right, expresses a willingness that the government should aid in promoting the increase of occupying owners. But the commission is given such unlimited liberty in applying the purchase clause that it is not likely much will come of it.

First, the landlord must be willing to sell; second, if he have more than one tenant, three-fourths of all occupying holdings must be willing to undertake to buy; third, the commission must be satisfied of the ability of the tenants to carry out the agreement; and, fourth, the conveyance cannot take place, unless the commission is convinced that a resale can be effected without loss to the government. All this is clumsy, indeterminate, and, to the tenants, costly. They must either pay their fourth of the purchase-money, or give a mortgage and pay interest on that; they must pay the government five per cent. for thirty-five years, and another rate, making in all five and a half or six per cent., to provide a fund to meet expenses and loss. "In other words," says Mr. George Campbell, who had so much to do with settling the land question in India, "in order that their children or grandchildren may become peasant proprietors, they must consent for their own lives to increase their present payments fifty per cent." He is of the opinion that few may be able to do this in Ulster, but he does not think there are many estates in other parts of Ireland where it will be possible.

Much will depend on the temper shown by the commission. If it fixes rents fairly, the tenants will not feel disposed to undertake an enterprise so burdensome, while the landowners, on the other hand, may be brought to retire voluntarily, at least, in considerable numbers, leaving the land in the open market, and facilitating the purchase on better terms than those described by Mr. Campbell. If the landlords are of the same mind as the now well-known Mr. Bence Jones, Ireland will have no great difficulty in getting rid of them.

Mr. Jones still suffers keenly from the effects of his having been "Boycotted," and he is constantly breaking out, now in this periodical, now in that, with some churlish complaint against the tenantry and the government, for he hates them with equal zeal. He never fails to attribute to the former all the vices which his fancy can mention, or to the latter the imbecility of laggards and dolts. He cannot cease regretting that Mr. Secretary Forster was not "Boycotted," and it may be pardonable to add that there are many people in Ireland, and possibly a few in the United States, who, on this point, heartily agree with him. The effect of that quaint discipline on Mr. Jones was really admirable. He left the country, and, although he has been writing ever since with the galled pen of Caliban, he has a right to give vent to his chagrin when it hurts only his own reputation as a gentleman of good manners on paper.

Mr. Jones has gathered many of his printed protestations into book form; their possible force was dissipated by the blunt facts previously given to this country by that intrepid traveller and witty commentator, Mr. James Redpath, who saw a great deal more in Ireland than the British Government should have permitted him to see, and who related all he saw to tens of thousands in the United States, and in few of his audiences did he lack for corroborative witnesses. Nothing that Mr. Bence Jones can say is of value in the land controversy merely because it is he who says it; for he has been effectually shown by Mr. Redpath to be either ill-informed concerning the facts relating to his own estate, or his memory is weak, and, perhaps, at this point Mr. Redpath will permit one, who is not a Presbyterian, to regret that in winning tears and provoking laughter by his graphic description of what he saw in Ireland, he should have said one word painful to the feelings of the Irish Presbyterians, or other members of that, or of the sister Protestant denominations. The debt which the Irish Catholics owes to Mr. Redpath, is not feebly or grudgingly to be acknowledged. As a Protestant, he certainly was free to say what he pleased on his own responsibility of his fellow-Protestants. A Catholic will not be refused by him the privilege of uttering a regret that he should assail by even quips any portion of the Protestants in Ireland, or elsewhere, while championing the cause, in which four-fifths of the victims are Catholics.

As for the Irish Presbyterians, the simple truth is that they long suffered as dreadfully as the Catholics for their religious opinions; it is not true, as has been recklessly asserted, that they founded the Orange Society; on the contrary, they were, by its constitution, excluded from it in common with Catholics. It is, on the other hand, true that many of the sturdiest of Irish patriots,—men, who talked little, and turned their silence into blows for their unhappy country,—were Presbyterians. Many of the refugees, whom the

suppression of the industries in Ulster drove into exile in the eighteenth century, emigrated to the colonies; they carried with them, in many cases, strong Presbyterian belief, and an equally strong hatred of political and religious tyranny, and, when soldiers were wanted for the war of the Revolution, their experience in Ireland under English proscription did not diminish their valor. The Irish Presbyterians have not had justice done them in Irish history. Of course, in Mr. Redpath's case, he meant no injustice; he meant merely to be witty.

It is with genuine pleasure that the Irish tenantry who knew him will learn from Mr. Bence Jones, that if the land bill pass he will never return among them. "The Act of 1870," he says in a recent dissertation, "was heavy discouragement to those who were not as far advanced as I was in improving. But if this bill is passed as it now stands, it will drive us all away, as is now seen and admitted by everybody. Landlords will wholly cease to spend money on their estates. Knowing much of improvers in the South, I believe all will go in such time and way as their different positions make most advantageous. I shall certainly do so myself. I went to Ireland thirty-eight years ago to do my duty," and now he will have no more of it.

Mr. Jones, it will be observed, is not above resorting to a little cant; one would suppose he went to Ireland to make money. As to the sad state of the Irish landlords who spent money making improvements, and who, by the creation of free sale of tenant-right, will lose something unless they raise rents, their number is happily so small that the sympathy of mankind will scarcely lament their misfortunes while beholding the condition of their wretched tenantry. It has never been characteristic of Mr. Bence Jones to see any good in an Irish tenant or any much evil in the Irish landlord; but it is true, nevertheless, that the rule in Ireland has been the tenants made the improvements and the landlord then raised his rent. But he is unquestionably correct when he declares that men who bought land in Ireland under the law creating the Landed Estates Court should not now be robbed of the rights guaranteed them in the terms of their purchase. The purchasers who bought in estates at that time were guaranteed absolute ownership; they were assured that no claims of any nature existed against their title. Many of these estates have been occupied by tenants who have done nothing to improve them; and it seems a considerable hardship to the owners that Parliament should now create a partnership right for these tenants which they may take into the market and sell. The Duke of Argyle, among the many fallacious arguments he urges against the bill, presents one which is transparently foolish. The bill makes no discrimination, he says, between landlords who have made no improvements and landlords who have made

all the improvements; between tenants who have made all the improvements and tenants who have made none. Now, while it is true that there are few landlords in Ireland upon whom rests the credit of spending money on their estates, it is assuredly good morals not to cheat one man in order to be just to another; and the equitable rights of the landlords who have done anything to acquire such rights should be respected. In fact, the bill does respect them, for it requires the court to award a proportionate amount of the tenant-right to the landlord if he have an equitable claim.

The bill of 1870 contained substantially all that this bill contains on that point; the landlords felt so much confidence in defeating the bill then that they made no considerable outcry. But they are perfectly aware, as is Mr. Bence Jones, that if this bill pass, they will have no slight opposition to contend against; the people were not then inflamed to the pitch at which feeling has been seething for the past year; they had not then the tremendously strong organization which they have now; the clergy and the people were not together then as they are now. The Ireland of 1881 is not the Ireland of 1870. A season of famine has made the people stronger. There was no fund then, as there is now, to provide able counsel to guard the people's rights in court. They have found their friends throughout the world; their condition opened up the discussion of the merits of the land laws; and when a government is driven to the expedient of suspending *habeas corpus* and of imprisoning men without warrants and keeping them in jails without trial, the government is in a precarious state, and those who look to it to bolster up the wrong that has resulted in such a crisis, are reckless of their welfare. If the bill pass, it will do a great deal toward rendering the Irish landlord uncomfortable. That such a bill should need to be passed in the latter half of the nineteenth century is a suggestive criticism on the way mankind have of flattering themselves on their achievements.

But if the bill pass it will not settle the land question, it will only postpone the settlement. It will never be settled until the man who tills the land lives by the land. It will never be settled until the man who tills the land shall have the first right to the fruits of his labor, and an equal voice with every other man in framing the laws he has to obey, and which determine the rights of property and labor and regulate all economic questions.

As the Irish people in Ireland are a nation of farmers, the land question will not be settled until they are also a nation of landowners. As the Crown of Great Britain deprived them by long-continued and well-devised legislation of the opportunity of getting their living by any other means than by farming, the Crown is bound to see that they get a living by that. They cannot get it so

long as they are only tenants, with the armies of the Crown to compel them to give the crops to the landlord, even to the last sheaf of the harvest, to pay the rent. The land question in Ireland will never be settled until the failure of a crop shall fall upon the landlord when it falls upon the tenant. The Crown now has fifty thousand soldiers in Ireland to reinforce the constabulary for the repression of the people. That is a very expensive way of protecting a system which has nothing to recommend it, and whose death would be a blessing to all classes in the country and to humanity.

The only true remedy is that so often pointed out,—the remedy which even the experience of the British government itself so emphatically indorses, and without which it could not have one day of peace in India,—the remedy of peasant proprietary under state trusteeship. The landlords of Ireland will have to be expropriated. If the government does not provide an equitable and peaceful way for their elimination, it may be apprehended that they will nevertheless have to go.

WHAT RIGHT HAS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO MISMANAGE THE INDIANS?

A Century of Dishonor: a Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with some of the Indian Tribes. By H. H., author of "Verses," "Bits of Travel," etc. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1881.

Present Aspects of the Indian Question. By Carl Schurz. North American Review, July, 1881.

OUR government, although a matter of pride to Americans, and one under which the resources of the country have been developed to an unexampled degree, as compared with other systems, has nevertheless points where what is weak and unsound and vicious seem so deeply rooted that we are sometimes tempted to doubt whether the country has prospered really by the influence of such a government or actually in spite of it.

If there be one department rather than another which should make every honest American hang his head with shame, it is the whole subject of the relations of the Federal government to the Indian tribes. Its policy was based on unsound principles, and has been carried out with imbecility, fraud, and cruelty,—an utter absence of good faith and sound political wisdom.

After the discovery of America the sovereigns in Europe, under

whose auspices expeditions were fitted out to explore the New World, claimed the territories found and colonized by their citizens, subject to the Indian right of occupation. This vague term meant much or little. The Catholic sovereigns of France, Spain, and Portugal recognized the Indians as subjects who were to be made Christians and raised as far, and as soon as possible, to civilization. The great moral obligation and responsibility were fully recognized and formed the basis of the whole system of intercourse with the native tribes. Even where wrongs were committed you can always trace the recognition of this principle.

With the English, however, there was no such responsibility recognized. Not a document, from Elizabeth to George III., exists in which a ruler of Great Britain shows a sense of this deep moral obligation, or attempted, even in the most rude and primitive fashion, to relieve his conscience by laying down a system to be pursued by his subjects settled in America and their local governments.

Spain obtained her dominion in America mainly by war, and held it by right of conquest; but once mistress of the country, laid down in full detail a course of policy which, much as we might question it in portions, was sound on theory and based on conscience.

France secured her foothold on the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi by a friendly course, winning and retaining to the last the goodwill of the various nations in the territory to which, as against other Europeans, her sons laid claim, and carrying on no war except in defence of the settlers or their allies. From the very outset the French government recognized its duty to the Indians, the obligation to protect, civilize, and Christianize the native tribes in the territory where she planted the lily-brodered flag. Her system was not so elaborate as that of Spain, as the circumstances of the two parts of the continent differed widely. Spanish law aimed to prevent the Indians from being enslaved and oppressed, for in her conquests there was a large Indian population, which love of gain led the Spaniards to enslave and oppress, while in the North the Indians were too independent and manly to be deprived of their freedom by the French.

Not only the patents issued by the kings, but the narratives of explorers like Champlain and Lescarbot attest the deepseated conviction of their duty to the Indians. With the very commencement of French colonization began efforts to convert and civilize the Indians. Their languages, manners, ideas were studied, and their system of intercourse, where advantageous, adopted as a basis. The wampum belt, the calumet, presents to repair wrongs done, were all adopted. Before the language of a single tribe under English or Dutch rule, from the Merrimac to the Savannah, had been

investigated, the French in Canada had printed works in Huron and Montagnais, in the languages spoken from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Upper Lakes, as the Spaniards had in the prevailing language of Florida.

The French sought by missionary influence to check the intertribal wars and infuse a Christian spirit, encouraging the tribes to rely more on agriculture. Their error was in pushing the fur trade, which made the Indians give too much time to hunting, and induced them to kill merely for their skins the wild animals, which constituted their main food supply, and which were soon nearly exterminated, leaving the tribes without any resource, but depending on the most precarious means of subsistence.

The English colonies and the Dutch at New York came as friends, but as soon as their numbers enabled them to attack the Indians began hostilities. The rooting out of the Indians became a principle. Where they went or what became of them was a matter of supreme indifference, except in New England, where they occasionally found it profitable to send them to the West Indies to be sold as slaves, an example which Carolina copied at a later date. Robinson in Holland lived to groan in spirit over the terrible fact that his followers had so soon imbued their hands in Indian blood. Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Netherlands, and Virginia had their Indian wars from the very earliest period of their history. Maryland escaped them by beginning on a Catholic and Christian basis. She began by converting rather than fighting, and she stands as a solitary example among the earlier English colonies,—an example not followed till William Penn founded the State that bears his name.

The history of the American colonies is filled with the story of Indian wars. The efforts at conversion were tardy and feeble, and the mission work of Elliot and Mayhew in New England met with opposition, rather than cordial support; and when in the last century the Moravians attempted to elevate the Indians socially and religiously they found public opinion arrayed against them.

Liquor was furnished readily to the Indian tribes. Fire arms and scalping-knives were sold to them without stint. No effort was made to save them from being rendered more degraded by the contamination of the worst refuse of the settlements.

When, at the close of the seventeenth century, Canada had so increased as to excite alarm in the English colonies, the French and English in America became involved in the wars of their respective countries beyond the Atlantic. Then the French made one request which shows the Christian basis of their Indian system. They asked the English colonies to agree not to use Indians in any war that might ensue. This pledge, so nobly asked, was absolutely refused,

but after Indians, hounded on by the English, had given Lachine to the tomahawk and firebrand, Canada, too, used her Indians till the English colonists bitterly rued their folly.

This fatal step, by arousing and stimulating the worst elements in the Indian character, was a bar to progress and to development.

Under the colonial governments there was no wise or statesman-like treatment of the Indian question. Each colony acted for itself, and the native tribes were gradually crowded from their original grounds, or reduced to a mere handful by war, disease, or famine.

Nothing of a general character was attempted till 1756, when Sir William Johnson was appointed by the king "Agent and Sole Superintendent of all the affairs of the Six Nations and other Northern Indians." Previous to that date there was no one to represent the king in transactions with the Indians of the colonies. Each province had in conference and agreements of one kind or another adjusted affairs with the tribes, but there had been no action by the English monarch. In fact, during our whole colonial period, there is no example of any treaty regularly negotiated between an English king and any tribe or tribes.

As the colonists had employed Indians against the French in Canada, so in our Revolution retribution came and they were done to as they had done to others. The British government, which had created a Superintendency and obtained a control over the Indian nations, roused the fierce tribes and stimulated them by money, goods, and liquor to desolate the frontiers. The Mohawk and the Seneca, the Cherokee and the Creek, were the scourges of the States, which might by a wiser policy have made them a useful part of the population. The Indians who had been under Catholic influence in Maine, Indiana, and Illinois were the only ones to favor the American cause heartily.

When our republic was established, the ideas of Rousseau, the philanthropic ideas of Benezet, and the influence generally of the philosophical theories led to the step of recognizing tribes as governments, and the United States, succeeding to the regal powers held and exercised by the English sovereigns, began to negotiate and execute treaties with the various Indian nations. Sound thinkers even then protested against the use of the word *treaty*, as implying an equality between the contracting parties, but no heed was paid, and a system of Indian treaties began, extending from 1775 to a very recent date. The idea of equality was at first so complete that one of the earliest treaties—that with the Delawares in 1778—looked forward to action on the part of the Indian tribes by which they could "join the confederation and form a State whereof the Delaware nation should be the head."

Under the Constitution of 1787 the Federal government had a general power of treating with the Indian nations, but New York adroitly claimed complete jurisdiction over her Indians as ancient dependants of the State, and has to this day managed their affairs with only a nominal authority on the part of the General Government. It would have been well if other States had taken a similar ground and confined the Federal government to its constitutional powers in its relations with the Indians.

All that the Constitution of the United States says about the Indians is this:

"Section 8. The Congress shall have power—

"3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian tribes."

There is not a word giving any legislative power over the Indian tribes or the districts occupied by them, such as is given over the Federal district, forts, dock-yards, magazines, and arsenals; not a word limiting the authority of the several States or Territories over the Indians within their limits.

Yet upon the mere grant of a power to regulate trade with Indian nations, given in connection with the power to regulate it between the States and with foreign nations, over which it certainly never claimed authority, a monstrous and unauthorized power has grown up, mischievous, fruitful in difficulties, ruinous to the Indians, and costly beyond example.

The power exercised by the Federal government is a mere usurpation; it is monstrous in that it assumes exclusive jurisdiction over a quarter of million of people, whom it has assumed to govern without laws, without courts of justice, without any but the most despotic system, confining people to prescribed limits, from which it excludes citizens, and making the discretion of satraps, called agents, the sole law, legislature, judiciary, and executive, enforcing their authority by the military arm.

A system offering greater temptation to fraud, oppression, and waste could scarcely be devised, and its history is the record of those natural results of the idiotic policy.

The first steps in the usurpation were the treaties made with the Creeks, August 7th, 1790; with the Cherokees, July 2d, 1791, and June 26th, 1794, in which the jurisdiction of the States of Georgia, North and South Carolina is utterly ignored, and the Indians are invested with the power of punishing in their discretion and without form of law the citizens of those States.

This system of treaties had begun prior to the Constitution, but had elicited a solemn protest from Georgia and North Carolina,—those States alleging that it was a violation of their legislative rights. They claimed the same rights which New England and

New York exercised over the Indians within their chartered limits, but when these treaties were actually made the States so deeply interested took no positive steps to maintain their own authority within their own limits.

Then the General Government went on; its original action, based on the dreams of Rousseau and Paine, having taken a deep hold on the sentimentality of the day. At last, however, the matter came to a critical point in 1830. Georgia resolved to enforce her laws in the Cherokee country; the Cherokees resisted, claiming the right of self-government, and appealed to the United States government to carry out the romantic, sentimental treaties, but the result was humiliating to the United States. The General Government was forced to acknowledge that it had made promises it could not keep, that the States had absolute power within their limits, and that the United States could not exercise or authorize any body of men to exercise within the limits of a State the powers of an independent government.

Unfortunately, too, the real vital question was obscured by the sentimental ideas, and the United States Government played the part of a friend to injured Indians, and encouraged them not to submit to State laws. The General Government actually fostered rebellion to State authority.

Meanwhile Louisiana had been acquired from France, and treaties had been made with many tribes there. All that the General Government could do was to adopt a plan for removing the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and all other tribes to districts beyond the Mississippi. With them and with the tribes found there new sets of treaties were made, guaranteeing forever, on the honor and public faith of the United States Government, tracts of land to the various nations, hoping thus to be permanently rid of the subject forever.

But events have developed more rapidly than common sense has done in the minds of our rulers at Washington. In 1830 they acknowledged the imbecility and blunders of 1785 and 1791; in 1880 they recognize the blunder of 1830. The vast territory beyond the Mississippi rapidly filled up with population, and the Indians were forced from time to time from the lands solemnly guaranteed to them; they were transferred from place to place without regard to the fitness of climate or soil, isolated more and more from all civilizing influences, till at last they are huddled together in confined reservations, each of these being under the charge of an agent, who has absolute power over the Indians,—is their financial agent, shop-keeper, butcher, judge, and by a monstrous piece of folly, conceived in the strange brain of President Grant, appointed on the nomination of a religious denomination,

and installed as a grand lama in his little territory, authorizing or prohibiting at his will the exercise of any other religion in the realm set up in defiance of the Constitution of the United States.

Such is the actual position of the Indian question. The helpless imbecility which has so long guided the Indian affairs will probably soon seek an amendment to the Constitution to legalize the long series of unlawful acts, and give power for the future.

An amiable lady, known for her charming descriptions of our wilder territory, who has travelled through many of the Indian tribes, publishes a work which she calls *A Century of Dishonor*. In the preface, Julius H. Seelye says: "The great difficulty with the Indian problem is not with the Indian, but with the government and people of the United States. Instead of a liberal and farsighted policy looking to the education and civilization and possible citizenship of the Indian tribes, we have suffered these people to remain as savages, for whose future we have had no adequate care, and to the consideration of whose present state the government has been moved only when pressed by some present danger. We have encroached upon their means of subsistence without furnishing them any proper return; we have shut them up on reservations often notoriously unfit for them, or, if fit, we have not hesitated to drive them off for our profit without regard to theirs. . . . That the government of the United States, which has often plighted its faith to the Indian, and has broken it as often, and while punishing him for his crimes, has given him no status in the courts except as a criminal, has been sadly derelict in its duty towards him, and has reaped the whirlwind only because it has sown the wind . . . ought to be admitted with shame by every American citizen."

Bishop Whipple says: "Treaties were made of the same binding force of the Constitution; but these treaties were unfulfilled. It may be doubted whether one single treaty has ever been fulfilled as it would have been if it had been made with a foreign power. . . . Pledges solemnly made have been shamelessly violated."

In a word, the only power which the Constitution confers on the General Government, that of making treaties with the Indian tribes, has been exercised without prudence or honesty, without any regard to the good of the country or of the Indians!

Such assertions are admitted, even by high officials. "What does the Bishop want?" said Secretary Stanton. "If he came here to tell us that our Indian system is a sink of iniquity, tell him we all know it."

Carl Schurz, who, recently, as Secretary of the Interior, studied the Indian question seriously, opens his recent article in the *North*

American Review, with this terrible admission: "That the history of our Indian relations presents in great part a record of broken treaties, of unjust wars, and of cruel spoliation, is a fact too well known to require proof, or to suffer denial. But it is only just to the government of the United States to say that its treaties with Indian tribes were, as a rule, made in good faith, and most of our Indian wars were brought on by circumstances, for which the government itself could not fairly be held responsible. . . . Frauds and robberies have, no doubt, been frequently committed. It has, also, happened that the Indian tribes were exposed to great suffering and actual starvation, in consequence of the neglect of Congress to provide the funds necessary to fulfil treaty stipulations."

In spite of lame excuses he must admit bad faith, injustice, cruel spoliation, and yet in 1880 there was an appropriation of \$1,425,700 to meet stipulations. The interest on trust funds held by government swelling the amount nearly to two millions of dollars, to be paid by the capital and labor of the country, nominally for the Indians, but in most cases to be fraudulently misappropriated and really doing the Indian more harm than good.

The great question now is to discover a plan, by which the government of the United States can get out of the dilemma, into which bad faith, bad management, usurpation and tyranny has brought it.

There is no lack of plans, but none seems to go to the root of the Indian problem, and yet a sound one is imperatively needed, for Canada, forsaking her own system based on the Catholic morality of French days, is fast adopting a copy of our wretched failure, and likely to prove as ruinous. No one can read the series of reports issued by the Dominion Government, without a pang of regret, that they are thus centralizing and abandoning a policy, which has been as fruitful in good, as our system in evil.

After depicting the results of our policy, Bishop Whipple says: "Then came a new treaty, more violated faith, another war, until we have not a hundred miles between the Atlantic and Pacific, which has not been the scene of an Indian massacre. All this, while Canada has had no Indian wars. Our government has expended for the Indians a hundred dollars to their one."

That Canadian system grew out of religion. While the colony was in its infancy, the missionaries obtained grants of land, Sillery, St. Francis, Loretto, La Prairie, Saut au Recollet, Lake of the Two Mountains, by gift or purchase, and on them settled Indian converts. French and Indian were alike subjects; the same law and protection extended to all; all stood side by side in the defence of the colony, and according to their ability in developing it. There was no wresting of the land from the Indians by fraudulent treaties never kept, if ever intended to be kept, but the Christian Catholics

of Canada gave lands to the Indians for civilizing homes, and their descendants occupy some to this day, beside the graves where their Christian ancestors for two centuries are mouldering.

This is the fact throughout the valley of the St. Lawrence and the great lakes. In the wilder North religion occupied the field before the State, and the old Catholic idea is implanted in Manitoba, Columbia, and Hudson Bay.

A secretary of war admitted the Indian Department to be a sink of iniquity, yet in no department of government has religious influence been more steadily exerted. The various Protestant Missionary societies and both organizations of Friends have constantly been a power there. This can be traced too clearly to admit of denial. At last the power of the department was under General Grant virtually placed in their hands. From the commencement of our Constitutional government, Catholic missions have been kept up among Indian tribes, and all the territory acquired by cession was territory in which the Catholic religion was at the time the established religion, with missions among the various nations of Indians. There are, and have been, Catholic Indians from Maine to California, from Florida to Puget's Sound.

The history of the Indian Department is a history of the sectarian intrigues and violence to hamper and break up the Catholic missions, and raise such obstacles as would drive from the fields of labor, in which they were really serving the whole country, the devoted Catholic priests, who gave their talents and education to the enlightenment of degraded members of the human family. Unfortunately, we must admit with shame, that the Catholic body in the United States has never shown any interest in the Indian missions; the priest among the native tribes labored without being sustained by the charity, or buoyed up by the sympathy, of his fellow-Catholics in the United States. His labors, his sufferings, his wrongs, were a matter of perfect indifference to them. No missionary society arose to aid him. No Catholic of wealth gave means to found or endow a mission, little as the sum required would be. When sectarian malignity, cloaked under the name of Christianity, sought to defeat the labors of years, no Catholic in public life appeared to remonstrate, or plead the cause of religious equality. When, under Grant, the United States Government surrendered to the sects as unconditionally as Pemberton did to him, the Catholic missions were doomed. There were Catholic missions among the Chippewas, Ottawas, Menomonees, Winnebagoes, Pottawatomies, Osages, Kansas, Flatheads, Pend d'Oreilles, Nez Percés, Yakamas, the California Indians, the Pueblos of New Mexico. About 1865 one-sixth of all the missionaries, employed among the Indians, were Catholics, notwithstanding the immense exertions of

the Protestant sects to maintain their missions, at lavish expense of missionary societies for years.

The Catholic missions were a constant annoyance to these zealots, and a new scheme was devised for their destruction. The government lent itself to a scheme as un-American as it was un-Christian. The Catholic missions were the oldest in the country; they had been founded and carried on by men who held life little, compared to duty. While the Protestant missions could scarcely claim a single martyr, Catholics could enumerate nearly a hundred, who had died within the limits of the United States by the hands of the Indians, while endeavoring to instruct them.

This iniquity was carried out in 1871-72, and the Commissioner's Report of 1872 is the first official record of our government setting aside the Constitution, by making established religions with exclusive privileges at various points of our territory.

To the Hicksite Friends were assigned the Catholic Winnebagoes, 1440 in number; to the Orthodox Friends, 400 Catholic Pottawatamies; to the Christians, or Campbellites, who never had Indian missions, the 7683 Catholic Pueblo Indians of New Mexico; to the Methodists, the 1700 Catholic Mission Indians in California; 3000 Catholic Yakamas in Washington Territory; to the Reformed Dutch, the Catholic Pimas and Maricopas to the number of 4342; to the Congregationalists, 1362 Catholic Menomonees of Green Bay; the Catholic Chippewas, of Baraga, on Lake Superior. Having thus wrested from the Catholics the great majority of Indians, among whom they had been laboring, they proceeded to assign a few to them. They received in Washington Territory the Fort Colville Agency, with 3349 Indians; the Tulalip, with 2600; Grande Ronde and Umatilla, in Oregon, with 1707; the Catholic Flatheads, 1700; the Grand River and Devil's Lake agencies, with 7445 Sioux; only one of these had a regular Catholic mission established. Every other Catholic mission was placed at the mercy of fanatics. What this meant was soon apparent. The agent was nominated by the denomination, and introduced missionaries, or acted as missionary himself. No clergyman of any other denomination could enter the reservation, except by leave of the agent; no Indian could cross the line of the reservation to attend the church to which he belonged, without the permission of the agent. Such permission was refused, and in a country, that with shameful effrontery flings in the face of mankind her boast of religious equality, a power was given to a single individual to prevent a clergyman from reaching his flock, or his parishioners from attending his ministry! An agent in Washington Territory claimed the special right from the United States Gov-

ernment to baptize, and he actually wrote to Washington, to denounce a Catholic priest, because he told his Catholic Indians, whom the State had made the bondmen of this bigot, that the sacraments were instituted by Christ, and should be administered by the ministry he had established. In California Father Osuna, endeavoring to continue his labors among the robbed and plundered Mission Indians, was set upon and cruelly beaten by the agent! In a Chippewa mission the agent called in the United States troops, who stormed Father Tomazin's Catholic chapel, and carried off all the vestments and altar furniture, a valiant feat of arms, which the future historian of the battles of the United States must not forget to record.

On all these violations of the rights of American citizens, the country looked with apathy. The sufferers were merely Catholics, but when Mr. Tibbles, of the Omaha Committee, "was insulted by the agent (of the Poncas), taken by force out of the reservation, and threatened with much more severe treatment, if he ever returned," the public and the press woke up. Had Mr. Tibbles been a Catholic missionary, they would have been still sleeping with Rip Van Winkle. Then the New York *Tribune* made a discovery. "No petty Indian agent has the legal right to imprison, maltreat, and threaten the life of any citizen, totally guiltless of offence beyond that of working to give these serfs of the government the standing of human beings," and the *Century of Dishonor* tells us that this "high-handed outrage on a free citizen of the United States aroused indignation throughout the country."

But when Father Luciano Osuna, a minister of religion, attempting to administer the ordinances of his Church to his own flock, was brutally beaten by an agent, these guardians of the rights of citizens were dumb.

The fanatic violence against Catholics was most marked in agencies confided to the denomination to which the chief magistrate belonged, a denomination which was the first in the annals of the country to make the presidency a tool in its exaltation and propagandism.

In 1865 (Report, p. 229) the agent at Round Valley, California, says: "His agency is under the care of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and though no missionary has been provided, the agent, with the assistance of the employés, has imparted religious instruction regularly on Sundays, morning and evening, and also on Thursday evenings. A few of the younger Indians have attended, who have been taught as plainly as possible the fundamental truths of Christianity. Traces of old Roman Catholic teachings are apparent in some of their ceremonies, and I doubt

not, many of the middle-aged and old, on account of such teachings, are prejudiced against the Protestant religion."

Here is a distinct admission that government officials were forcing Protestant teachings on a Catholic population who did not wish them.

In the same report, p. 278, Isaac T. Gibson, a Friend, who had been made agent of the Catholic Osages, has a series of abusive paragraphs against the Catholics. "Corrupting influences, emanating from these persistent harpies, disappointed traders, would, be contractors, and discharged employés, have been gathering force rapidly since last winter; and having joined the Roman Catholic interest, which has been assiduously at work for months past among the Osages, and manufacturing and circulating through the press the grossest libels on the management at the agency, calls for active measures by the department to rid the reservation of these elements, or abandon the Osages to their rapacious greed. The half-breed Osages, who are shouting the loudest for the Catholic priests, are the leaders in procuring the fraudulent claim; and the full-bloods that are doing the same are the wildest and most insolent of the tribe."

"When I took charge of the Osages, the Catholics had control of the religious and educational interests of the tribe. Sixty children were in their mission schools, most of them being mixed bloods; no chief or leading man among the full-bloods patronized the school at that time, and up to this date the priests have failed to induce any."

He then proceeds to tell how he had indirectly broken down the Catholic school, and how he suspended "the usual religious services, which are union in their character," whenever the priest came, and concludes his diatribe thus: "If the priests would let the Catholic half-breeds alone, they would much prefer sending to a school where most of the time was not occupied in the study of religious ceremonies."

The United States Government not only printed all this man's violent language, through which, however, it clearly appears that he was straining every nerve to break up the Catholic mission and schools, and make the Osages "union Christians," but if you turn to the index you will find that the Indian Department employs an index-maker as unscrupulous as Agent Gibson. There you find "Roman Catholics incite the Osages against the government. . . . 278." This is false, as even a summary of what Gibson said. He also refers us to page 23. "Roman Catholics interfere with the purposes of the government towards Indians." On that page, Edward P. Smith, commissioner, says: "No desire for Church

propagation on the part of any religious denomination has in any way interfered with the purposes of the government, and such interference on the part of the Roman Catholics has arisen, evidently not from intent to produce such effect, but from the incompatibility existing between a strict adherence to their religious system and any provision for public schools other than those taught by themselves. At the seven agencies assigned to the care of the Catholics, no restriction has been placed upon their system and methods of education, and no other religious body, so far as I am aware, has in any way attempted to interfere. I regret to say that this is not true, so far as the Catholics are concerned, of some of the agencies assigned to other religious bodies, and in some instances the interference has been a material hinderance to the efforts of this office through its agents, to bring Indians under control, and to enforce rules looking towards civilization."

In other words, Commissioner Smith claims that when the Indian Bureau saw fit to place Catholics under a Protestant, Jewish, Chinese, or Mormon agent, the Indians, with an eye to their civilization, were bound to become Protestant, Jew, Buddhist, or Mormon, and that for a Catholic priest to attempt to minister to his old flock or instruct the children, was "interfering with the purposes of the government towards the Indians." As he gives Gibson's charges at length, he evidently laid stress on them. Yet what manner of man this mild and gentle Quaker was, may be seen in the fact that in a short time the press of the country rang with charges of fraud against this very agent, and he was quietly displaced, but his false and libellous charges stand uncontradicted in the official report. Government has never unsaid his lies which it printed.

This extraordinary index, under civilization, has: "Civilization of Chippewas at White Earth, progress in retarded, by interference of Romanists."

By what right a government official, in an official document, takes upon himself to fling mud upon the Catholics by applying to them one of the most degrading and insulting nick-names that the slums of religious hate ever invented, we do not know, but there it stands in the Commissioner's report for 1875. Now if we turn to page 298 we read: "The Roman Catholic missionary here, named Ignatius Tomazin, has been creating disturbances from time to time, and in fact all the time, to a certain extent." This is the language of "Lewis Stowe, agent," dated "Chippewa Agency, White Earth." We supposed the Protestant Episcopal Church would select more gentlemanly agents, and that an agent of their selection would give the ordinary title, Mr. if not Rev., to a clergyman attending all or part of the Indians committed to him. But

the dastardly use of the epithet "Romanist," cannot be charged on Mr. Stowe; it is the work of the Indian Bureau at Washington.

In this division of agencies, no established Protestant mission was put under Catholics. Catholics nowhere interfered with Protestant Indians; the Protestant Spokans at Fort Colville were in no way disturbed; but as the scheme was to break up Catholic missions in the name of civilization, the Catholic Indians were put under Protestant care, and every effort made to cut them off from the exercise of their religion.

As though it were not enough to insult us one year by applying to us the term "Romanist," the index-maker, in 1877, gives us "Mission Baraga, in charge of Belgian priest (Romish) for many years. . . . 123." Now on p. 123 the agent draws a comparison between the material condition of the Indians at "Baraga (Catholic) and l'Anse (Methodist Episcopal) missions," and of course unfavorably to the Catholics; but he does not use the filthy word "Romish" at all; that is coined at Washington. In 1878 this index-maker again uses the insulting term Romanist.

The Papago Indians, Catholics, and who had adopted the Mexican dress and usages, were at first assigned to the Catholics. Bishop Salpointe, in whose vicariate they are, made no effort to have a Catholic agent appointed, trusting to the honor of the Protestant agent; but he was repaid by abuse, and by charges that led the government to suppress the agency, so as to prevent the appointment of a Catholic, and to consolidate it with the Pimas.

The Pueblo Indians, in New Mexico, a thoroughly Catholic territory, where no other Church exists, were assigned to the Christians and then to the Presbyterians. Every Pueblo has its Catholic church, so that the assignment to a Protestant denomination was distinctly a piece of religious propagandism and perversion on the part of the government. And what has been the result? The Protestant clergyman sent to Zuñi, writes in 1879: "The Church has not yet erected a church building, as there are but three white members, and no Indian members." It is a pity to see one who evinces judgment and ability placed in such a false position.

We admit that the fierce proselytizing spirit in the government seems to have abated; whether they have awakened to the monstrous iniquity of such a prostitution of the power of the General Government, or whether the effort produced so little result that it has been silently abandoned, we know not; but what has been may be, and the same un-American system may at any moment be revived.

The creation of the Catholic Indian Bureau, although it has not effected all that some anticipated and many desired, has undoubtedly been of no little service. Were it sustained by the Catholic body throughout the country, the very best results might be at-

tained. The present commissioner seems to be a gentleman who has zealously done his part, and endeavored to obtain justice from the government for the wronged, oppressed, and harassed Catholic Indians; but if one more competent and experienced can be found, and the Catholic community will in earnest take up this Indian subject, they will strengthen his hands, relieve the missionaries, and in a few years place the Catholic Indians at the very head of the red race in the United States.

One of the first objects should be to obtain redress for the Flatheads, whose lands the government took without the slightest pretence at compensation. By every principle of law, a deed without consideration is void. The treaty by which the Flatheads gave up their lands was without consideration. They trusted to the honor of the United States. In that transaction its honor was that of the highwayman.

The agency system is all wrong. Its history is that of fraud, oppression, and violence. If any member of Congress were to call for a report of the number of agents who filed their accounts regularly and settled them up fully, the report would be a startling one; and we venture to say that it would cost less to print than any document issued from the government printing-office during the current year. The Ute massacre resulted from the tyrannical use of the arbitrary power conferred on agents, as the Modoc war arose from the wanton and unjust system of moving Indians by force from lands which they hold by right of occupancy, and placing them on reservations from which, when their harvests are ripening for the sickle, they may be removed by the stroke of a president's pen.

The whole system is a violation of every American principle; and if the Indians ever learn to read the Declaration of Independence, they can bring heavier charges against our government than our forefathers did against George III.

In the Ponca case the matter has for the first time been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States. A number of questions must sooner or later be decided by that tribunal, and the sooner the better.

Is the cession of lands to government without consideration express or implied valid, and does it convey title?

The Pueblo and California Indians were recognized as Mexican citizens—do they not, under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, stand in the same position as the Mexican residents of ceded territory?

Can the United States set up within a State or organized Territory a reservation, and exercise exclusive jurisdiction over it?

Can an agent appointed by the United States prevent citizens of a State or Territory from going freely through any part of such

State or Territory and following his usual avocations, so long as he does not violate State or Territorial law?

Can the United States government remove any part of the population from a State or Territory?

Can the United States create a Territory or State, confining the population to any one race, color, or religion?

Many of these questions must be decided before any real solution of the Indian question is attained. The authorities at Washington are so wedded to their long-usurped power that they will not easily lay it down, till the decision of the highest tribunal compels them. What that decision will be can scarcely admit of a doubt; for if we look to the Constitution of the United States we cannot find the slightest basis for the enormous power that has been assumed, power not wielded wisely or for the good of the Indian, or the general good of the country, but used only wastefully, to gratify political and religious bias, to enrich a privileged class at the expense of the Indians, "not taxed," and the whites, who are sorely taxed.

The author of the *Century of Dishonor* dwells particularly on the cases of the Delawares, Cheyennes, Nez Perces, Sioux, Poncas, Winnebagos, and Cherokees. Other and more glaring cases might have been selected.

The Delawares are a striking proof of the utter incompetency of our system. These Indians, originally a petty tribe on the river from which they take their English name, were, under Moravian training, more advanced in civilization before the Revolution than their descendants are to-day; but they have been moved and removed, deprived of their lands, thrown among wild tribes, and degraded till only a handful are left, intermingled with Caddoes and Comanches!

The case of the Poncas is so recent, that we need not detail all the facts. The order was sent to remove them to Indian Territory. They did not wish to go, and appealed to the President, but no answer came. One of them tells the story:

"They kept us in jail ten days. Then they carried us back to our home. The soldiers collected all the women and children together, then they called all the chiefs together in council; and then they took wagons and went round and broke open the houses. When we came back from the council we found the women and children surrounded by a guard of soldiers. They took our reapers, mowers, hay-rakes, spades, ploughs, bedsteads, stoves, cupboards, everything we had on our farms, and put them in one large building. Then they put into the wagons such things as they could carry. We told them that we would rather die than leave our lands; but we could not help ourselves. They took us down. Many died on the road. Two of my children died. After we

reached the new land all my horses died. The water was very bad. All our cattle died. Not one was left. I stayed until one hundred and fifty-eight of my people had died, then I ran away with thirty of my people, men, women, and children." They reached the Omaha reserve, but when the United States officials attempted to seize and take them back, public opinion was roused. The case was taken into the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, and the Poncas were set free.

Here were Indians so far advanced that they had farms, reapers, mowers, ploughs, houses warmed by stoves, furniture; living in peace and comfort, who were evicted with the utmost brutality, hurried away to an unhealthy district to begin life anew, dropping down dead and dying all the way! And the men that did this boast of their superior civilization and wish to teach our Catholic Indians their religion!

The *Century of Dishonor* details wrongs, but does not give any definite plan of relief. It concludes with these vague sentences:

"However great perplexity and difficulty there may be in the details of any and every plan possible for doing at this late day anything like justice to the Indian, however hard it may be for good statesmen and good men to agree upon the things that ought to be done, there certainly is or ought to be no perplexity whatever, no difficulty whatever, in agreeing upon certain things that ought to be done and which must cease to be done before the first steps can be taken toward righting the wrongs, curing the ills, and wiping out the disgrace to us of the present condition of our Indians.

"Cheating, robbing, breaking promises—these three are clearly things which must cease to be done. One thing more, also, and that is, the refusal of the protection of the law to the Indian's rights of property, 'of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'

"When these four things have ceased to be done, time, statesmanship, philanthropy, and Christianity can slowly and surely do the rest. Till these four things have ceased to be done, statesmanship and philanthropy alike must work in vain, and even Christianity can reap but small harvest."

This is very vague and unsatisfactory; and what is said by Bishop Whipple and President Seelye in the same volume has as little of a practical character.

Carl Schurz, who, as Secretary of the Interior, is responsible in no slight degree for what may be called the eviction and massacre of the Poncas, comes forward in the *North American Review* with his solution of the Indian problem. The last pet project of government has been the reservation system, and Indians were huddled on a reservation one day and hustled off the next, their tenure being the freak or fancy of the executive. Well, what does Secre-

tary Schurz say of this system? "I am profoundly convinced that a stubborn maintenance of the system of large Indian reservations must eventually result in the destruction of the red men, however faithfully the government may endeavor to protect their rights."

A common idea prevailed that the Indians are dying out; but in spite of such cases as the Poncas, where the government tried systematically to exterminate a tribe, they are increasing, rather than declining in numbers. They are not dying out rapidly like the natives of the Sandwich Islands. It is now admitted that they must be absorbed into the population generally. A country that receives and absorbs fifty thousand European immigrants a month ought to have no difficulty in absorbing a quarter of a million of Indians, equal only to half a single year's immigration.

Mr. Schurz says: "To fit the Indians for their ultimate absorption in the great body of American citizenship three things are suggested by common sense as well as philanthropy. 1. That they be taught to work, by making work profitable and attractive to them. 2. That they be educated, especially the youth of both sexes. 3. That they be individualized in the possession of property, by settlement in severalty, with a fee-simple title, after which the lands they do not use may be disposed of for general settlement and enterprise without danger and with profit to the Indians."

The education of the young has been attempted from the earliest period, yet without producing any marked results on the tribes. Those who were educated either shrank from association with their countrymen, or threw aside their newly acquired civilization, and became as wild savages as ever. This was the experience with the Virginia Indians educated by the Spaniards, about 1570; of those youth, who were sent to France by the early Recollect missionaries of Canada, and of the Iroquois Indian who, in the seventeenth century, became an Augustinian religious, and preferred to remain in Spain.

The Jesuit and Franciscan schools among the Timuquans in Florida, those of the Jesuits, Ursuline, and Congregation Sisters in Canada, the Indian school in Connecticut, Amherst College, the Moravian schools, all failed alike to exert any considerable influence over the tribes through the children. This can be relied upon but for little; the few children who are apt will succeed, but will not remain Indians. The instruction in various handicrafts is simply a revival of the reduction system of the Jesuits in Paraguay, and the Franciscans in California. Heretofore it has been denounced as depriving the Indians of their natural liberty; but as carried out under Mr. Schurz's idea has the fatal element of taking the young thousands of miles from home, alienating them from their families and hopes, and sending them back with new habits,

ideas, and hopes, to utterly uncongenial associations, where there is no field for them to turn to account the newly acquired knowledge.

The division of lands among the Indians where it has been attempted has as a whole proved a failure, and has succeeded in very few instances. It is an easy way for the Federal Government to rid itself of responsibility which it has unwisely assumed; but it leaves the Indians to become in a few years a mass of citizen paupers,—a heavy charge and burden on the States and Territories where they may happen to be.

One thing is certain. The United States Government had no warrant in the Constitution to assume the control of the Indian tribes. Its own officials will admit that its whole management has been a most disgraceful failure, even apart from the frauds, speculation, bigotry, tyranny, and oppression which make it so odious to every real lover of his country.

One great mistake was the disregard of State authority; another, the neglect to discriminate between the capacities of the various tribes for progress, and the attempt to fit all to a red tape system, concocted by men of little practical knowledge of the subject.

The removal of the Indians from civilization under the pretext of civilizing them; taking them from the very heart of settled and industrious communities, where good examples were constantly before their eyes, to keep steadily evicting them and throwing them between wild tribes on the one side, and the lawless, unscrupulous frontiersman, often a fugitive from civilization and an outlaw,—all this is so utterly unphilosophical and absurd that it amazes us to find that it was adopted fifty years ago, and has been persisted in to this day,—persisted in till it is found that there is no longer any square on the chess-board for the king piece to be put, and government admits that it is checkmated.

This isolation of the Indians was the very acme of absurdity. The ruder classes of men are imitative. Build a bark canoe before Indians that had never seen one, and they will catch at it readily, and attempt to make one, till they acquire skill. Try to teach them out of a book by diagrams, and it will take centuries to get them to make a canoe.

Where Indians see a well-ordered white community around them, and find that they too must do something to support themselves, they will seek work suited to their capacity, some in one line, some in another. A few will try to study; some will take to farm work, others to act as drivers, boatmen, lumberers, pilots, and the like. In Lower Canada Indians are found in all these capacities, and it is the same in California. Under our system all must be uniform, and when, as in Iowa, some Indians hired out as farm hands to settlers, and gave complete satisfaction to their employers, they were marched back to enforced idleness.

The old Spanish system was one of singular wisdom, and showed a far higher comprehension of the subject than any of our statesmen have displayed. After conquering the semi-civilized monarchies of Mexico and Peru, and bringing the principal nations to adopt Spanish regulations and Christianity, they gradually advanced settlements and mission stations into the less civilized parts. With a few missionaries would be sent a small squad of soldiers to establish a *presidio*, that is, a little fort for protection, several families of Indians already trained, flocks of cattle, sheep, and swine. This little colony planted itself, say, in New Mexico. While the missionaries were teaching Christianity and developing the minds, the civilized Mexican Indians were teaching their ruder brethren to take care of the flocks, to spin, weave; were explaining how they had improved their old methods, and as a matter of course boasted of their own former greatness. Of all this we can see traces yet. The Navajoes have ever since been sheep-raisers, blanket-weavers; the Pueblo Indians took steps forward in agriculture, securing irrigation, and acquiring live-stock, and in all their towns still linger traditions of the great Montezuma, taught their ancestors in olden time by the Mexicans who came with the first Spaniards, and who ultimately blended with them.

We may profit by the Spanish example. The Indians who came up from the land of the chapulin and of uncertain rainfall taught the tribes not only to plant crops, but to make azequias to secure irrigation, and the methods in use to prevent the ravages of grasshoppers. What would an agent sent from Massachusetts know about either? He would force the Indians for a year or two to raise crops to perish by drought or by the insects, till at last no force could compel them to renew such utterly useless efforts.

The removal of the Indians west of the Mississippi, about 1830, was a blunder fruitful in evil. Georgia should have retained her Indian population and aided it to advance. The Federal Government should have admitted its first blunder in making treaties it could not keep; have compensated the Indians, shown them that their true interest lay in mingling among the whites, and made them understand that a distinctly Indian government never could exist in the country. Instead of such a wise course they encouraged an unfortunate dream.

Had Georgia retained the Cherokees, and gradually induced them to sell half or whole sections here and there to worthy whites, the Indians would have improved steadily and the State laws would gradually have become respected by the Indians, who found them a shield and a protection. The real Indian progress has been attained where States have retained authority over their Indians. Secretary Schurz unwittingly admits this, apparently without seeing the real argument. "I see no reason," he writes, "why the degree

of civilization attained by the Indians in the States of New York, Indiana, Michigan, and some tribes in the Indian Territory, should not be attained in the course of time by all." In fact the States have done what the General Government, with all its outlay, all its pretension, has failed to do. The recent action of the State of Rhode Island in regard to the Narragansetts, shows how completely the Indians have been adopted into the State population, and how honestly the State has acted towards its Indians. We are forced to confess that the United States Government stands as the greatest obstacle to the progress of the Indians.

The first great step in Indian reform is the abolition of the present Indian Department, and the resigning by the General Government of all authority over the tribes in States and Territories to the local governments, to whom they properly belong. The powers it now assumes have no warrant in the Constitution; and they have been used to the detriment of the whole country. They should be relinquished forever. In that part of the national domain not yet organized into Territory, the jurisdiction of the United States Government extends over whites and Indians alike, and should be exercised similarly. No tribal government of Indian or white should be recognized. The existence of the Cherokee nation and Choctaw nation, with constitutions and machinery of government, is an anomaly that ought to cease. In that district there should be one or more Territorial governments to become, in time, State governments; but no Indian government, either State or Territorial.

With the control of its Indian population left in its own hands, free from Washington interference, and with the fact recognized that this Indian population cannot be evicted, but must be assimilated, each State, for its own good and the good of the Indians, will adopt plans tending to bring them as rapidly as possible into harmony with existing institutions.

Some States will, of course, act more wisely than others, but all will learn by experience. There will be haste to force too much on the Indians at once, but experience will soon teach. Minnesota, Colorado, Oregon, with the whole responsibility on their own hands, will do as well as New York, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, or Indiana; as well as North Carolina did with the Cherokees still within her borders, until a United States agent was sent, who robbed them of all their lands, involved them in litigation which lasted for years, and reduced them to misery and want.

A good teacher is one who grasps almost intuitively the stock of knowledge and the capacity of each scholar, and how one differs from another in the amount of facts, and guides his instruction accordingly. The power guiding the Indian tribes must have the same qualities. No two, it may be said, stand just alike. The

resources of each must be studied, and they must be aided to rise by developing any industrial tact they possess. Improve the agriculture and manufactures of the Pueblos and Navajoes; enable the salmon-fishing tribes to can and send the fish to market. And so in other cases. Many of the tribes like to keep numbers of horses; take steps to make them carriers, expressmen, and freighters, so that the ponies shall not be a mere idle expense. We have a Bureau of Agriculture at Washington; but it has done nothing to develop by cultivation plants like the camass and white apple, which in their wild state have long constituted an important element in the maintenance of many tribes. The camass is a hyacinth-like bulb, growing in marshy lands; the *pomme blanche*, a mass of starch as large as a turnip. Had these been improved years ago by cultivation, they might be now a certain resource for the Indians, who would raise them in fields, instead of hunting for them wild.

If Indian ingenuity, before the coming of the whites, developed by cultivation the potato from the size of a pea to its present size, and that of the ear of corn from about the size of a little finger, it is a deep reproach that our government, with its scientific bureaus, its institutions, its masses of theoretical knowledge, has not developed any of these known food supplies,—has not done as much as the aborigines did.

Improved cultivation of crops which they know and appreciate will be easier than the introduction of new plants. The main thing is to build on the foundation that exists and encourage progress in any direction.

But the Indians should everywhere be made to understand that the sooner they become part of the people of the United States, as immigrants do, the better it will be for themselves, that they may have ease and comfort as others do, by working for it, and that our government can support no set of people in idleness.

Under State charge the Indians will be left free in matters of religion,—free to accept such religious teachings as they desire; free to attend the church that suits them, and to send their children to the school where they think they will derive the most benefits for this world and for the next.

The few wild and turbulent tribes in still unorganized parts of the national domain will be safer in the hands of the army, which they respect, than of an agent, whom they hate, and who too frequently calls on the army to protect him, at the cost of Indian blood, from the result of his own folly and wickedness.

Viewed in any aspect Indian progress, under the present Indian system, seems almost an impossibility. Why should we go on confiding our important interests to hands self-accused of folly, incompetence, and crime?

BIOLOGY; OR, THE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE.

Institutiones Philosophiæ Naturalis, Secundum Principia S. Thomæ Aquinatis. Father Tilman Pesch, S. J.: Friburg, 1880. "Novi errores impugnandi sunt veritate antiqua."

Synthetic Philosophy—Other Works. Mr. Herbert Spencer. New York: Appleton & Co. "There is a soul of truth in things erroneous." (Introduction to First Principles.)

I.

"ALL your culture," says Mr. Herbert, in his speech at the end of "the New Republic,"—"all your culture is based ultimately upon this,—a discrimination between right and wrong. True, profoundly true. But will you be able to say what is right, and what is wrong any longer, if you do not know *for whom* anything is right and *for whom* anything is wrong,—whether it is for men with immortal souls, or only with mortal bodies,—who are only a little lower than the angels, or only a little better than the —?"¹

Who is it that furnishes the fact, which lies at the base of ethical science? What is he?—he whom ethical science presupposes, contemplates, and then directs? *Aut deus, aut bestia?* Is he god, or is he brute, or is he some degree betwixt the extremes?

We had better dismiss at once all notion of his being a god, or even an angel. That was a conceit of Jewish psalmody. It is the poesy of Christian spirituality. "I have said it. You are all gods and sons of the Most High!" So sang the psalmist. And the Christian saint takes up the same refrain: "Heavenly men, or earthly angels!" Let us dismiss, however, all such notions, as too poetically sublime for the present matter-of-fact question.

What then is man? Shall we set him down at the other extreme, as differing but a trifle from the brute? To speak in the terms of modern science, shall we set him down, with his energies, his perceptions, and that wonderful consciousness of his, as being only a subject-matter into which some perceptive current makes its way from without, and out of which some motor impulse goes answering from within? Shall we explain his psychical life by the symptoms of a brute "sympathetic," as the brute himself is explained by chemistry?

Now as to that consciousness of his,—we should prefer indeed to call it intellect,—it is manifestly so unique a fact in this material universe, that Mr. Herbert Spencer relegates it entirely out of Biology in general. It is, he says, radically distinct in its nature

¹ W. H. Mallock.

from any such subject-matter as Biology comprehends; and the method of self-analysis, by which alone the laws of dependence among changes of consciousness can be found, is a method unparalleled by anything in the rest of Biology.¹

And yet, if we listen now to one of Mr. Spencer's own type and color, answering Mr. Mallock, and laying down from the most authentic sources the positivist doctrine with regard to the consciousness of man, we shall hear the following explanation:

"Psychical life (that is to say, the life of the human soul) commences in the organs of the senses; it is a constant current, which passes from without inwards into perception, and from within outwards into organs of movement. Between the sensation and the motor impulse is gradually formed an accessory sphere, and this sphere, developing, extending, enlarging little by little, finally becomes itself a powerful and complex centre, which, in its turn, diminishes in many respects both sensation and movement,—and in the midst of which moves the entire spiritual life of man. This sphere is the sphere of the intelligence. All effort, instinct, and volition represent the centrifugal motor force of the activity of the soul. The individual constitution of this aspect of the life of the soul forms in great part what we call personal character," etc.²

In terms of a more common philosophy, this passage may be interpreted thus. What we call the life of the human soul, with its perceptions of things without and of things within, is a product; it is a product in the shape of a centre; this centre is generated as the development of a sphere; this sphere is accessory as a gradual formation; the gradual formation is betwixt sensation from without and movement from within; and, finally, the first principle of all is a current which is started in the outward sense.

This is the philosophy of human life. As so stated it is not quite complete in its brevity. To complete it, let us add that the current started in the outward sense, is explained in the same way as any other physical or chemical phenomenon, by the combinations and vibrations of atoms. And if the reader desires a specimen of the complete satisfaction engendered in an inquiring mind by the subtlety, ingenuity, and lucidity of the scientific explanation, we may take, almost at random, the following passage. Mr. Spencer is speaking of the life in plants, and, coming to speak of light acting on the leaves of plants, he delivers himself as follows:

"These conceptions help us to some dim notions of the mode in which changes are wrought by light in the leaves of plants. Among the several elements concerned there are wide differences in molecular mobility, and probably in the rates of molecular

¹ Principles of Biology: Scope, p. 99.

² The Value of Life: A Reply to Mr. Mallock's Essay, Is Life Worth Living? p. 69.

vibration. Each is combined with one of the others, but is capable of forming various combinations with the rest. And they are severally in presence of a complex compound, into which they all enter, and which is ready to assimilate with itself the new compound atoms that they form. Certain of the ethereal waves falling on them when thus arranged, there results a detachment of some of the combined atoms and a union of the rest. And the conclusion suggested is, that the induced vibrations among the various atoms, as at first arranged, are so incongruous as to produce instability, and to give collateral affinities the power to work a rearrangement, which, though less stable under other conditions, is more stable in the presence of these particular undulations. There seems indeed no choice but to conceive the matter thus," etc.¹

It might indeed be objected here that "choice," or no choice, is not a fit term for philosophy; particularly when the choice only "seems;" one would think that at least it ought to be seen. It might be objected that the "suggestion" of a conclusion is not a conclusive way of deducing; that "probably" is an odd word in deductive logic; and that if a "dim notion" is indeed the intellectual result of so much subtlety and ingenuity, it is about as much as might be expected.

But this is not to throw discredit on Mr. Spencer's occupation. For, short of such conclusions, his occupation as a philosopher were gone.

Only we say, reverting to the question with which we had begun, it stands obvious that neither the matter nor the form of such argumentation as we have now exemplified can furnish a fair basis for the science of Ethics. As to this form and style of argumentation, it enervates the mind with feeble hypotheses instead of solid theses, with flimsy probabilities instead of downright reasons, with words instead of thoughts, and with much eloquence, possibly, about premises that can never warrant any other conclusion than a "perhaps," or a "may be," or a "suggestion," or a "choice." And, of course, the suggestion takes its color from the optics of the philosophic mind that sees, and the choice from the likes and dislikes of the very human will that chooses. That is not logic. "Hypothesis upon hypothesis, and cloud upon cloud!" as Mr. Frederick Harrison somewhere stigmatizes it; though the stigma comes back to him who sent it, and finds itself at home.

Be it remarked, that when the mind has grown accustomed to this unsubstantial, airy flitting, there is never a reason then why it should halt at executing any figure of thought which fancy suggests; or hesitate to call such figure logic, if science so demand.

¹ Data of Biology, chap. ii.; Action of Forces on Organic Matter.

So much for the form of such argumentation. Now, as to the matter, it is clear that man remains undistinguished from the brute, as the brute on his side is only a mass of chemicals. It is clear that the gravest interests, whether of the person in both the moral and intellectual orders, or of society in both the civil and domestic spheres, are swamped in the deluge of turbulent thought. Actual life, with its vagaries, whether normal or abnormal, does not fall under a rule. Such philosophy can give no rule; nor does it pretend to give one. Life becomes a "series of experiments in living," as Mr. Mill would say; "the deepest moral degradation becomes a phase of enthusiasm comparable with religion and social virtue," as a certain French oracle poetically declaims; "realism and naturalism can in nowise lead us to a state of savage sensuality; and even if they did," say men of Büchner's type, "that fact would avail nothing against the truth of nature;"—"a truth to be sought," says Cotta, "whether logical or illogical, whether æsthetical or otherwise, whether conformable to error or at variance therewith."

Such being its programme for the future, this molecular theory looks back, and finds there a history to match. It finds no sin there, albeit there is suffering. It finds no wrong there, albeit there are things not right. It discerns only a process of "adaptation to circumstances," a mere "self-adjustment to environment," on the part of all humanity, whether molecular or organized. Now, as adaptation or self-adjustment is always attended with incidental friction, restraint, pinching, suffering, here you have suggested, in a nutshell, the explanation of the mystery of evil in the world. Let us take a specimen passage:

"The manifold evils which have filled the world for these thousands of years—the murders, enslavings, and robberies; the tyrannies of rulers, the oppressions of class, the persecutions of sect and party; the multiform embodiments of selfishness in unjust laws, barbarous customs, dishonest dealings, exclusive manners, and the like—are simply instances of the disastrous working of this original and once needful constitution, now that mankind have grown into conditions for which it is not fitted,—are nothing but symptoms of the suffering attendant upon the adaptation of humanity to its new circumstances."¹

With such a metaphysical theory, the science of ethics becomes impossible. And but for ethics, what Christian with a soul to save cares for metaphysics? With Seneca, let us avow that but for something beyond the human, it were never worth our while to be ranked in humanity. And with such a metaphysical theory there is nothing left us. We are like those who have no hope. Right

¹ Herbet Spencer's *Social Statics*, p. 451.

and wrong, as Mr. Mallock graphically describes, fade into one another; and virtue and vice are deadened into one neutral tint. This state of mind is the "malady of the modern world—a malady of our own generation, which can escape no eyes that will look for it. It is betraying itself every moment around us, in conversation, in literature, and in legislation."¹

If the moral colors appear still to remain distinct, they are no longer those of right and wrong, but of a public opinion, of a social behavior, of a *savoir faire*, and other technicalities, which we need not take the trouble to show are very different from morality.

And therefore, to conclude this introduction, by quoting again from the Mr. Herbert cited above: "There never was a time when you talked so much as now about teaching the people; and yet do not you yourselves confess that you cannot agree together as to what to teach them? You can agree about teaching them—I know this too well—countless things that you think will throw light upon life; but life itself you leave a blank darkness, upon which no light can be thrown. You say nothing of what is good in it, and of what is evil. . . . Does success in it lie in the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, or in the doing of spiritual duty? Is there anything in it that is right for its own sake, or are all things right only because of their consequences?"

With the ulterior object of working out so important a problem—no difficult task for the Christian philosopher, and incumbent now in the face of fashionable atheism—we propose for our present question the gist and essence of Biology—What is Life? And as in one article we cannot reach that point of the treatment where it affects man, we shall be forced to leave for subsequent handling both sensation and the psychological portion of the subject.

II.

LIFE AND NON-LIFE.

To begin with the primary notion of life. We cannot tolerate in matters of science commencing with an obscurity and ending with a mystery; standing upon hypotheses and climbing up to unknowables. Yet Mr. Spencer repeatedly proclaims that all ultimate facts are mysteries! After establishing all the grades of metamorphoses, called evolution, from those modes of the unknowable which we style heat, light, chemical affinities, etc., to those other modes of the same unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought, he continues:

"How this metamorphosis takes place,—how a force existing as

¹ Is Life Worth Living? Chap. VIII.

motion, heat, or light can become a mode of consciousness,—how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion—these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformations of the physical forces into each other. They are not more completely beyond our comprehension than the natures of Mind and Matter. They have simply the same insolubility as all other ultimate questions.”¹

Now we may as well have it distinctly understood at once that the scholastic philosophy does not presume to touch mysteries, which are beyond its sphere; but what things it does comprehend as within the sphere of philosophy, those it does not dispatch as mysteries.

Life, which we see so crudely wrapped up in the inexplicable by Mr. Spencer, is, on the contrary, a very simple primary notion. It is an inductive fact which is derived from observations made by common-sense. Such things as the common mind understands to be alive will give the same common mind to understand what life is and what it is not. They can give common-sense a clear notion of life as far as common-sense goes; not a comprehensive and adequate idea, which it belongs to science, from that point, to pursue. Thus it is that the question receives, at the same time, the fundamental solidity of common-sense and the philosophic distinctness of science.

Animals are manifestly alive. Hence the principle which appearing in them makes us call them “alive,” will enable us to predicate life wherever that principle is, and to deny it where that principle is not. This is common-sense. Now what is the principle which is so evident in them, and makes us at one and the same time affirm that they live because it is present, and that rocks are dead because it is absent?

It is surely that in which the animal’s life is first said to show itself, that with which life is seen to endure, and that in which common-sense declares that there the life disappears, and the animal dies for want of life. When a thing is first seen to *move itself*, there common-sense comes in, and from that moment affirms such self-moving thing to be alive. As long as such moving thing continues to go of itself, so long does common-sense persist in the same affirmation. And when at last it is discovered that the moving thing no longer actuates itself, but has to be actuated from without, then common-sense says “Oh, it is dead!” for want of life—that is, for want of inward action.

According, then, to the verdict of common-sense,—that is, of

¹ The Correlation and Equivalence of Forces, § 82.

observation; that is, of physical fact, unimpeachable, because patent and universal,—the criterion by which we judge whether a thing is alive or not is its power of moving itself. And therefore—and let us note this metaphysical consequence—the principle of life is that from which such self-moving power proceeds; it is such an active cause as is adequate to such an effect. It is *that from which* this act of moving self does come; and as this act of moving self is clearly an actuation of self, a form of activity in oneself, an “informing” of oneself with activity, the principle from which it comes must correspond; it must be the principle of a formal act; it must be a formal principle in the agent. By a formal principle is meant the principle of a formal act; and by a formal act is meant an actuation of an agent as distinct from any passive actuation on the part of a recipient. So much for the metaphysical use of terms. But the argument is clear enough: that there must be a principle admitted; and we may call it, for the time being, “soul,” “form,” “idea,” “reason,” molecular vibration,” as we like.

This is the metaphysical argument simple and clear, based on the fact which common-sense reports. It is a skeleton argument; uninteresting, like most skeletons, except that as other skeletons reveal much to the physiologist, so this will be found eloquent by the philosopher. In this one argument you will find the reason why all orders of beings are distinguished from one another, and why they are what they are in themselves—from the eternal chaos through the grades of beautiful beings up to the Eternal Being who drew everything out of chaos. In this one argument from the effect to the cause, with the implied formal relationship between them, that the inward movement is the *formal* effect of a principle within, we have revealed the inflexible framework on which the universe is stretched; and while physical sciences abound in descanting on the universe, metaphysics alone reveals the thing within.

But this and the like of this are just the subjects which the so-called New Philosophy relegates as unknowable to itself. Then, so saying, it condemns itself as being, not philosophy, but physics. As Monboddo said: “Nothing deserves the name of philosophy except what explains the causes and principles of things.” And, moreover, he said well: “With regard to Experimental Philosophy, so called, I am far from denying the use of it; but I would have the gentlemen who value themselves so much upon this kind of *manual* philosophy, to distinguish betwixt the *phenomena* and the *principles* of nature, and not imagine that the latter as well as the former are objects of sense, to be discovered by chemical analysis, or seen through a microscope. They should consider themselves as the historians of nature, who, by great attention and minute observation, investigate facts which escape the vulgar, and

may be called the anecdotes or secret history of nature. But history and philosophy are two things very different."¹ And Father Harper in the same vein animadverts that "if every science permits itself to run riot in its neighbor's property,—if osteology 'out of its dry bones constructs a theology,—if comparative anatomy must needs trespass on cosmogony, physical science on psychology, mathematics on logic,—if physics and applied mathematics are to meddle with the essential nature and constitution of being,—if metaphysics is to change its teachings at the beck and call of each whimsical theory of the hour, then anarchy is introduced into the commonwealth of science, the old landmarks are subverted, vagabond caprice is liberated from prison, and truth is expatriated."²

Reverting now to the skeleton argument, which is taken, by the way, from the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas,³ we may observe that life is spoken of in two distinct states. We started with the action and landed in the principle, we began with the formal effect and ended in the formal cause; just as we may speak of the strength of an arm when it is striking the table, or of the same strength when not exerted in striking anything. In the act of striking you have an exercise of the permanent power within, a formal effect thereof. When not exercised in striking, the permanent power still remains, that is to say, the formal principle or cause. And so in life: you have the exercise of life in the actual movement, called by Scholastics life *in actu secundo*; you have the principle always remaining within, and capable of putting forth actual movement, until the animal is dead; this principle the Scholastics call life *in actu primo*.

This life *in actu primo* is another term for the principle of life. The principle of life is the formal cause of immanent or inward action. The formal and visible *effects* of the principle are the action put forth by the principle upon itself, or upon the living subject which the principle is informing with life. This action on self is called *immanent*, "remaining in" the subject. Action which does not "remain in," but goes out to any other recipient is called *transient*. Immanent action begins within, actuates within, terminates within, so that the agent acts on self, goes, moves, energizes in a *self-principled* shape or form, if I may coin a term. Transient action passes from the agent to another subject, beginning in one as a principle and ending in the other as a term. So bodies act by heat, and by light, and by electricity and chemical affinities, all of which act from body to body, or from cell to cell, or from molecule to molecule. But living action is manifestly immanent in a single cell, which energizes throughout; in a whole arm, which puts forth its energy as a whole member and

¹ Lord Monboddo, Introduction to Ancient Metaphysics.

² The Metaphysics of the School, Book I., Ch. III.

³ I p. q. 18, art. 1.

receives the whole actuation in itself, whatever exterior or transient effect there may or may not be at the same time. So it is in the whole body, and in every member of the body. And thus it is that the eye sees; thus the mind thinks.

At once we are in face of a question, a problem, which answered definitely becomes a great metaphysical principle. That is to say: Can the non-living account for the living? Can life come from non-life? Is life merely a mode of motion? This latter term, motion, is taken by the scientists in the sense of only local motion.

We answer positively, absolutely: No phase whatever of non-life can account for life. No variation of motion, which is not already living motion, can produce that which is living. Life is not a mode of motion.

This is directly in the teeth of evolution. Here it is we meet the first great paralogism of modern science. Here the first great application of its capital principle, that 2×2 do not only make 4, but likewise 5, aye 6, nay 7; in fact, it is not clear why they stop, or where they stop. They do not stop at all, but find that their 2×2 , if they make more than 4 at all, may just as well make all. And hence, in sober earnest, the evolutionists will have not only the lowest forms of life to be a mode of motion, but the highest too; and intellect and emotion all sink down into gyrations of the atoms, and God and the soul become rotations of the molecules.

We proceed to establish that there is an essential difference of principle between the living and non-living: that non-life cannot produce life, and therefore that life is not a mode of motion. When once this restraint is put upon uncontrolled thought, the energies of the mind have a chance of being kept in their channel, of being ordered by the eternal principles of logic, and so of remaining strong, beautiful, and true.

The physical action of heat, light, electricity, gravitation, etc., is such that no one claims for it any other character than the *transient* one of *passing* from particle to particle, from molecule to molecule, from atom to atom. If a chemist speaks of a single atom as getting heated, he means merely that its "mobility" is being actuated, that its attractions and repulsions are undergoing a certain modification, that, in fact, its heat consists in some motion with reference to other atoms, as the very notion of attraction and repulsion necessarily implies. Here we are met by no difficulty. There is not a physicist, I suppose, who claims that an atom gets hot by turning round upon itself; and, being itself the independent principle of that reflex action, becomes likewise the term of the same, so that the heat is the consequence of enterprise, as it were, upon itself. No; heat, light, electricity, affinities, are conceived of as undulations of different lengths and degrees of rapidity; and the undulations pass over atoms, molecules, particles,

gyrating them perhaps into "more than astronomical" periodicities of revolution and complex curves of motion, which, as nobody so far has seen them, nor any one cast them on a screen like Lissajous's figures, every one is free to describe as he will, provided he subscribe to the theory. But however unsatisfactory such undemonstrated theory may be as an adequate explanation of what the physical forces are, certain it is that there is one thing which they are *not*, and which no one claims for them. Their action is not that of the atom upon itself, of the molecule on itself, of the subject reacting on the subject; it is not action inward, immanent. It is all transient.

Now no amount of transient action can give that which is immanent. Let us take a living molecule. Take a living cell of the smallest size—a segmentary cell of the germ from which a great living body is going to evolve. Take that smallest expression of physical life to which analysis and the microscope can reduce the problem in act, and call it as you like, with Mr. Huxley, protoplasm, with others, bioplasm—the first, simplest plasm in which, as in a distinct cell, science detects life.

And first, by the way, I would remark the propriety of determining the issue on a cell. Atoms are smaller indeed than a cell; they are aggregated to the cell; and matter generally is transmuted into the homogeneous mass of the cell. But it is perfectly proper and correct not to join issue, in this question of life, on an atom or a molecule. First, because no molecule separately is seen to live. Secondly, because molecules, in this connection, are known as only subserving the purpose of living particles, by being taken into them or being moved out of them. Thirdly, because it requires a certain amount of material to show the phenomena of life in even its simplest form. An atom does not supply enough of material. Just as in other substances generally there must be a certain amount of material to enable the substance to be in its identity, so in a living thing there must be a certain quantum of material, and that complex enough, to allow of the very first and simplest phenomena of life. In such a quantum, called, as we choose, protoplasm, bioplasm, primary cell, complex atom, or the like, the problem of life in the first place opens, though, be it said, it does not there in the last place close. For, though short of that you have only non-living material, beyond that you have endless developments of living matter, through various grades of perfection, up to life without matter in spiritual being.

Such being the case, let us take this living cell. As living, it is acting on itself. That is to say, it is the principle of its action, and is itself the term of the same. Thus, if it grows by nutrition, what happens? It appropriates external matter, and changes it into its own homogeneous mass; it is itself the principle and itself the

term, although, in the circuit, it touches, handles, alters things which are not itself,—these are external effects, resulting from the immanent action; and, from the elements of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon, it forms the protein which enters into its own homogeneous formation, and there results then a development of cell within cell. There is an inward action in it, a distinctly marked action, which can disappear or “die,” though the simple elements all remain, yes, and remain as the oxy-hydro-carbon compound; because even so remaining they can be dead, and their action is dead too, as far as it was immanent. The transient remains as ever. The protoplasm is dead through want of life. There was in it that action which escapes the analysis of the chemist, “inasmuch as such matter must needs die in the act of analysis,” says Mr. Huxley, and therefore: “Chemical investigation can tell us little or nothing, directly, of the composition of living matter.”¹

Again, therefore, we say, no amount of transient action can produce that which is immanent or reflex. No number of straight lines can make a curve (except by a fiction of mathematics). By no possibility can the action which supposes another term as the patient, at one and the same time make the agent the patient. All the relative changes of attitude and location, by oscillations and revolutions, elliptical, spheroidal, complex in any order and expressed by unknown equations of any power; all the “astronomical distances” imagined between atoms, thus gyrating and flitting and sailing through molecular skies, subject to the laws of molecular astronomy, will never produce this resultant, that the action which by every physical law is simple and transient, directed to a term outside, is, with the same simplicity, immanent, reflex, and terminating inside.

The primary action of the living atom is extremely simple, indivisible, and is immanent. If we speak of the “complex atom,” called a cell, the whole of it is living with an immediate reflex action in itself. If we speak of each component part of that primary cell, each component part is living in the same way. Though life would not subsist in conditions less than those of the complex cell, yet the cell being actuated with life every minor part of it is alive. So that however you take it, whether in the whole or in molecular parts, there is everywhere action immanent; and such cannot come from any combinations of action transient.

There seems to be no need of dwelling further upon this proposition. Therefore the conclusion follows of its own weight, that, since living action is immanent, then transient action—which can never become immanent—cannot give living action. The non-living

¹ Lecture on the Physical Basis of Life.

cannot explain the living. If each has an intrinsic principle that constitutes it in its own order, the intrinsic principle of life cannot be explained by the intrinsic principle which does not give life. There is an essential difference of principle between the one order and the other.

Is it necessary to speak of principle at all? Many think not; or rather they do not know what is meant by principle. According to the principles of Comtism—which has its own principles, to the effect that nobody has any business with principles at all—it is said that antiquated philosophers used principles, and it is said they obscured knowledge by such notions, of things which the senses certainly cannot see. Knowledge, says Comtism, is the experience of facts acquired by the *senses*; and the senses observe only the succession of phenomena. What do they know of principles or cause? They observe accidental qualities. What do they know of essential substrata, or substance? All that we know, says Comtism, is what we see and touch. The rest is unknowable. Cause, agent, matter, motion, force—all are an unknown reality underlying known phenomena. A question of principle therefore is ruled out of court.

Nevertheless, without pausing to analyze the axiom of “principle” or causation, that there is nothing without a sufficient reason or cause, let us take occasion to animadvert upon the use or abuse of it by the scientific school. In the first place, though not expressly denied, it is equivalently so; for if a cause exists, then it is knowable; and if it is not knowable, at least as a cause, then neither can you say that it exists. The axiom is equivalently denied. In the second place, however much this science kicks against the goad, and imagines it takes pleasure in doing so, we may notice that, though kicking, it goes all the same, and it is going precisely in the line of finding in practice the very cause which in theory it equivalently denies. Thus Mr. Huxley, in his essay on the *Physical Basis of Life*, first denies that we should seek a principle: “What justification is there for the assumption of the existence in living matter of a something which has no representative or correlative in the non-living matter which gave rise to it?” Of course, with that, there is an end of anything like asking for a principle which may be adequate to the phenomena of life. But immediately afterwards, with a pass or two of sufficiently unphilosophic blundering in his conceptions, he falls back into the good old fashion of finding a cause, and laying down a principle on the sly, as it were. The laying down is covert, but the principle is broad. “I can find no intelligible ground,” he continues, “for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm *result from* the nature and disposition of its molecules.”

“Naturam expellas furca!”

Good old mother nature will not go! Mr. Huxley then proceeds to show what will come of this admission, and expresses in his own way what we ourselves were inculcating awhile ago, that the first metaphysical relationship of effect and cause here, the "skeleton" argument as we called it before, can be the skeleton of a man or a monster, according as you argue right or wrong. He says that this admission of his will make all vital action, all thoughts and emotions, merely a direct result and expression of molecular changes in our protoplasm. Or, as Mr. Tyndall puts it in his poetical rhapsody on the Matterhorn, the formless fog whence issued the solar and stellar systems contained potentially the *sadness* with which he regarded the Matterhorn. The *thought* which ran back to the universal cloud simply returned to its primeval home. "If so," he continues, "had we not better recast our definitions of matter and force; for, if life and thought be the very flower of both, any definition (of matter and force) which omits life and thought must be inadequate, if not untrue."¹

Apropos of this method of arguing, it is well to make some observations on the use and abuse of the axiom, "There is nothing without a sufficient reason or cause." It means that a cause must be assigned either equal to the phenomenon or greater than it. $2 + 2$ give 4; $3 + 2$ give 4, as containing it; $4 + 2$ give 4, similarly. But $1 + 2$ do not give 4, being neither greater than it, nor equal to it. If now you start with one intellectual admission,—not a conviction, for that cannot be, but an admission,—that $1 + 2$ *may* give 4, by some "unknown" system of combinations and permutations, then there is no arithmetic for you. You dispense yourself from the science and the use alike of arithmetic. How you could possibly do it we could not possibly imagine, unless, perhaps, one's ingenuity in these matters being sharpened by a Herbert Spencer and his philosophy, we might suggest, that $1 + 2$ are next door to 3, and 3 is certainly next to 4, therefore $1 + 2$ give 4.

And now, applying this to philosophy, if by any intellectual admission, resting on an obscurity or possibilities, a "may be" or a "suggestion," one commits himself to what he neither knows by the senses, nor perceives with the eye of his mind, nor can logically deduce from distinct premises, thenceforth there is no intellectual science for him. At least, if he is consistent there is not. There is no arithmetic for a person who admits the remotest possibility that $1 + 2$ may give 4. No shopkeeper of the smallest calibre will let such a person supervise the scantiest daybook.

Hence Mr. Darwin's precious observations of empirical science, as far as they are empirical facts, may be gems; but in his hands,

¹ Fragments of Science; Note to Essay on Scientific Materialism.

when deductively put together, are what gems would be when the barleycorn were much better. The barleycorn of logic any day before the gems of such science!

If all this seems to be severe upon the school of modern science, let us recall to mind that, just at present, we are not in their school but they are in ours, and they must observe the regulations of metaphysics if they aspire to be metaphysicians. And, secondly, we shall do them the justice forthwith of filling out their scheme of defence, which they make on the respective heads in the bill of indictment. First defence: We may admit secret forces which we do not know of; occult, hidden agencies. Second defence: We must not run to miracles, and talk of soul, forms, spirit—no miracles! Third defence: There are so many mysteries in the world! “Regarding science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience.”¹

Here some one objects: You are scouting mysteries and obscurities in science. Can you make it clear, without mystery, what life is; and particularly the life of man?

III.

THE DEFINITION OF LIFE.

The term “mystery” is very obscure,—about as obscure as the thing it signifies. Nevertheless, in the mouth of a scientist it comes to this: That is a mystery which is only intellectually conceived, with no other aid from imagination than what imagination can lend analogically, or, as in a certain subject-matter it is called, anthropomorphically. If the imagination cannot paint or represent definitely the length, breadth, height, depth, hardness, color, temperature, hygrometry of the object, that object is a mystery. If, however, the object can be so represented, with its material attributes, then it is not a mystery.

From this it follows that everything abstract and everything spiritual is a mystery. By the term “abstract” we designate the state of reality which is not actual in nature, but is underlying the actual. Thus *whiteness* is an abstract notion, for it is a state of reality which does not appear to our eyes as whiteness; we see only things white. Nor does whiteness exist except in things white; yet nothing would be white but for the whiteness in them. That is a sample of the abstract.

By “spiritual” it is clear what is meant; not that which merely prescind from actual existence in matter, as whiteness, but that which is eminently actual and existent, independent of all matter. And here our imagination is naturally quite at a loss to paint the

¹ Mr. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*: “Religion and Science.”

height, depth, color, and so forth of an idea; for instance, of an emotion, of a mind, a soul, God. Therefore, says science, all these things are mysteries, and unknowable. We cannot even predicate that they exist, because they are not "mentally presentable." Science means because they are not subjects to be painted, that is all.

On the same principle, neither is logic knowable. It cannot be painted. Therefore, theoretically, it is unknowable. Practically, it does seem to be somewhat unknown. Practically, this school of science does not abound in logic, however much it is exuberant in fancy. If we chose to adopt the style of fence used by a certain opponent of Mr. Mallock,¹ we might say "that the very picturesqueness of its style, and its abounding imagery, derived from a love and contemplation of the surface of nature, suggest the doubt whether it is really adequate to the task of entering into the constitution of nature, and discovering the principles of things. As Cardinal de Polignac beautifully expresses it:

"Materiæ decus et formam externumque nitorem
Miramur tantum, summoque in cortice rerum
Ludimus.
Quam pulcrum est in principiis, in origine rerum
Defixisse oculos et nobile mentis acumen!
Pervolat huc sapiens, nugæ sunt cætera vulgi."

However, to say that the school of science is not equal to this, is only saying that it is a school of "science" and not of metaphysics. And yet we should wish it did not stumble so. Father Pesch mentions that Maurice Wagner, for instance, meets the difficulty of not finding certain links in the chain of evolution by suggesting that the links may have migrated!

Father Pesch, the title of whose book we have prefixed to this article, has accomplished a very excellent task. Evidently a man of scientific bent, he has applied a vigorous philosophic mind to the grateful task of filling up the skeleton of scholastic principles, so far as they bear on physics, with modern physical facts. So much drifting has taken place in scientific thought, so many illogical, loose theories are afloat, that a considerable portion of his space is taken up with direct antagonism to the imaginings of the new philosophy; but this direct antagonism of his only makes his body of scholastic philosophy the more valuable, as bringing it everywhere into immediate contact with errors in all their minutiae. And, at the same time, there is such analytic appreciation and grasp of the philosophy which has energized in the philosophic mind of centuries, that he builds it up through every stratum of physical fact and scientific intuition (for which thanks to the modern physicists); and he edifies too the moral sense of the Christian

¹ The Value of Life, ch. ii.

philosopher with the beautiful harmony which is intuitively discerned betwixt the open, physical world and that which lurks behind. Nature thus becomes an open scroll, and the supernatural is seen to adorn it as an illumination. His motto is *Novi errores impugnandi sunt veritate antiqua*: "New errors are to be righted by ancient truth."

We have laid down a metaphysical abstract truth with regard to the essence of life. We should be happy now to clear up whatever cloud of "mystery" overhangs such truth. If we mistake not, the mystery comes from the background, or rather, from the want of background,—from the absence of a perspective.

That principle of life to which we have so rigidly argued—one should like to approach it closer, and examine it minutely, and see how it ranges among other principles of its own class, or of other classes. For, to be candid, all that this paper has established so far, is the fact that such a principle exists. A relationship from observed facts of common observation has been discerned to a cause adequate, and has been followed up; and as far as the facts or effects give us to understand, we know now some general attributes of the cause or principle behind. But the cause itself—how does it stand? as an effect of what other cause? as subordinated in nature to what principles of its own, or other kinds?

Curiosum ingenium! says Seneca. "Inquisitive mind" of man, that is always asking what? and why? and how?

We should be glad to supply the background desired; or, in other words, having established two of the five points, which Father Liberatore¹ very well distinguishes, we should like to establish the other three. First, as he maintains, we should establish well the fundamental fact of life as distinct from non-life. Secondly, we should rise from the fact to the law, by answering the question, What true cause can be assigned to such a fact, considered as an effect? These two things we have done.

Then comes, thirdly, the connecting this order of facts with others more general, and the ranging this special law under laws more universal. Fourthly, general observations should be taken on the bearings of things mutually, and the phenomenon of life should be properly located in the universal order of beings. Fifthly, the essence of life being thus completely ascertained, its accidental properties could be more accurately investigated.

While the psychological portion of the subject will avail much towards clearing up the principles already laid down, the background which we feel is needed to the entire presentation of the subject is the internal composition of bodies, or as the scholastics put it, the theory of matter and form.

¹ Del Composto Umano.

This would serve as a background ; and we reserve it for future treatment. It is notable how such a perspective helps to the realization of the abstract principle we have advanced and established. Then, besides supplying the perspective, when the outlines of the principle are filled up with the universe of living beings, all representing the one law of Immanence as made concrete in their respective grades, and this upwards, even to God himself, truly a creditable test has been applied to the definition of life, and it is more than a creditable definition which stands such a test.

We propose now to conclude by repeating the definition in a double form, as that of the principle of life, and this is manifestly a metaphysical idea ; secondly, as that of life in action, and here the ideas are manifestly physical. So that life *in actu primo* draws on metaphysics, and life *in actu secundo* on physics.

While we shall repeat both definitions, we take occasion to remark, that for the development of the latter, or the physical description of life, there is scarcely a way more simple, more profitable or entertaining, than to consult the physicists themselves. Indeed, we should be glad to give here a *résumé* of their researches in the laboratory of vegetable physics ; but we have no room. So we refer, for instance, to Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose ingenious and solicitous concern about physical facts, and whose comprehensive summaries of the results arrived at by specialists, furnish a large repertory of facts for developing the physical idea of life. What is wrong in him is the metaphysics. And let no one venture to assert that a metaphysical principle is useless, because dry ; is valueless, because abstract ; when the difference between a right metaphysical principle and a wrong one makes the difference between a sophist and a philosopher, between agnosticism and true science, between atheism and Christianity ; and that, too, although both use the very same physical facts to construct their respective bodies of doctrine. Babel and Jerusalem may be built of the same stones. Just as he is a singular metaphysician who runs counter to logic and common-sense, so is he eccentric in common-sense who denies a due value to metaphysics.

Life then, in principle, is the principle of immanent action. It is that adequate principle which is sufficient to explain its effects ; therefore, in the last analysis, it is found to be simple, substantial, informing matter, and to be the inner reason why the body is one, active, ordered, and subordinating others to its purpose ; just as, on the other hand, matter is found to be, in the last analysis, the principle of inertia, extension, divisibility, density. Only material body it is which has all these qualities ; but the qualities are respectively to be referred either to the active principle actuating or to the passive principle actuated, the latter being matter, the other

form. And, in a living body, the substantial principle of its *immanent* action is the principle of life.

Life, physically considered,—not in principle now, but in its action,—may here be described diversely, though briefly.

Life then, as it appears phenomenally, is an active state of self-preservation, in a composition which of its own nature is corruptible. This state of self-preservation is the result of means applied in the shape of circulating moistures or humors, and in the selection and rejection of matter for a definite purpose. Such is the definition of Ernest Stahl, a celebrated physician of the last century.

Life is the sum total of many functions, which have for effect the continuance of action, as opposed to the discontinuance, or the state of death. This is the definition of Bichat.

It is, again, the faculty which certain material combinations have of lasting a definite time under a determinate form, by drawing unceasingly into their composition a part of the substances around them, and restoring to the elements portions of their own substance.

Life is a whirling vortex, more or less rapid, more or less complex, having a direction which remains constant, and carrying around molecules of the same kinds, but meanwhile receiving and losing continually; so that the form of the living body is more essential than the matter. As long as the movement lasts, the body is alive, it lives. When the movement stops without recovery, the body dies. This is the definition of Cuvier.¹

Life is a tendency to individuation, says Schelling.

It is a collection of phenomena which succeed each other during a limited time in an organized body. So says Richerand, coinciding very much with Cuvier.

It is the twofold internal movement of composition and decomposition, at once general and continuous. This is De Blainville's.

It is a series of definite and successive changes, both of structure and composition, which take place within an individual without destroying its identity. This is from G. H. Lewes.²

Finally, to give Mr. Herbert Spencer's own definition, expressed in his own luculent metaphysical style,—Life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences. Or briefer: It is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. Or briefest: It is the co-ordination of actions.³

These may all be right in the limited physical direction in which they go. But the scholastic philosophers have given the simple and complete definition, which we established above from the data of common-sense. Taken in its physical aspect, life is immanent action.

¹ These three definitions are taken from Father Liberatore's work, *Del Composto Umano*.

² These last four definitions are taken from Spencer's *Data of Biology*, ch. iv.

³ *Data of Biology*, ch. v., iv.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SCHOOL. By Thomas Harper, S. J. Vol. I. London: Macmillan & Co., 1879. Pp. lxxx-592. Vol. II., 1881. Pp. xxvii-757.

The past twenty-five years have witnessed a great revival in English thought. Convinced that the physical sciences can give no answer to the deeper problems upon which they rest, English thinkers, even those who are *ex-professo* physicists, have wandered into the domains of metaphysics. Proofs of this revival are apparent in every department of our current literature—from the “leader” of the “Daily” to the stately article of the “Scientific Monthly, or Quarterly”—from the pert little book of him who “makes *science* easy” to the many volumed Spencer, who makes *science* nescience. But the effect of this reaction is as evident as it is under existing circumstances inevitable. For, when men undisciplined in metaphysics, and with contempt both for divine revelation and for the discovered “wisdom” of the past, attempt to grapple with the mightiest questions of philosophy, what can come of the effort but confusion, defeat? Hence “systems of philosophy unduly multiplied,” “opinions diverse, and often contradictory, even in regard to those things which hold the first place in human cognitions,” “hesitations,” “doubts,” “errors,” are hardly less apparent and widespread in the “philosophy” of England than in that of the Continent.

Still, just as in the religious order the unceasing strife and contradictions of the sects have driven many a weary searcher after truth into the Catholic Church, so also is it coming to pass in the world of science. Full many a one in these times, “fatigued with the Babel of that legion of theories and dreams which in our day are undeservedly graced with the title of philosophy, . . . is casting a wistful glance back upon that ancient doctrine which has stood the test of over two thousand years, and calmly holds its own, spite of the unmeasured calumnies and copied scorn of interested adversaries.” (P. xlv.)

In presenting, therefore, to the English-speaking world the “Metaphysics of the School,”—the recognized philosophy of the Church—F. Harper confers a timely and an inestimable boon, which will be valued most highly by those who, whether from lack of time, patience, or other causes, are hindered from “collecting that science for themselves from the many folios of the mediæval doctors.” (P. xiii.)

But the good influence of his work will not be limited to the non-Catholic student, nor even to the intelligent Catholic reader, who is, however, insufficiently versed in scholastic language to draw the philosophy of the school from its primary or more remote Latin sources, but even those who are already familiar with the writings of St. Thomas, or who have mastered more recent treatises on his philosophy,—professors and advanced students,—can learn many things from F. Harper’s volumes. The end which the Holy Father had in view in authoritatively reviving the doctrine of St. Thomas will not be reached until we have thoroughly acquired the “wisdom” of our Master, and learned to express it in genuine English. F. Harper’s work will be a powerful aid to the attainment of both these ends—to the attainment of the former since he gives us a good digest of St. Thomas’s metaphysics; of the latter since he has written it in true English.

¹ *Dubl. Rev.*, Ap., 1880, p. 449.

As Bishop Hedley, speaking of the first volume, aptly remarks:¹ "If the volume were of *no other* use than to afford thoroughly worked-out examples of elaborate and sustained argumentation, it would be a treasure and a prize. But to the student it is in many other ways most valuable. It will help him to 'translate' his philosophy into current speech; it will assist him in correcting his slovenly and slipshod English; it will make him ashamed of unnecessary barbarisms, and it will not unfrequently kindle a spark of true philosophic fire by the keen and nervous 'rally' of its responses, or the solid and vigorous phrasing of its demonstration."

Hitherto it had been regarded as impossible to render the metaphysics of the school in the vernacular tongue. And we believe still that it is to some extent *untranslatable*. "You can only render it into English by taking its terms and altering their terminations. *Forma* is 'form,' *materia* is 'matter,' *actus purus* is 'pure act,' *intellectus passivus* is 'passive intellect,' and so of a hundred other words and phrases"² which constitute the fixed terminology of Catholic philosophy. But the work before us is no mere *translation*. Its author has digested and assimilated scholastic science to his own mind, and presents it to the reader stamped with the traits of his own individuality. He does not simply *translate* terms, but satisfactorily *explains* them—thus giving his readers the sacred terminology of the science which he interprets, with the peculiar shade of meaning it bore in the minds of his masters. (P. lxxix.) In addition to this he has adopted the happy trait of Aristotle and St. Thomas, of clothing the deepest abstract truth in the familiar garb of some sensible image or illustration,—a feature of the work which will be most highly appreciated by students that have given much more attention to physics than to the "First Science."

It would be vain to attempt to condense within the space granted us here the elaborate arguments of F. Harper on the central questions of metaphysics treated of in the two portly volumes before us. Such attempt, indeed, would be very much like the effort of him whom the author cites as wishing to have the philosophy of St. Thomas presented in an octavo volume—attempting "to lull a giant to sleep in a baby's cradle." (P. lxxvi.) We must content ourselves with a few general remarks on the entire work, and upon that portion which has thus far been given to the public.

In his admirable introduction the author states, and ably refutes, the old, though in the minds of his adversaries, even new objections (better calumnies) against the *form* and *matter* of the scholastic philosophy. (Pp. vii–xliv.) The mind of the student being thus purged of prejudice, the chief obstacles which may beset his path, when about to enter on a study of metaphysics, are next exposed at length. (Pp. xlv–lxvi.) Having thus proximately prepared his reader for the reception of scholastic science, F. Harper proceeds to explain the intention, plan, sources and divisions of his work. "The title of the book," he says, "sufficiently explains its aim and purpose. It does not pretend to be a new and original philosophy. Of these we have had quite enough already. It professes simply to give in English, to the best of the author's ability, the fundamental philosophy of the school, which will be found to differ little, if at all, from that of Aristotle. But two obstacles stood in the way of such a work: 1st, The existence of the rival schools of the Scotists, of the Thomists, of the Augustinians.

¹ Encycl. *Aeterni Patris*.

² Dublin Rev., Cit., p. 449.

The points of difference between these schools could not reasonably have been introduced into his work, so, moved both by the intrinsic merit of the doctrine of St. Thomas, and by the weight of ecclesiastical authority in his favor, F. Harper determined to follow the Angelic doctor. In questions agitated between the Dominican school on the one side, and the Jesuit on the other, wherein the authority of St. Thomas is claimed by both parties, the author defends the interpretation which appears to him possessed of the greater intrinsic evidence, not omitting, however, the opposite view, with its proper arguments. (P. lxxv.)

"Another obstacle arose from the fact that the mediæval doctors have not written express treatises on metaphysics." (P. lxxvii.)

St. Thomas, indeed, has left valuable commentaries on Aristotle and various opuscula on detached questions, but no systematic "course." (*Ib.*) The *disputations* of Suarez, though entire, systematic, and very valuable, were written for a peculiar end, which unfits them for general use. (P. lxxviii.) F. Harper met this difficulty by "assuming the general order, method, and divisions of Suarez as the logical basis" of his work, and arranging upon this system the metaphysics of St. Thomas drawn from his different treatises. The entire work is therefore to consist of nine books, "The *first* treats of the Definition of Metaphysics; the *second* of Being; the *third* of the Transcendental Attributes of Being; in the *fourth* will be considered the Principles of Being; in the *fifth* the Causes of Being; in the *sixth* the Primary Determinations of Being; in the *seventh* and *eighth*, the Categories of Aristotle; in the *ninth*, Natural Theology." (P. lxix.) These nine books will be distributed into four large octavo volumes.

The first volume contains the first three books, viz.: The Definition of Metaphysics (pp. 3-42); Being Possible and Existent (pp. 45-151); Attributes of Being—Unity, Truth, Goodness (pp. 155-570).

We are glad to see that the author starts by vindicating the reality of metaphysics as a *science* (p. 8)—a question of immense importance in these days of positivism, materialism, and sensualism.

In the question on the nature of the distinction between actual essence and its existence, F. Harper rejects the so-called *theoristic* opinion which defends the *real* distinction, and follows that of Suarez,¹ Vasquez, and others who contend for "only a logical distinction founded on a reality" (p. 106). He maintains, however, that in adopting this view, he is not at variance with the Angelic doctor, since a careful examination and collation of his teachings in the passages adduced by the supporters of the opposite opinion, and in "cognate passages, lead to the conclusion that he (St. Thomas) is in nowise directly referring to the nature of the distinction between *actual* finite essence and its existence; but is insisting upon the metaphysical distinction between finite *possible* essence and the existence which it is considered as receiving, or in other words, its actuation."

Also in treating of the important question regarding the principle of Individuation (p. 224 and sq.), the author does not follow the opinion attributed to St. Thomas by such philosophers as Sanseverino,² Zigliara,³ and Lepido,⁴ which declares that principle to be *materia signata quantitate*, but embraces that of Suarez,⁵ viz.: "Every material substance, whether complete or incomplete, is the intrinsic constitutive

¹ Disp., xxxi. 1.

² Elementa Ontologia, C. III., A. II.

³ Summa Phil. Cosmol. Lib. II., C. II., A. IV.

⁴ Elementa Cosmol., L. I., Sect. II., C. 1. III.

⁵ Vid. Disput., v., sect. viii., n. 23 sq., and sect. vi., n. 1 sq.

principle of its individuation by its own actual and proper entity." (P. 238.) He shows, however, that the "respective teachings of the Angelic doctor and of the Jesuit philosopher are in complete harmony," since the latter has treated of the principle "*physically*" constitutive of Individuation in material substance, while the former has dealt with the same question "*conceptually*" and "*metaphysically*." (P. 246.) "If, therefore, the question be considered metaphysically, it is true to say that fundamentally and remotely matter as such, proximately matter conceived as potentially disposed, is the extrinsic genetic principle by which the form is individuated, and consequently the chief intrinsic genetic principle by which the entire substantial composite is individuated." (P. 247.)

Numerous passages are then cited from diverse works of St. Thomas — *The Libri Sent.*, *Questiones Disp.*—and many Opuscula, all of which render it "plain that St. Thomas is throughout considering the whole question from a *metaphysical* point of view. All his expressions are clearly indicative of this fact. For he tells us categorically that indeterminate dimensions have no physical existence. They are in this respect like color, which cannot physically exist, save under the form of such or such determined color. And when he refers to the *physical* constitution of the material substance, he asserts that the haecceity¹ of the whole substance is composed of *this* matter, and *this* form, which is identical with the doctrine of Suarez." (P. 266.)

We have not studied F. Harper's treatise sufficiently to give an opinion on his view of this question, but we have read enough to convince us of the appositeness of Bishop Hedley's remark: "Let the student read the argument of F. Harper on the 'Foundation of Individual Unity in Material and Immaterial substances,' and he will rise from its study a weary, perhaps, but a satisfied man,"²—satisfied as well with the author's admirable power of abstraction, and "discourse," as with the genuine pleasure derived from the very labor of following the march of his argument.

In his introduction F. Harper warns the reader that he will probably find the first volume "somewhat dry and very difficult," but consoles him with the thought that an "accurate knowledge" of its subject-matter is "a necessary preliminary to the study" of the second volume, wherein will appear questions of "more general interest." The author redeems this promise most lavishly. He would be but a sorry admirer of the "Queen of Sciences," who would not consent to surmount far more and greater obstacles than are found in F. Harper's "Transcendentals," if only to get a glimpse at the magnificent pageant of truth arrayed in this second volume. Here we have the book on the "Principles of Being," containing treatises on the "Nature of Analytical and Synthetical Judgments;" on the "Ultimate Principle in the order of Reduction," with the refutation of Sir William Hamilton's objections against the "Principle of Contradiction;" on the "Synthetical, *a priori*, Judgments of Rant." Then follows the book on the "Causes of Being," with its long array of propositions on the deep questions of causality, and two elaborate chapters on the "Material and Formal Causes," in which the scholastic doctrine regarding the Constitutive

¹ Whenever the author uses a purely scholastic term, or is compelled to coin a new word (a very rare occurrence), attention is called to it at the time, and a full explanation afforded of the meaning. To make "assurance doubly sure," a Glossary of Terms is given at the end of the first volume, to which additions are to be made in succeeding volumes, if it be deemed necessary. (P. lxxix.)

² *Dubl. Rev.*, Cit., p. 455.

Principles of Bodies is explained and defended at length, and the chief rival theories refuted. An appendix follows, wherein is stated the teaching of St. Thomas touching the genesis of the material universe—comprising those questions on evolution which so largely engage the attention of recent scientists. Our space does not permit us to show how ably the author handles these difficult and important subjects. And even if it did, a “synopsis” would impart but a very inadequate notion. Every English-speaking student should read these volumes for himself. We feel certain that a very brief study of them will convince him that they are “a great acquisition to Catholic philosophy, and a grand monument of the learning, the power, and the patience of one man.”¹

BOSTON MONDAY LECTURES, 1880-81. *Christ and Modern Thought; with a Preliminary Lecture on the Methods of Meeting Modern Unbelief.* By *Joseph Cook*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1881.

The successive series of discourses known as the *Boston Monday Lectures* have their origin and continuance in excellent intentions. It was felt by Mr. Cook and many other prominent Protestants of Boston and its vicinity, that doubt and positive disbelief in the reality of divine revelation, and its consistency with what are claimed to be logical deductions from actual discoveries in the fields of scientific investigation, are rapidly widening and deepening. To counteract this growing skepticism and infidelity these lectures were planned and are continued. For several years they were delivered chiefly, if not exclusively, by Mr. Cook; but, with the exception of the preliminary lecture, the volume before us is made up of discourses by other distinguished Protestant “divines” and professors, at the invitation of the Executive Committee in charge, for the time being, of the course of lectures.

The general theme which all these discourses were intended to elucidate, as stated in their common title, is *Christ and Modern Thought*; yet it is a significant fact, unmistakably indicating the entire absence of unity even of religious opinion, not to speak of faith, among Protestants on even so vital a question as what they believe about Christ, that the Executive Committee, who selected the lecturers and published their discourses, deemed it necessary to print a preliminary card in the volume they have published, warning readers that they (the committee) “do not wish to be understood as being responsible for the views expressed.” With such an expression of doubt and dissent on the part of the members of the Executive Committee from the reasoning or, as they themselves term it, “the views of the lecturers,” whom they invited to discuss subjects so vital to Christianity as those comprised in the volume before us, it is a pertinent question, How can the committee or any one else expect these lectures to have any influence over either avowed skeptics, or others who wish to believe yet are confused or in doubt as to the fundamental truths of Christianity? The lecturers who were invited to deliver these discourses, it may be reasonably supposed, were gentlemen whom the committee believed were most competent and best prepared to give true Christian answers to the questions and objections raised by opponents of Christianity; yet to the correctness of these answers even the members of the Executive Committee are not willing to commit themselves. If the statements and arguments of their own selected defenders of the Christian religion are of such doubt-

¹ *Dubl. Rev.*, l. cit.

ful soundness and force, how can the general public be expected to accept them? and what good can those who sustain those lectures hope they will accomplish? - The reply might well be made by confessed infidels or doubters, "Gentlemen, first settle among yourselves who and what Christ is; how Christianity originated; what are its doctrines; on what basis do they rest; and what are the evidences by which Christianity is authenticated and supported. After that come to us and we will give you a hearing."

The fact is, whatever claims these discourses respectively have to scholarship or soundness of thought, the point from which they start and the basis on which they rest is that of mere individual opinion. This renders them powerless for the accomplishment of their professed purpose—the refutation of infidel ideas—for they have no other basis than that of individual opinion; and because of its variability they are on many points antagonistic and mutually destructive of each other.

No such method or way did Christ employ to convince those who were inclined to doubt Him and deny His divine mission, and no such method or way did He instruct those to use whom he commissioned to teach to all nations and in all ages the eternal, unchangeable truths He revealed. He spoke to those who surrounded Him, whether believing or unbelieving, "as one having authority;" not the authority due to human thought, human opinion, or human learning and philosophy, but the authority due to Himself as God, the embodiment of absolute truth. And in like manner He instructed those to speak who were to carry on His work throughout all time till "the consummation of the world," and with like authority He invested them: "Go ye, TEACH. . . . He that heareth *you* heareth ME, and he that despiseth *you* despiseth ME. . . . He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned."

In this spirit and manner the Apostles went forth and taught, and so they instructed and empowered their successors to teach. So spoke St. Paul to the cultured Greek skeptics at Athens, the then metropolis of philosophy, where the most acute and skilful dialecticians of the world, practiced in all the arts of disputation, carried on interminable strife, with equal ardor to that of the trained *athletæ* for victory in the amphitheatre. So spoke St. Peter to the Romans at the very seat of their empire, where the pride of universal dominion united with the power of superstitions intertwined with national history and ancestral traditions to oppose the religion of which he was the representative and teacher. So taught St. Mark, St. Peter's chosen disciple, at Alexandria, where all nations met to traffic; where all languages were spoken and all philosophies were taught; where the science of Egypt, "advanced" in human "learning" even before the time of Moses, welcomed and hospitably received the culture and luxury of the East, the poetry and philosophy of Greece, and the second growth of that philosophy at Rome; where Neoplatonists, despising the vulgar idolatry paid to mythical gods, were dreaming, like our modern pantheists, of some "misty impersonal abstraction to which they gave the name of God; where Pyrrhonists took refuge in a system of universal doubt; where many were content to know nothing at all about the soul, and concerned themselves rather with mathematics and astronomy and material prosperity; where Greek Epicureans speculated about a world that had made itself by chance, and set up sense as the standard of certainty, and enjoyment as the end of life; while freethinkers quoted the witty atheisms of Lucretius, and then went to burn incense before the statue of the emperor."

The Apostles had to win their converts from peoples who valued "culture" as highly as any esteem it now—peoples among whom were sophists and dialecticians as acute and skilful in employing the arts of disputation and the power of rhetoric for inculcating fallacies as subtle, as plausible, and as delusive as any which French, German, or English metaphysicians or scientists now put forth in the name of reason, to obscure real knowledge and destroy Christian faith. Under other names there were then transcendentalists and materialists, positivists, agnostics, and pessimists, as subtle and as sophistical as any who now marshal their followers in the various schools of "advanced thought." There were then, as now, those who, in the name of reason, denied the existence of a personal Deity and Creator of the world—who maintained that mind and spirit were but results and forms of material action, and asserted that it was impossible to have knowledge of anything that lay beyond the reach of our material senses. There were those then who talked and wrote as beautifully and as delusively about "sweetness and light," and painted as glowing pictures of what they saw in dreams in the cloudland of transcendental fancy as the "philosopher of Concord" or any of his disciples.

Soon, too, there arose those who professed to be Christians, yet constructed ideal Christs and ideal systems of Christianity—denying the real Christ, and denying or perverting the truths of divine revelation as regards the existence and attributes of God, the one person and two natures of our Saviour, the existence and coequality of the three persons in the glorious and undivided Trinity, and who endeavored, with as subtle process of ratiocination as any which modern rationalists employ, to make Christianity subservient to their fallacious speculations.

Countless variations and modifications of these heresies followed each other in quick succession during the first four or five centuries of Christianity, and on ever unchanging ground the successors of the Apostles, like the Apostles themselves, met and overcame them. It was not on such ground as that taken by the learned Protestant disputants, with a like purpose in view—the defence of vital truths of Christianity—in the *Boston Monday Lectures*. The Fathers and Doctors of the Church during those ages, ripe with speculation, subtle and profound on every subject (and the same remark holds good of Catholic defenders of Christianity in all subsequent ages) spoke with no hesitating tongue, or timid, apologetic utterance respecting Antichristian errors. It was not with "views" or individual opinions that they combated error. What they enunciated they did not propose to the assent of men as something possibly or probably true, yet still open to question. What they declared they declared as verities, absolute certainties. They frequently appealed, it is true, to the conclusions of human reason in confutation of their adversaries, and freely employed whatever was true, even in heretical or pagan thought, to expose the errors with which it was mixed, thus refuting unbelief and the false doctrines of pretended Christian philosophers on their own ground and with their own weapons. To employ the figures then frequently used, they "spoiled the Egyptians of their own treasures," and "cut off Goliath's head with his own sword." But they never abandoned the firm ground of authority which they occupied as ambassadors of Christ, divinely appointed and commissioned, for the uncertain basis of mere human speculation.

Just here is the mistake and the disadvantage of Protestant controversialists in their efforts to refute skepticism and infidelity. Skepticism and infidelity in all their varying phases are but different forms of rationalism, different speculations of minds unwilling to subject human

reason to the obedience of faith. But Protestantism itself is essentially rationalistic, both as regards its fundamental ground and the methods of argumentation by which it is attempted to be sustained. Its attacks, therefore, upon Antichristian error are simply attempts to displace one form of rationalism with another, to drive out one set of human opinions and enthrone another. The conflict at last, therefore, always resolves itself into a contest merely of dialectics and rhetoric, in which the most skilful disputant or eloquent speaker carries off the palm, but seldom or never convinces his opponents that they are in the wrong.

This is the fatal defect of the *Boston Monday Lectures*. It is a mistake, too, which it is impossible for the learned lecturers to escape as long as they remain Protestants and stand on Protestant ground. They have nothing but speculators' views, opinions to present; and mere opinions are powerless to convince those who firmly hold opposing opinions.

It is not necessary, therefore, to criticise in detail and notice each of these lectures separately. They are of different degrees of merit as regards scholarship and the intellectual ability displayed. There are true things in them well expressed, sound arguments strongly put, mingled up with mere hypotheses, mere personal speculations, some of them probable, some of them preposterous; but the ground on which they are based is unstable, and the superstructure necessarily has the same defect.

CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS AND SCHOLARS; or, Sketches of Education from the Christian Era to the Council of Trent. By *Augusta Theodosia Drane*, author of "Three Chancellors," "Knights of St. John," "The History of Sienna," etc. Second Edition. London: Burns & Oates. 1881.

Could the leaders of the modern crusade to expel religion from education be induced to read this work with unprejudiced minds, and study the lessons it furnishes on the subject, their ardor in behalf of purely secular instruction, and their admiration for intellectual development divorced from faith in Christianity, would certainly be very much lessened, and perhaps, indeed, from opponents of those who advocate the necessity of religious training forming an essential part of all educational processes, they would become friends and allies. Those, too, who, with ignorance which, under the light now thrown by the historical researches of modern indifferentists and skeptics, as well as the writings of eminent Catholic historians and controversialists, upon the actual intellectual action of Europe previous to the sixteenth century, call the preceding ten centuries Dark Ages, and represent it as a period when ignorance conjoined with superstition reigned with undisputed sway, can learn from the pages of the volume before us how utterly untruthful are their representations respecting the movements of the human mind during that period wherever Christianity penetrated, and how cruelly unjust is the libel they thus formulate against the Catholic Church.

The book, however, was written with no such purposes or objects, or, if they entered at all into its design, they were incidental and aside from the chief intention of the author. That intention, as we learn from the preface (and an examination of the work fully confirms the statement), was to present "a general and connected sketch of the history of Christian education down to the period of the Council of Trent, illustrated from the lives of those who have in successive ages taken part in that great work." The author, with that modesty which often accompanies true scholarship, and always makes it more admirable,

apologizes for certain omissions, among which is prominently mentioned the absence of a complete account and critical examination of the writings of those who were most eminent as teachers, or in other ways were most distinguished for the part they took in carrying forward the great work of Christian education. But, as she correctly says, such an examination would properly enter into a history of Christian literature, and would, moreover, extend the book (which is a large 8vo. of upward of 700 pages) into several volumes. For like obvious reasons the author does not refer, except in an incidental way, to the philosophical and theological controversies connected with the lives of the great men whose characters and labors and relations to the educational action of the Church she sketches with masterly vigor, truthful accuracy, and with sufficient fulness of detail to furnish clear and distinct pictures of them, of the ages in which they lived, of the intellectual status and characteristics of those ages, and of the process of education then employed, and of the schools and other institutions by which these processes were maintained in vigorous action.

The evidences of extensive research and close study of the most reliable histories and authorities are plainly visible throughout the whole work, but the results are given not in dry didactic form, but in that of a highly interesting narrative, written in charming style. The subject is treated from a purely historical point of view, and the interest as well as value of the work is enhanced by the fact that as far as is possible the coloring, and sometimes even the language, of the statements of ancient and mediæval writers is preserved.

It is beyond our power to give even a synopsis of the wonderful activity of the Church in founding schools, under the eyes and direct supervision of her bishops, establishing them in the porticos of her churches and in the cloisters of her convents, and, as time passed on and opportunities were afforded, multiplying those schools, extending their scope, supplementing them with colleges, and developing these in turn into universities, to which the poor and the rich, the sons of barbarians of remote countries, were attracted and mingled on terms of equality with the children of native rustics and those of kings and counts and of the wealthy burgesses. Scarcely had the fires of pagan persecution been quenched—indeed, long before they were quenched, and while the Apostles were still living—steps were taken to establish Christian schools. This was notably the case at Alexandria, where St. Mark—whose first convert there was a poor cobbler—though commencing his work of teaching with the poor, yet soon extended his labors, in accordance with his Apostolic mission, so as to embrace also the philosophers of the world-famed Alexandrian Musæum, as well as the rude and despised rabble and slaves. To St. Mark, and through him to the Prince of the Apostles, may be traced up the institutions which were the nurseries of the Christian schools; for all the allusions of early writers to the labors of St. Mark at Alexandria concur in the fact that, though the Sacred Scriptures, the Creed, the Liturgy and Ecclesiastical Chant, along with prayer, were the subjects which those who were under training for the priesthood studied at first, yet very soon other subjects were added, so that pagan philosophers found in the Christian teachers persons who could beat them with their own weapons. Human learning was united with the faith, and through that union was elevated and ennobled. It is undeniable, too, that catechetical schools, for the instruction of Christian neophytes, and that episcopal seminaries forming part of the Bishop's own household for the training of candidates for the priesthood, existed in other cities as well as at Alexandria

at a very early period, and that from them subsequently sprang up schools for the more general education of the children of all classes of people.

It would be interesting to give some of the proofs the author has collected, in the early ages of Christianity, of the high appreciation in which secular learning was held by the Christians of those ages, when it was sought for and employed in the right spirit and with reference to right purposes, and of the clearness and strength of their convictions; and on the other hand, of the pernicious influences of intellectual training when separated from religion. Take, for example, the following account of the process adopted by St. Origen in training his pupils: "He began by mercilessly rooting out the weeds and briars of bad habits and false maxims which he found choking up the soil. . . . Then he taught them in succession the different branches of philosophy; logic, in order to exercise their minds and enable them to discern true reasoning from sophistry; physics, that they might understand the works of God; geometry, which, by its clear and indisputable demonstrations, serves as a basis to the science of thought; astronomy, to lift their hearts from earth to heaven; and finally philosophy, which was not limited, like that taught in the pagan schools, to empty speculations, but was conveyed in such a way as to lead to practical results. All these were but steps to ascend to that higher science which teaches us the existence and nature of God."

This was Origen's plan and method of education, and in this he was not peculiar. The same plan and method, varying as to details and as to the comprehensiveness of the course according to the circumstances of those whom they instructed, but the same in spirit and general purpose, were adopted and faithfully adhered to by the Fathers and Doctors of the Church elsewhere and in subsequent ages; and happy would it have been for the world had it not, working through the ambition and pride of opinion of scholars puffed up with conceit of their own acquirements, but wanting in the humility and obedience of faith, and working, too, through the ambition of secular rulers, jealous of the influence thus exerted by the Church in directing intellectual training, and seeking to gather into their own hands all the means by which their power as princes and monarchs might be increased, interfered with the splendid systems of schools, colleges, and universities, which, with untiring industry and zeal, and with immense self-denial and labor, Christian teachers in the course of ages built up on this true basis of education.

One of the most interesting chapters of the book is that on the early Christian schools in Britain and Ireland. The monastic institutions of Britain existed almost from the period of her first conversion to the faith, and wherever there were monasteries there were schools, or the beginnings of them, in one form or another. But whatever schools existed there in earlier ages had fallen into decay by the beginning of the fifth century. Fresh foundations then began to be laid, the origin of which must be traced to three distinct sources: the labors of St. Ninian among the Picts, of St. Palladius in North Britain, and of St. Germanus and St. Lupus in the southern part of the island. Yet these three streams flowed from one common fountain,—the Holy Apostolic See of Rome.

St. Ninian, the son of a petty prince of Northumberland, was educated at Rome by teachers under whose care he was placed by Pope Damasus, and after spending fifteen years there he received consecration at the hands of Pope St. Siricius, and was sent back by him to exercise his episcopal functions in his own country. On his homeward journey

he visited Tours and conversed with St. Martin, and was thus fully prepared to introduce into his diocese the rule and manner of life he had seen in the churches of Italy and Gaul. At Witherne, in Galloway, where he fixed his see, he built a stone church after the Roman fashion, and lived in an adjoining house along with his cathedral clergy, in strict observance of the ecclesiastical rule. In this episcopal college the young clerics pursued their ecclesiastical studies, while a school was also opened for the children of the neighborhood. The Great School, as it soon came to be called, was resorted to both by British and Irish scholars.

At this time the churches of South Britain were suffering from the ravages of the Pelagian heresy. To remedy this, Pope St. Celestine commissioned St. Germanus, of Auxerre, and St. Lupus, of Troyes, to visit Britain as Papal legates and take the necessary steps for eradicating the evils caused by Pelagianism. Their first visit was made in 429 (three years before the death of St. Ninian). One of the chief measures they took for checking the spread of error was the foundation of educational institutions both for clergy and laity. At Caerleon, the British capital, they themselves lectured on the Holy Scriptures and the liberal arts. They were soon surrounded by studious pupils, some of whom applied themselves to the study of the arts and sciences, while others devoted themselves wholly to that of the Sacred Scriptures. Under the disciples they instructed and trained a large number of monastic schools soon sprang up in various parts of Britain, in which both sacred and secular learning were diligently cultivated. The most distinguished of the followers of St. Germanus were Dubricius and Iltutus. By the first of these, two great schools were established on the banks of the Wye, one of which was attended by a thousand students. But this was surpassed by the monastery of Lantwit in Glamorganshire, where St. Iltutus presided over a community of two thousand four hundred members, and from which went forth many eminent scholars. Iltutus was also the founder or rector of Bangor on the Dee, where there were seven colleges, each containing at least three hundred students. Daniel, a disciple of St. Iltutus, founded another Bangor, and had under his care large numbers of the most hopeful youths of West Britain. Paulinus, one of his scholars, founded in Caermarthenshire the college of the Whitehouse, afterward known as Whiteland Abbey. Among his pupils was the celebrated St. David, who began his studies under St. Iltutus at Bangor. St. David was the founder of twelve monasteries, in which intellectual labor and manual labor were prosecuted with great and equal industry; and, while living austere and laboring industriously, the monks diligently and successfully cultivated liberal arts and polite learning.

During this same period St. Palladius, at whose solicitation St. Germanus and St. Lupus had been previously sent by the Sovereign Pontiff into Britain, was consecrated Bishop "over the Scots believing in Christ." He first went to Ireland, but was soon obliged to leave it by the hostility of the native princes, and crossed over to North Britain, where there were several colonies of Scots. There he pursued his apostolic labors with more success, establishing strict ecclesiastical discipline, and founding a number of schools, which his immediate followers greatly increased. Among these followers some authors count St. Servanus, first Bishop of Orkney, the founder of the monastery and ecclesiastical school at Culross, which was numerous and attended, and among the pupils of which was St. Kentigern, or, as he is best known by the people of Scotland, Mungo, the dearly beloved. Having been consecrated Bishop, he erected a church and monastery at the

mouth of the river Clyde, the site of the city of Glasgow, his diocese extending from the Atlantic to the German Ocean. Having been driven from Scotland by a usurper of the Scottish throne, he took refuge in Wales, and after visiting St. David, he erected the monastery and college of Llan-Elwy, from which a great number of Apostolic missionaries went forth, not only into different parts of Britain, but also to Norway, Iceland, and the Orkney Islands. On the restoration of the rightful king of Scotland in 544 he returned to his see, leaving the government of his monastery and schools at Llan-Elwy to St. Asaph, his favorite scholar. Another of the most famous British schools was that of Llancarvan, founded by St. Cadoc in Glamorganshire, near the site of the present town of Cowbridge. A few years later, in the year 565, St. Columba, of Ireland, after founding two monasteries in his native land, crossed over with twelve companions and disciples to Scotland, and erected on the island of Hy, or Iona, the celebrated monastery which in time became the mother of three hundred religious houses, and diffused both secular knowledge and spiritual light throughout all Scotland and its islands as far as the Hebrides.

Under the influence of these Apostolic labors the peoples of the island of Britain would probably have soon not only universally received the light of the true faith, but also rapidly advanced in all the liberal and industrial arts; but during the latter part of the period we have been sketching, Saxon invaders were devastating England and establishing themselves in its fairest regions. By these invasions and the disorders which they produced the light both of Christian faith and of intellectual action was almost extinguished, and the work of Christianizing and educating the people of Britain had to be almost entirely done over again. The Saxons were both barbarians and pagans, and, in fulfilment of her mission, the Church, through her visible Head, the Holy Roman Pontiff, soon took measures to carry to them the light of the true faith. The story of St. Augustine's mission to England, and of the successful labors of himself and his coworkers and followers, so far as they relate to diffusing education in Saxon England, is admirably told in the work before us. The schools connected with the monastery at Canterbury soon became models of many other seminaries founded in different parts of England. Teachers trained in those schools or obtained from abroad taught every then known branch of human learning. Along with the study of the Sacred Scriptures they gave instruction in grammar, astronomy, logic, music, geography, arithmetical, versification, and natural philosophy. The success of the educational movement, urged on by these institutions, was of course impeded by the almost constant wars in which the rulers of the different petty Saxon kingdoms were almost continually engaged with each other. Yet the movement went on, constantly gaining in volume and in force, until the incursions of the Danes, who devastated and destroyed wherever they landed or penetrated, threw England back into the barbarism from which she was emerging, sweeping away all her seats of learning. During the century that elapsed between the first landing of the Danes and the accession of Alfred the Great, gloom and darkness settled down upon the land.

The author relates in admirable style and with many interesting details, obtained from ancient writers, and not generally known, the noble efforts of Alfred, by means of learned ecclesiastics, chiefly obtained from other countries, to revive education in England; and how this work of restoration was, a few years afterward, taken up and carried forward by St. Dunstan, St. Oswald, St. Ethelwold, and others, their co-laborers or successors. In other chapters she describes the continuation

of the movement in following ages, until the wicked insanity of the so-called Reformation almost destroyed learning and scholarship for a time in England, and inflicted a blow upon education from which, though more than three hundred years have elapsed, she has not yet recovered.

We turn back to ancient Ireland. About the same time that St. Germanus and St. Lupus were founding monastic schools in Southern Britain, St. Patrick was commencing his mission in Ireland. One of his first steps was the establishment of an episcopal monastery and school at Armagh, the government of which was intrusted to Benignus, who afterward succeeded St. Patrick in the primacy. The school soon rose in importance, and the number of students, both native and foreign, so increased, that it became, in fact, a university, and was divided into several parts or colleges, one of which was devoted entirely to Anglo-Saxon students. Even when Ireland was overrun by the Danes, and so many of her sanctuaries were given to the flames, the schools at Armagh were kept up. In the ninth century they could boast of nine thousand students, while the schools at Cashel, Dindaleathglass, and Lismore vied with them in renown. In all parts of Ireland there was an extraordinary multiplication of monastic seminaries, and a wonderful ardor on the part of their members in the cultivation of letters. "Within a century after the death of St. Patrick," says Bishop Nicholson, "the Irish seminaries had so increased that most parts of Europe sent their children to be educated in them, and drew thence their bishops and teachers."

One of the earliest of these monastic schools, not later than 480, was that erected on a rocky island called from the wild flowers which even still flourish there, Aran-of-the-Flowers, a name it afterwards exchanged for that of Aran-of-the-Saints. Its schools were the nurseries of some of the greatest Irish teachers, and also the resort of students from beyond the sea. To them came St. Carthag the Elder, St. Kieran, and St. Brendan. In them, too, St. Fursey spent many years before going forth to found his monasteries in England and France. A little later St. Finian founded his great school of Clonard, whence, says Usher, issued forth a stream of saints and doctors. Even during St. Finian's lifetime the number of students at Clonard is said to have numbered three thousand. A little later on St. Kieran, a pupil of St. Finian, founded two great monasteries, one of which took the name of Clusn-Mac-Nois, now changed to Clonmacnois. About ten years later, in 559, St. Comgall founded the famous schools of Benchor, near the bay of Carrickfergus, which St. Bernard extols as having sent forth swarms of saints and scholars, who spread themselves like a fertilizing inundation into foreign lands. The most famous of its scholars was St. Columbanus, the founder of Luxeuil in Burgundy and Bobbio in Italy.

Another of the Benchor scholars was St. Luanus, or Molna, who founded, according to St. Bernard, a hundred monasteries, among which was that of Clonfert in Leinster, equal in greatness to that of Clonfert in Connaught, founded by St. Brendan. St. Columba, too, the great Irish missionary to North Britain, before leaving his native land, founded the two great monasteries of Doire-Colgaich and Dairmagh in Ireland. The last of these centres of spiritual and intellectual light that we shall mention was that of Lismore, founded by St. Carthag the Younger in 630. It became a resort for religious students from all parts of Ireland, England, and the continent of Europe, and one of its most famous masters was St. Cataldus, the patron saint of Tarennum.

In these monastic schools the classics, both Greek and Latin, were in-

dustriously studied, the mechanical arts, law, history, and physics. They improved the arts of agriculture and horticulture, supplied the people with ploughshares and other implements of labor, and taught them the use of the forge, in the mysteries of which every Irish monk was instructed. The Hibernian scholars were remarkable for combining acuteness of the reasoning powers with the gifts of the musician and poet. In the ages to which we are referring there were nowhere more accurate mathematicians or keener logicians than they were. Their love of Greek was perhaps excessive, for they evinced it by even Hellenizing their Latin.

As Ireland hospitably received and instructed in her schools men of all races and tongues, so, too, she sent forth swarms of saints and scholars, who mightily aided in the work of Christian education in other countries, the traces of which still remain in Scotland, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Iceland and the Orkney Islands. Professors from ancient Hibernia assisted in the Carlovingian revival of learning, and to them, in no small degree, the great universities of Paris and Pavia owed their foundation.

We have already exceeded the limits allowed us for our notice of the work before us, though on the topics referred to we have given but a bare skeleton of the author's narrative. We can only mention the titles of the other chapters, which are equally full of details gathered from rare but authentic sources, and equally interesting, and, we may add, equally important in the light they throw upon the work of education in which the Church was engaged previous to the sixteenth century, with which period the book before us terminates. The titles of the chapters, which alone we can give, are: St. Boniface and his Companions; Charlemagne and Alcuin; the Carlovingian Schools; King Alfred; St. Dunstan and his Companions; The Iron Age; The Age of the Othos; The Schools of Bec; The Rise of Scholasticism; Paris and the Foreign Universities; The Dominicans and the Universities; English Schools and Universities; Old Oxford; Dante and Petrarch; English Education in the Fourteenth Century; The Red and White Roses; The Renaissance at Florence, Deventer, Louvain, and Alcala; The Renaissance at Rome; English Scholars of the Renaissance; The Council of Trent.

In the course of the author's valuable history she traces clearly the course by which education in the great schools and universities, founded by saints and doctors of the Church, was gradually taken from under the direction and control of the Church and deprived of its essential Christian elements; and how through this change it became paganized and secularized, thus preparing the way for "free thought" and the great religious rebellion headed by Luther in the sixteenth century. She has also collected and summarized the testimonies of Luther, Roger Ascham, and other schismatics, showing the loss of real scholarship and earnest study, and the intellectual superficiality that followed this secularizing of learning and inauguration of so-called free thought. We close our notice of this truly admirable work with the following pregnant remark, taken from its concluding pages:

"For two centuries at least education has been the battle-ground of the Church, and the battle is not yet fought out and finished. In France, in Belgium, in Germany, and in Switzerland infidelity has triumphed exactly in proportion as it has succeeded in substituting an Antichristian state system of education for the system of the Church, and has never done its work more surely than when its agents have been philosophic universities and ministers of public instruction."

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIII. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881.

History divides great men into two classes. The giant, who, like Napolion Bonaparte, destroys and creates history ; who, for good or for evil, turns the world upside down, belongs to the first, with but few in number. The men in this class are mostly phenomenal figures, great through their genius, great in their singleness, men whom fate lifts up and fate crushes. They revolutionize the age and carry it on the wings of their own fortunes ; but they pass away, doomed as it were even to greatness in the grave, and the traces they have left behind are sad mementos. The exile of Elba, later the captive of St. Helena, the grand prisoner of the whole continent of Europe, a revolution by himself, he bequeathed to his nation a race reduced in its height by an inch. The influence of men of this class is, therefore, mostly more mischievous than useful.

The class of great men which comes next contains the men who influence their age and are in turn influenced by their age. Men who are enough in advance that their age can accept them as teachers and leaders, but who do not thwart it. They guide the course of events, they make it go quicker or slower ; they form themselves part of the events. They are not out of gear with their times. They are forms less surrounded by the halo of fame, but they mould and shape, and they leave moulds and shapes behind to succeeding generations.

To this class men like Kannitz, Metternich, and Talleyrand belong. The conspicuous part played by the two last named at the Congress of Vienna suffices to assign a place of prominence to both among the many prominent personages of those times. The events to which the correspondence of Prince Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento and Bishop of Autun, with Louis XVIII., are well known. They form part and parcel of the alphabet of diplomacy of even our times.

The publication of the Memoirs of Prince Metternich, the illustrious Austrian premier, has thrown much light upon the same period which is touched upon in the letters of the French plenipotentiary to the Congress.

But the inner workings of that distinguished assembly of crowned heads and diplomates, convened for the purpose of revising the map of Europe, are now being made known to us.

The extreme difficulty of the task which the Ambassador of France had to discharge, requiring more than common ability and tact and firmness, is laid openly before the reader. France at first had no position. Having gone, within a quarter of a century, through revolution, anarchy, republic, directory and empire, having thrown the whole continent into a series of wars, of which confusion, depopulation, new kingdoms, new republics, a new organization of power had been the result, the nation who had lent her lifeblood to the disturber of peace and had barely gone through the throes of a new birth in recalling the Bourbons to the throne of the kings of France was necessarily looked at with mistrust. Prince Talleyrand, however, proved himself master of the situation. Comprehending fully the enormous difficulties with which his mission was fraught, he availed himself of the resources of his richly gifted nature. With rarely equalled diplomatic skill he knew how to lay out a line of conduct, and what is more still, to pursue it to the end and crown it with success, which has earned for him the laurel-wreath as king of the diplomates of his time. He established and maintained the position which France had forfeited. He restored the nation to the

place which she had lost in the councils of Europe. He advocated the principle of legitimacy, which reinfused a conservative spirit into Europe at large. He remained firm where yielding meant impairing France, and he knew how to yield with dignity and grace, where insisting upon a demand was inopportune.

He rescued Saxony from the grasp of Prussia, and preserved amid the one hundred days of Napoleon's meteorlike appearance, his faith in final victory.

The correspondence gives an insight into the character of Talleyrand as a man. It acquaints us with his powerful and comprehensive grasp of mind and that rare facility of striking out under the pressure of the moment the most expedient and dignified course for the furtherance of his own aims. Nowhere is there lack of energy; he feels, so to speak, that the events do not control him, but that he controls the events. Nothing daunted by defeat, defeat stimulates only his energy, and the issue of the negotiations imprints "success" upon his works.

The study of such an intellect is instructive and interesting, apart from the value which the rôle he played in the history of his times assigns it. The *gentilhomme* permeates thought, word, and action. His relations to the king and to all royal personages are distinguished by a delicate observance of those subtle distinctions of rank and superiority which none better than he knew how to appreciate and how to distribute. And in his intercourse with the plenipotentiaries and other dignitaries, it is pleasing to observe what keen knowledge of individual weakness can accomplish. A certain vanity and self-complacency may be read between lines not unfrequently, yet an even tenor of language conceals the consciousness that *he* and not the king held the reins over the state chariot in France.

From a literary standpoint, the book deserves a most favorable criticism. The grace and ease and fluency of expression, the direct dealing to the point with many subjects, the skilful approach of questions of extreme delicacy; these and many other charms make it most pleasant reading. While many turns of expression which are peculiar to the French language fail of course to please us, the translation is in every particular well-meriting unqualified praise, and the work is in more than one respect well-deserving of a warm reception. A very valuable addition to the book market, it reflects equal credit upon author, translator, and publisher.

PROVE ALL THINGS, HOLD FAST THAT WHICH IS GOOD. A Letter to the Parishioners of Great Yarmouth on his reception into the Catholic Church. By *I. G. Sutcliffe, M. A.*, late Curate of St. Nicholas, Great Yarmouth, etc. London: Burns & Oates, 1881, 12mo., pp. 63.

"A thousand ways lead to Rome" was a proverb of our European Catholic fathers in mediæval times. And it is always interesting to a theologian to read an intelligent convert's description of the road that led him "Romeward;" in other words, his account of the motives that drew him out of the dark bondage of Protestant error into what St. Peter calls "the marvellous light" and freedom of Catholic truth and unity.

Mr. Sutcliffe's Letter cannot but interest all readers, whether Catholic or Protestant, who are watching the present condition of the Anglican Church. He seems to have actually acquiesced for years *bona fide* in the notion that the Church of England *had the right* to teach Christian doctrine, and that she *boldly asserted* that right. But when he found her, as all merely human institutions do, coolly backing out of her pretended divine right, and maintaining by judicial decision the supreme right of individual private judgment, his idol was shattered. His Christian principle forced him to seek elsewhere for an unchanging principle of au-

thority. And he soon discovered it, where alone it has always boldly and unhesitatingly asserted itself, in the Church of Rome.

Mr. Sutcliffe, we are glad to see, takes hold of two prominent defenders of Protestant theory, Chillingworth and Littledale. They are supposed to occupy the two opposite poles of anti-Catholic doctrine. The former became a convert to Catholicity from Protestantism out of sincere conviction, then fell away, from God alone knows what bad motives, and slid down the plane of unbelief, till he landed in Arianism, Socinianism, and who can tell in what farther depths. His unbelief did not prevent his advancement in the Episcopal Church, of which he lived and died a dignitary, just as did Stillingfleet, the unbaptized heathen Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Socinian Hoadly, Archbishop of Wales. We are sorry that Mr. Sutcliffe did not copy the exact formula used by Chillingworth in subscribing the Thirty-nine Articles. It is preserved in manuscript in the archives of some English Cathedral, and it says virtually, though we cannot remember the exact words, that he subscribed *in order to obtain* the cure or prebend there mentioned. This expression is given, as copied from the subscription itself, in an edition of Chillingworth's works, printed at London some forty years ago, and reprinted in this country. But we have lost our copy, and can no longer refer to it.

The other noted controversialist is Rev. Mr. Littledale, once an Irish country parson and Orangeman, now the acknowledged leader of the English Ultra-Ritualists. Orangeism is the type of all that is lowest and most rabid in Protestantism, and Mr. Littledale has retained his nature while renouncing his creed. His present profession is extremely high church, but his style of controversy is unchanged. It is marked with all the virulence, unscrupulous low cunning, and persecuting spirit that characterize the Orangeman. Rev. Mr. Sutcliffe shows him in his true colors.

CHRISTIAN TRUTHS. Lectures by the *Right Rev. Francis Silas Chatard, D.D.*, Bishop of Vincennes. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1881.

Under this modest title, the volume before us contains eleven lectures on the following subjects: The Personality of God; The Existence of the Soul in Man, its Simplicity and Spirituality; The Relation between God and the Soul—Revelation; Faith and its Requisites; The Rule of Faith; Infallibility, No. 1; Infallibility, No. 2; The Liturgy of the Church and Catholic Devotions; Penance; The Blessed Eucharist; Early Christianity.

Most of these lectures, as their titles imply, are directly connected with questions that are earnestly contested to-day. The others bear upon subjects that form essential parts of the Catholic faith and on which Catholics cannot be too fully instructed. In plan and style they are calculated to be widely useful. The statements and arguments are direct and free from all technicalities; the thoughts clearly and forcibly expressed in a style of admirable simplicity. It is seldom, indeed, that discussions on so important truths as those comprehended in this volume are put in so happy a form or one so well calculated to interest, instruct, and convince the general reader. The lectures will be useful to Catholics in confirming them in their faith and giving them ready answers to the sophistry of their assailants. They will also be useful to honest Protestants and skeptics in showing them the falsity of the grounds on which their ideas rest, in resolving their doubts and difficulties, and setting before them the fundamental truths of Christianity.

The fact that the lectures are entirely uncontrovertible in form and irenical in spirit and language adds both to their attractiveness and value.

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